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ABSTRACT
A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM

May 27, 1984

Jesse
M.A.

L.

Yoder, B.A., University of Maryland

University of Massachusetts, Ph.D., University of Massachusetts

,

Directed by: Professor Gareth Matthews

The principal critical objective of this dissertation is to
examine three contemporary theories about the mind-body problem:
dualism, anomalous monism, and functionalism.
is closely linked to Cartesian dualism,

form of materialism.

The dualism examined

while functionalism is a

Anomalous monism is

a kind of dual

aspect

All these theories have a long tradition with different

view.

formulations and exponents.

I

examine three contemporary exponents

of these views: Saul Kripke, a dualist,

Donald Davidson, an

anomalous monist, and Daniel Dennett,

functionalist.

I

a

argue that each of these theories is incorrect or has serious

difficulties.

The chief difficulty for dualism is in giving an

account of mind-body interaction.

The chief difficulty for

anomalous monism is that internal tensions within the theory
relating to Davidson's conception of physical events and scientific
laws have the consequence that anomalous monism applies to the

viii

entities of physics and chemistry but not to events in the brain.
The most serious difficulty for functionalism is in accounting for
the qualities of subjective experience.
I

then discuss two criteria for identifying mental phenomena:

incorrigibility and intentionality

mind-body interaction as

a

.

I

consider the problem of

problem for dualism.

I

argue that the

mind-body problem is misconceived in that it is supposed that
univocal definition of 'physical' can be given.

I

state three

scientific

different definitions of this term: one containing

a

conception, one an objective conception, and one

personal

a

a

conception.
In my final chapter,

I

formulate

accounts for mind-body interaction.

a

On this view, mind is an aspect

This plural aspect view can

of body and body is an aspect of mind.

be derived from a more general theory

IX

plural aspect view that

I

call Viewpoint Pluralism.
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INTRODUCT ION

What is the relation between mind and body?

This is one

formulation of a problem which has perplexed both philosophers
and
non-philosophers for many centuries.
known as

This problem has come to be

the mind-body problem", and is not lacking in attempted

solutions.

Fortunately, each solution is not completely unique;

solutions fall into categories and types so that
of the main solutions is not an impossible task.

While such

survey could not hope to examine every variation on
solution, many comments on a theory which offers

also apply to other theories offering

a

a

a

survey
a

type of

type of solution

solution of the same or

a

similar type.

The principal objective of this dissertation is to critically
examine three contemporary theories about the mind-body problem:
dualism, anomalous monism, and functionalism.

The dualism examined

is closely linked to Cartesian dualism, while functionalism is a

form of materialism.

Anomalous monism, on the other hand, is

of dual aspect view.

All these theories have a long tradition with

different formulations and exponents.

I

a

kind

have chosen contemporary

exponents of these views to focus on since my purpose is primarily
critical and not primarily historical.
chapter

I

give

a

However,

in this first

historical overview of the mind-body problem.

will now outline the chapters in the order in which they occur.

1

I

2

The critical examination of three contemporary theories about

the mind-body problem takes place in Chapters II, III, and IV.

Chapter II,
Saul Kripke.

I

In

consider dualism as represented in the writings of
In Chapter III,

Donald Davidson.
Daniel Dennett.

I

discuss the anomalous monism of

In Chapter IV, I consider the functionalism of

These three theories are contemporary formulations

of three traditional solutions to the mind-body problem: dualism,

dual aspect views, and materialism.

I

argue that each of these

three theories is incorrect or has serious difficulties. In Chapter
V,

I

discuss two criteria for identifying mental phenomena:

incorrigibility and intentionality

In Chapter VI,

.

problem of mind-body interaction as

a

present the

problem for dualism.

distinguish three conceptions of what is physical.
I

I

also

In Chapter VII,

present an account of mind-body interaction, utilizing the

distinctions developed in Chapter VI.

I

CHAPTER

I

THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

1.1

Introduction

The main purpose of this chapter is to introduce the mind-body
problem as a philosophical problem and then to provide

overview of the problem.

I

historical

a

introduce the mind-body problem as

philosophical problem in the next section.

a

The historical overview

follows, and is divided into five main sections: Dualism,

Materialism, Plural Attribute Monism, Idealism, and Pluralism.

The

purpose of placing the "Dualism" section first is to allow me to
begin with a consideration of early Greek conceptions of mind and
body, which are dualistic, and also to allow me to discuss Plato

before Aristotle.

I

begin the "Dualism" section with

a

consideration of early Greek conceptions of soul, mind, and body,

particularly as they occur in the works of Homer.
the views of Plato and Descartes.

I

then consider

In the "Materialism"

section

I

mainly discuss materialism as represented by Aristotle and Hobbes.
In the "Plural Aspect Monism"

section

I

discuss Spinoza's dual

aspect view as an ancestor to anomalous monism.

Because

I

do not

consider idealism in later chapters, it receives only brief

attention here.

In the "Pluralism" section

3

I

describe the views of

4

Leibniz, mainly in relation to his notion of a point of view.

I

conclude with a brief summary of the chapter.

1.2

The Mind-Body Problem as a Philosophical Problem

Sometimes when

tell my non-philosophical friends that

I

writing about the mind-body problem, they say "Oh,
there was a problem!".

I

I

am

didn't know

What, then, is the problem about the

relation between mind and body?

The fact that many people who have

not reflected on this issue think it odd that someone should think

there is a problem about the mind-body problem reflects how

unproblematical this relation is in daily life.

We have no problem

in acting on our decisions, in intentionally raising our arms, in

feeling pain due to bodily injury, and in seeing an oncoming
automobile.

These examples of mind-body interaction are so natural

that it seems pointless from a practical viewpoint to raise

problem about them.

a

These actions would be problematical only to

someone with paralysis or a mental disorder.

If there is a

mind-body problem, then, it is a theoretical or philosophical one,
not a practical one.

The philosophical problem here is not the practical question
"How can

I

raise my arm?" but the philosophical question "What

coherent account or explanation can be given of mind, of body, and
of their relation?"

Some solutions to this problem have held that

mind and body are of the same type.

These solutions are monistic.

5

^nd both

inatsirialisiti

and idaalisni ars fonns of monism; th© view that

there is only one type of entity or phenomenon in the universe.
Other solutions are dualistic; there are two types of entity or

phenomenon in the universe and these two types are mind and body or
mental and physical phenomena.

There are also pluralistic

solutions; minds and bodies are two of a wide variety of types of

entities and phenomena in the universe.
It should be apparent that the problem is already becoming more

complex than it appeared at first.

To answer the philosophical

question "What coherent account or explanation can be given of mind,
of body, and of their relation?", at least the following questions

need to be answered;
1.

What is mind?

2.

What is body?

3.

What is the relation between mind and body?

Even questions

1

and

2

can be interpreted conceptually or

ontologically , as can question

3;

1(c)

What does the term 'mind' mean, from a conceptual
viewpoint?

l(o)

What type of entity is mind, from an ontological
viewpoint?

2(c).

What does the term 'body' mean or refer to, from a
conceptual viewpoint?

2(o)

What type of entity is body, from an ontological
viewpoint?

6

3(c)

What conceptual relations obtain between mind and
body?

.

What ontological relations obtain between mind and
body?

3(o).

Question

could also be taken to mean either of these two questions:

3

3(a).

Are mind and body related by identity or
distinctness?

3(b)

Are mind and body related by interaction, and if
so how?

This list of questions shows that the mind-body problem is not
just one problem but rather a set of related problems.

Probably the

way the mind-body problem is most commonly formulated as a

philosophical problem is;
I.

What is the relation between mind and body?

Answers to this question do implicitly or explicitly contain a

theory about mind and body.

For example, materialism asserts that

mind is identical to, can be reduced to, or is a function of body,
while dualism asserts that they are of different (usually
dichotomous) types and they are distinct.

chapters

I

shall take question

mind— body problem with which

I

I

In this and later

as being the formulation of the

shall be concerned; if there are

other ways of formulating this problem, then what

I

say may or may

not apply to these other formulations, depending on what they are.

The only ways to show that the mind-body problem is a

philosophical problem other than what

I

have just said is to argue

philosophical
that it is traditionally discussed by philosophers in
what
contexts^ or to appeal to a general conception of

a

7

philosophical problem" is.

The rest of this chapter shows that

this problem is traditionally discussed by philosophers.

I

have

already done the second implicitly by saying that the mind-body

problem should be interpreted as a question about what coherent
account or explanation can be given of mind and body.

Rather than

defend the conception of "philosophical problem" which is implicit
in these remarks,

I

will simply say that it is

a

traditional

conception of a "philosophical problem" that it involves giving a
coherent account or explanation of some type of entity or
phenomenon, or a coherent account or explanation of the terms

referring to some type of entity or phenomenon.

One of the

challenges in solving the mind-body problem is to construct

a

single

coherent account or explanation that will account for both minds and
bodies, or both mental and physical phenomena, as well as for their

relations.

Thus, materialism is not usually faulted for its account

of body (although

I

do so in later chapters) but for its account of

Another way of putting this is to say that a solution will

mind.

involve constructing a single coherent viewpoint in terms of which
mind, body, and their relations can be accounted for.
I

now begin the historical survey of views on the mind-body

problem.

This survey is divided into five sections; Dualism,

Materialism, Plural Aspect Monism, Idealism, and Pluralism.

While

such a survey cannot be exhaustive, its main point is to show that
there is a link between those contemporary theories discussed in
later chapters and traditional mind-body theories.

This link is

8

that those contemporary theories discussed in later chapters are

contemporary formulations of traditional dualism, materialism, dual
aspect views, or pluralism.

Hence, many criticisms of and arguments

for these contemporary formulations also apply to traditional

formulations of these theories.

Therefore the critical discussion

of contemporary theories in Chapters II, III, and IV should be

conceived as a critical discussion of the traditional theories which
these contemporary theories formulate and not merely as a discussion
of single isolated theories.

1.3

Dualism

Dualism is the view that there are two irreducibly distinct
types of entities or phenomena in the universe.

Dualism can be

formulated as an ontological claim or as a conceptual claim.

Ontologically , dualism is a claim which can apply at least to
entities or substances, properties, events, states, conditions,
objects, and subjects; and this list is not complete.

Sometimes a

distinction is made between substantial dualism, or dualism of
substance, and dualism of properties.

On the former view, there are

two irreducibly distinct kinds or types of substance in the world
or universe: minds and bodies.

On the latter view, there are two

irreducibly distinct kinds of properties in the the world or
universe: mental properties and physical properties.

2

9

1.3.1

Types of Dualism

Mind-body discussion also often involves discussion of what
types of events or states there are: mental and/or physical.

An

event or state is not a property, but neither events nor states seem
to fit the criteria for being a substance either.

Substances such

as chairs and persons have continuity over time while most events

occur at a particular time and then cease to exist.

Even the term

'entity', which might seem applicable to almost any thing, does not

seem clearly applicable to an event such as the blinking of an eye
or to a state such as the state of confusion in which someone might

find the kitchen after a Chinese meal has been cooked.

Besides

dualism of substance and dualism of properties, then, there is also
dualism of events and dualism of states.

Similar reasoning could

also show the existence of dualism of conditions, dualism of
objects, and dualism of subjects.

What distinctions are significant here?

Certainly one of the

most important distinctions is between the term 'mind' used as a
noun and the term 'mental' used as an adjective.

Used as a noun,

'mind' contrasts with 'body' and refers to a type of substance or

entity.

Used as an adjective, 'mental' can refer to a type of

property, event, state, condition, subject, or object, to name some

but not all of the types of phenomena which can be either mental or
physical.

I

might say "My mind is playing tricks on me" or "A

feeling is a mental event".

Rather than trying to specify all the

10

types of phenomena which can be either mental or physical
each time this issue arises,

I

use the term 'phenomena' as a general

term to cover at least properties, events, states, conditions,
abilities, capacities, and phenomena other than entities that can be

either mental or physical.

This is not because

I

think there is no

important difference between, for example, dualism of properties and

dualism of events.

Furthermore, there are times such as in the

discussion of Davidson in Chapter III when the discussion will
center on one particular type of phenomenon; in Davidson's case it
centers on events.

Only when the differences in types of phenomena

are unimportant in a particular context or

statement do

I

I

wish to make a general

use the term 'phenomenon'

One distinction

I

maintain throughout future discussion is the

distinction between questions about the relation between mind and
body and questions about the relation between mental phenomena and

physical phenomena.

Much contemporary discussion of the mind-body

problem centers on the relation between mental and physical events
or states rather than the relation between mind and body.

The

implicit (and sometimes explicit) assumption of those conducting
this discussion seems to be that if one could state the relation

between mental and physical events, states, or other phenomena, then
it would be a simple matter to state the mind-body distinction.

A

person's mind could be defined as a collection of mental events or
states, or some other such definition could be given.

While this

may be true, it is not obviously true, and it is a mistake to make

11

such an assumption without examining its merits.

Furthermore, the

notion of a person is central to the mind-body problem and it is
more important to say what a person's body and mind are and what
their relation is to the person than to say what the relation is

between a person and his brain states and mental states.

And even

if it is not more important, the issues are distinct and should be

distinguished.

Hence

I

maintain the distinction between mind-body

questions as opposed to mental-physical phenomena questions
throughout future discussion.
In general,

'subject',

I

use the term 'entity' rather than the terns

'object', or 'substance' to denote an individual thing.

A subject is an individual thing which is the subject of perception

or of properties, while an object is an individual thing that exists

independent of the mind or that is the object of perception.
Something can be both a subject and an object: a subject of

perception can also be an object of perception, while a physical
object can also be described as a subject of properties.
'substance' has philosophical difficulties of its own.
'entity'

,

The term
The term

on the other hand, simply refers to an individual thing

and does not refer to a particular type of individual thing.
general, then,

I

In

use the term 'entity' to refer to persons, h\iman

beings, animals, minds, bodies, physical objects such as rocks and

tables, and also mental objects such as beliefs and feelings.

The

mind-body issue, then, is one of the relation between minds and
bodies, and of the relation between mental and physical phenomena.

12

Let us return to the distinction between ontological and

conceptual dualism.
D(o).

D(o)'.

Ontologically

,

dualism can be stated as follows:

There are two irreducibly distinct types of
entities in the universe: minds and bodies.

There are two irreducibly distinct types of
phenomena in the universe: mental and physical
phenomena

Conceptually, dualism can be stated as follows:
D(c).

D(c)'.

The terms 'mind' and 'body'- represent irreducibly
distinct categories.

The terms 'mental' and 'physical' as applied to
phenomena represent irreducibly distinct
categories.

These distinctions become especially important later when

I

discuss

philosophers such as Spinoza who combine conceptual dualism with

ontological monism.

1.3.2

Early Greek Conceptions
The history of the concepts of mind, body, and soul which we

have today goes back to the earliest recorded part of Western
civilization.

Homeric man had a very different view of himself and

his neighbor than we do today.

According to Bruno Snell,

3

"the

early Greeks did not, either in their language or in the visual
arts, grasp the body as a unit".

The Homeric man knew the human

body not as a unity but as a sum total of the limbs.

Likewise,

there are at least three words that characterize the mind or soul.
For Homer psyche is the force which keeps the human being alive.

Thymos is the generator of motion or agitation in Homer, while noos

13

cause of ideas and images,

Thymos, noos, and psyche are

conceived as separate organs, each with its own individual
function.

Just as the limhs of the body are not conceived as part

of a whole called "body",

so thymos

,

noos, and psyche are not

conceived as elements of a whole called "soul" or "mind".
Among the three terms
and

'

while

noos
'

"soul".

'

'

thymos

'

'

,

noos

'

,

and

'

psyche

'

,

'thymos'

are most closely associated with our concept of "mind",

psyche

'

is most closely associated with our concept of

Snell describes the thymos as the organ of (e)motion and

noos as the organ of perception.

4

We also might describe this as

the distinction between feeling and thought, certainly a fundamental

distinction today within the mind.

The word 'psyche' is akin to the

Greek word meaning "to breathe" and denotes the breath of life which
departs through the mouth.

Homer says that the psyche leaves man at

the moment of death and goes down to Hades; hence, this is one of
the original sources for the conception of the soul as an immaterial

entity that survives death.
Snell's account of how the terms 'soma'

(body) and 'psyche'

(soul) evolved from these very limited applications to terms more

closely resembling our terms 'body' and 'soul' is very
interesting:

5

That Homer's conception of thymos noos and psyche still
depended to a large extent on an analogy with the physical
organs becomes a matter of absolute certainty if we turn
to that era of transition when his conception began to be
abandoned. To be sure, the evidence for the use of the
words soma and psyche during the period extending from
Homer to the fifth century is not full enough to allow us
to trace the origin of the new terms 'body' and 'soul' in
,
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every detail. Apparently they were evolved
as
complementary terms, and more likely than not it
was
psyche which first started on its own course,
perhaps
under the influence of notions concerning the
immortality
of the soul.
The word denoting the eschatological soul
was put to a new use, to designate the soul as a
whole,
and the word for corpse came to be employed for the
living
body; the reason for this must be that the
element which
provided man during his living days with emotions,
P®^^®ptions and thoughts was believed to survive in the
psycl;^.
Presumably people felt that animate man had
''^ithin him a spiritual or intellectual portion,
though
they were unable to define this element by one term
sufficiently accurate and inclusive. As a matter of fact,
this is the state of affairs which we shall meet among the
early writers of lyric poetry
And it may be inferred
that, because the eschatological psyche had been
correlated with the soma of the dead, the new psyche, the
'soul', demanding a body to suit it, caused the term soma
to be extended so that it was ultimately used also of the
living body. But whatever the details of this evolution,
the distinction between body and soul represents a
'discovery' which so impressed people's minds that it was
thereafter accepted as self-evident, in spite of the fact
that the relation between body and soul, and the nature of
the soul itself, continued to be the topic of lively
speculation.
.

Snell credits Heraclitus with being the first writer to

introduce this new concept of the soul:
The first writer to feature the new concept of the soul is
Heraclitus. He calls the soul of living man psyche; in
his view man consists of body and soul, and the soul is
endowed with qualities which differ radically from those
of the body and the physical organs. We can safely say
that these new qualities are irreconcilable with the
categories of Homer's thought; he does not even dispose of
the linguistic prerequisites to describe what Heraclitus
predicates of the soul. The new expressions were
fashioned in the period which separates Heraclitus from
Homer, that is to say the era of the lyric. Heraclitus
says; 'You could not find the ends of the soul though you
This notion
travelled every way, so deep is its logos
of the depth or profundity of the soul is not unfamiliar
to us; but it involves a dimension which is foreign to a
Homeric speech does not
physical organ or its function.
yet know this aspect of the word 'deep'.
'

.

.

.

.
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Snell goes on to recount several other
important ways in which the

psyc^

of Heraclitus is different from the Homeric
psyche .

It has a

logos which is a "common" thing, so that two
beings can be of the

same spirit or mind, and the psyche of Heraclitus
also has a logos

capable of extending and adding to itself of its own
accord.

For

Homer, any augmentation in mental powers is effected
from without,

not from within.

We see, then, that the development of the concepts

of soul and body was like an organic process which took
many

centuries and did not occur by sudden stipulation.
In the course of his discussion of 'psyche',

'thymes'

and

'noos', Snell offers some interesting insight into the origin of
'to

know'

;

Never does Homer, in his descriptions of ideas or
emotions, go beyond a purely spatial or quantitative
definition; never does he attempt to sound their special,
non-physical nature. As far as he is concerned, ideas are
conveyed through the noos a mental organ which in turn is
analogous to the eye; consequently 'to know' is <6 (^6
which is related to
see', and in fact
originally means 'to have seen'. The eye, it appears,
serves as Homer's model for the absorption of
experiences.
From this point of view the intensive
coincides with the extensive; he who has seen much
sufficiently often possesses intensive knowledge.
,

We often speak of "intellectual perception" and of seeing that

something is true.

Also the term 'view' as it occurs in "visual or

intellectual point of view" is related to this analogy.

If Snell is

right, the idea of intellectual perception or having an intellectual

view originated in

a

conception that there is a mental organ like

the eye which is responsible for understanding and perceiving in a

way similar to the way the eye is responsible for vision.
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Furthermore, this "mental organ" was conceived as
being quite
any conception we might have today of such an
"organ", since it was not conceived as being an
element of a greater

whole known as "mind".

This conception of a "mental organ" or

something like it is in the Aristotelean doctrine of mental
faculties and in the "faculty psychology" of today.
survives today in terms such as 'faculty',

It also

'view', and in phrases

such as "I can see what you mean".

We can see from the preceding discussion that it was not

possible to even formulate dualism as a philosophical doctrine until
the elements of psy che , thymos
of a greater whole.

,

and noos could be seen as elements

However, it is important to notice that even as

early as Homer's time people found it useful and important to

distinguish between their body and other aspects which today we call
emotion, perception, and life, spirit, or soul.

Materialists who

wish to deny the validity of these distinctions would do well to try
to explain why peoples in the earliest part of Western civilization

found it useful and important to develop a language which recognizes
a distinction between the body and non-physical elements.

1.3.3

Plato

Two main elements of Plato's thought are of interest in
relation to Plato's views on the mind-body problem: his doctrine
that the soul exists before the birth of the person and also
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survives death and his doctrine that the soul
consists of three
elements.

I

now discuss both of these doctrines, beginning
with the

former.
G. M. A.

Grube cites a source for Plato's conception of
the

soul which is different from the Homeric source we
have just

discussed;
The conception of the soul as the highest part of man
seems to have been imported into Greece by those mystical
teachers and prophets who are usually somewhat summarily
lumped together as the Orphics. Their doctrines came from
the East; they seem to have taught an immortality that was
no longer a pale reflection of earthly life, but a release
from the body and a deliverance. The body to them was the
prison or tomb of the soul
as they pithily
expressed it. Man then aims at the purification of this
soul, and after many incarnations rises to perfection and
is absorbed, or reabsorbed, into the divine.
It was
probably under Orphic influence that the Pythagoreans
developed their way of life as a gradual process of
purification. But to them this immortal psyche was the
intellectual power of man and purification lay to a large
extent through a strictly scientific, which to them meant
a mathematical, training; though some of them seem to have
laid a great deal of emphasis on number-magic and on
ritual.
From them must have come the conception of the
intellect as the noblest and immortal part of man, of
salvation through knowledge, a conception so magnificently
expressed in the Phaedo and it remained with Plato to the
end.

—

,

This account and the view that Plato's conception also originated in
Homeric concepts are not inconsistent: the Homeric conception of

psyche was that its survival in Hades was
life.

a pale

reflection of human

This original weak conception of psyche had by Plato's time

become strengthened through the work of philosophers such as

Heraclitus and Pythagoras into a conception of

a

single entity which

survives through time and which unites different mental elements
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into one.

If Grube is right,

this conception became identified in

Plato with the rational and intellectual part
of man through the

influence of the Orphics.

What was the soul now acquired mental

properties, but still survived death.
This account should shed some light on a
fundamental ambiguity
in dualism which survives even today: the ambiguity
between "soul"

and "mind".

Philosophers today prefer to discuss "the mind-body

problem" and take dualism to assert the distinctness of mind
and
body.

Talk of the soul is left to theologians and ministers, and
to

those who speak metaphorically.

Phrases such as "a spirited

display", "my spirit was set free", or "a feeling in my soul" are

dismissed as metaphorical and/or anachronistic.

The preceding

account shows, however, that the original conception of psyche or
soul was developed long before Christianity and as developed as a

way of conceptualizing life itself, not in connection with a
religious theory

.

In Plato, this conception of psyche became

identified with the intellectual part of man; this intellectual part
or element then was conceived as having immortality but lost some of
its association with life.

Today, philosophers generally focus on

the intellectual mind which they presume not to be immortal and

discuss life or the soul seldom or not at all.

9

One principal source for Plato's views and arguments for the

preexistence and postexistence of the soul is the Phaedo

.

The

purpose of this dialogue is to show that virtue has its own reward,
that the man who lives a virtuous life is rewarded after he dies.
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In order to demonstrate this, Plato must show
that the soul survives

death.

Plato has Socrates argue for the existence of the
soul after

death by arguing that it follows from the existence
of the soul
before birth
the soul exists before birth, and in coming to life
and being born can be born only from death and dying, must
she not after death continue to exist, since she has to be
born again?

Socrates offers several distinct arguments for the claim that the
soul exists before birth.

One is based on the idea that things

having opposites are generated out of their opposites (the opposites
here are life and death)

Another argument is based on the famous

.

Platonic doctrine that learning is recollection of knowledge gained
prior to our birth as human beings.

My purpose here is not to critically evaluate Plato's argument
but rather to describe the type of dualism he advocated.

However,

there are two comments worth making in relation to his arguments.
One is that it is important to distinguish questions about (mere)

survival of death from questions about the immortality of the soul.
If I am to live forever,
I

I

must at least survive my own death.

might survive my own death yet not live forever.

Cebes proposes,

But

Perhaps, as

the soul enters into one body after another, but

eventually perishes at the end of one of these lives.
Secondly, if Plato wishes to prove that a virtuous man is

rewarded in the after-life, it is crucial that a person be
identified with his soul.

If

my soul survives death, but

I

am not

identified with my soul, then it is difficult to see why this is of
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more interest than the claim that my liver will
survive my death.

This same point applies to preexistence.

Suppose, as Plato says,

learning is recollection of something known in an
earlier life.
some person

^

can be truly said to be remembering that so-and-so,

then it must be the case that at some earlier time

_A

has at least

believed (and perhaps known) that so-and-so is the case.
applies to experiences and events.

If

I

This also

am to be truly said to

remember an experience or event, then it must be an experience
or an event

^

If

witnessed.

^

had

Hence if Plato's theory that learning is

recollection of knowledge gained before birth is to succeed, he must

claim that the person existed before his birth in order to acguire
this knowledge.

Thus Plato's arguments for preexistence and

postexistence both require that

a

person be identified with his soul.

The second main element of Plato's thought
his tripartite division of the soul.

intellect.

a

will discuss is

The main sources of this

doctrine are The Republic and the Phaedrus
Plato considers the soul as

I

12
.

In the Phaedo ,

simple unity, identifying it with the

The tripartite division of the soul retains the idea

that the soul is a unity, but adds the idea that it is complex, not

simple.

Plato's argument that there are three elements of the soul

is based in part on an analogy with his division of the state into

three classes and also on the fact that we experience internal

conflicts

13
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Are we to say, then, that some men sometimes
though
thirsty refuse to drink?" "We are indeed",
he said, "many
and often."
"what then," said I, "should one affirm
about
them. Is It not that there is a something
in the soul that
bids them drink and something that forbids,
a different
something that masters that which bids?" "i
think so."
And is it not the fact that that which
inhibits such
actions arises when it arises from the calculations
of
reason, but the impulses which draw and drag
come through
affections and diseases?" "Apparently."
"Not
unreasonably," said I, "shall we claim that they are
two
and different from one another, naming that in the
soul
whereby it reckons and reasons the rational and that
with
which it loves, hungers, thirsts, and feels the flutter
and titillation of other desires the irrational and
appetitive companion of various reflections and
pleasures."
"It would not be unreasonable but quite
natural," he said, "for us to think this."
"These two
forms, then, let us assume to have been marked off as
actually existing in he soul. But now the Thumos or
principle of high spirit, that with which we feel anger,
is it a third, or would it be identical in nature with one
of these?

—

Plato has Socrates, who is speaking here with Glaucon, conclude that
the third element, the "spiritual" element, is a distinct element

from the rational or appetitive elements.

These divisions resemble

the Homeric mental organs of perception, emotion, and life except

that the "spirited" element has lost much of its connection to the
"breath of life" and is a more purely psychological concept.

Also,

the Homeric divisions were not elements of a whole; they existed

independently, while in Plato the three elements are elements of a
unity known as the soul.
In conclusion, Plato did not seem overly concerned to prove the

distinctness of soul from body; perhaps he thought this did not
require proof.

Instead, he was concerned to demonstrate much bolder

claims: that the soul exists before birth and also after death.

He
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also provided a tripartite analysis of the soul
which preserved the
idea that the soul is a unity and yet accounts
for some of the

complexity of our mental and emotional experience.

Although the

idea that the soul exists before birth is not much
discussed or

widely held in Western cultures, yet the idea that the soul
survives
death is standard Christian doctrine.

Philosophers today, however,

tend to read "soul" as "mind" and concentrate on Plato's

identification of the soul with the intellect or reason at the
expense of those aspects of the soul connected with life or
af ter-1 if e.

Plato also made another important contribution to dualism; it
is in Plato that the soul appears as an independent substance which

can exist apart from the body.

It

is this conception that was later

taken over by Descartes who referred to this substance sometimes as
"mind" and sometimes as "soul".

At the same time, Plato made

dualism possible rather than triadism or some other form of
pluralism by identifying the soul with intellect or reason and by
treating the soul as a unity.

It is not an oversimplification to

say that in Plato the concepts of "soul" and "mind" merged; a merger

made possible by incorporating a psychological interpretation of
"spirit" into the soul-mind.

In this way the concept of "spirit"

or

"life" was legislated out of the mind-body problem and out of

dualism.

Hence Plato should be considered the architect of dualism.
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1.3.4

Descartes

Descartes did more than defend

a

robust form of dualism: he

also laid down the ground rules for discussion
of the mind-body

problem in modern philosophy.

Descartes divided the universe into

mental and physical entities and phenomena.
'soul'

He treated the terms

and 'mind' as being interchangeable and identified himself

with his soul-mind in parenthetical remarks.

Descartes'

determination to bring the study of animals and the human body under
the control of natural law together with his mental— physical

dichotomy resulted in his claim that animals do not have souls or
mind; that they have no feelings.

Even today Descartes'

mental/physical dichotomy is written into the formulation of "the

mind-body problem".
Descartes, unlike Plato, is concerned to prove the distinctness
of mind and body; he is less concerned to prove the survival of

death by the soul, although he believed in this.

Descartes gives

his proof of distinctness of mind and body in the following famous

passage:
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And first of all, because I know that all things which I
apprehend clearly and distinctly can be created by God as
I apprehend them, it suffices that I am able to apprehend
one thing apart from another clearly and distinctly in
order to be certain that the one is distinct from the
other, since they may be made to exist in separation at
least by the omnipotence of God; and it does not signify
by what power this separation is made in order to compel
me to judge them to be different: and, therefore, just
because I know certainly that I exist, and that meanwhile
I do not remark that any other thing necessarily pertains
to my nature or essence, excepting that I am a thinking
thing, I rightly conclude that my essence consists solely
in the fact that I am a thinking thing (or a substance
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whose whose essence or nature is to think). And
although
possibly (or rather certainly, as I shall say in
a moment)
I possess a body with which I am
very intimately
conjoined, yet because, on the one side, I have a clear
and distinct idea of myself inasmuch as I am only
a
thinking and unextended thing, and as, on the other, I
possess a distinct idea of body, inasmuch as it is only
an
extended and unthinking thing, it is certain that this I
(that is to say, my soul by which I am what I am), is
®^tirely and absolutely distinct from my body, and can
exist without it.
In the preceding passage, Descartes states that it is
sufficient for

two things

_A

and B to be ontologically distinct that he can form a

clear and distinct apprehension of

_A

apart from B.

He then states

that he can form a clear and distinct apprehension of himself as a

thinking and unextended thing and also can form

a

clear and distinct

apprehension of body as an extended and unthinking thing.

From this

he concludes that he is ontologically (entirely and absolutely)

distinct from his body, and can exist without it.
Descartes' classic argument is worth examining because it

illustrates so well the strengths and weaknesses of dualism.
strength it illustrates is that dualists have

a

demonstrating the distinctness of mind and body.

One

fairly easy time
Here Descartes

picks dichotomous properties: thinking and unthinking, extended and
unextended, as essential properties of mind and body.

Picking

dichotomous properties makes dualism fairly easy to prove since the
same thing cannot be both thinking and unthinking or both extended
and unextended.

On the other hand, Descartes really proves the

distinctness of himself from his body, not the distinctness of his
mind from his body.

Only in the last sentence does he mention his
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soul, and there he says "My soul by which

I

am what

I

am".

But this

IS hardly a claim of identity, and Descartes
did not really think he

was identical to his soul: he identified himself
with the union of

mind and body.

The moral here is that even Descartes could not
give

a clear and consistent account of the relation
between himself and

his mind or soul.

Notice also that Descartes slips from a consideration of "my
body" to "a distinct idea of body".

Descartes held that body as

such is a substance, but he still speaks of his body as "a body".
This ambiguity is paralleled in the question "What is the relation

between mind and body?".

This sounds as if it asks about the

relation between mind-as-a-whole and body-as-a-whole

,

but it is

usually taken to ask about the relation between an individual mind
and an individual body.

Descartes also says that he is essentially

unextended; this may be truer of his mind than of him but we do know
that he had height and that he could be touched, that he took up
space, and that he had weight.

Descartes would not have to deny

this if he maintained his claim that he is the union of body and

mind, not that he is identical to mind.

He would no doubt deny that

these predicates apply to his soul or mind.

Another interesting feature of Descartes' argiament is that he
needs to find a generic term which will apply both to him and to

physical objects.

He chooses the French word 'chose', which we

translate as "thing", for this purpose, and says that he is

essentially a thinking and unextended thing while body is
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essentially an extended and unthinking thing

.

In this way he

sidesteps the question whether or not it is essential
to him that he
is a j^iving thing i.e. a being.

By using the term 'thing' to refer

to himself, other persons, and physical objects, Descartes
avoids
the question about the status of life and maintains a
strict

mental/physical dualism.
In Chapter II

I

discuss an argviment proposed by Saul Kripke

which is similar to Descartes' "conceivability" argument, so
not comment further on this argument here.

I

will

One final comment about

Descartes is that he identified mind with consciousness.

While

Plato identified mind with the intellect or reason, Descartes

identified mind with consciousness and this identification has
influenced discussion of the mind-body issue since then.
also identified body with extension.

Descartes

Perhaps equally significant is

the fact that Descartes made mental and physical a dichotomy,

thereby making interaction between mind and body impossible to
explain.

Since Descartes' time, the mind-body problem has been

discussed in the terms laid down by Descartes.
correct to say that Descartes invented dualism

It would not be
-

that distinction

belongs to Plato - but it would not be incorrect to say that

Descartes invented the mind-body problem.
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1«3.5

Suinmary of Dualist Positions

Now that

I

have briefly summarized the views of
the two most

important dualists, Plato and Descartes,

I

conclude my discussion of

dualism with a summary of several important
dualistic theories.

All

these theories are defined by different accounts
they give of

mind-body interaction.
^nteractionism.

Interactionism is the view that mind and body

interact; that mental phenomena sometimes cause physical
phenomena

and physical phenomena sometimes cause mental phenomena.

Descartes,

who set up the problem of interaction, was himself an
interactionist.
C.

D. Broad

Interactionism has been defended in this century by

and has been advocated by C. J. Ducasse.^^

I

discuss the problem of interaction as a problem for dualism in some
detail in Chapter VI.

Occasionalism

.

On the occasionalist view, causal interaction

between mental and physical does not occur, but there are recurrent
sequences.

Occasionalists such as Arnold Geulinx and Nicolas de

Malebranche proposed that God is the intermediary between mental and

physical phenomena.

When

I

will to move my arm, this is the

occasion for God to move my arm.

Occasionalists held that God's

intervention is necessary for causal interaction, even between
physical objects.

They used the analogy of two clocks that keep in

phase not because they have direct causal connection but because
they have the same maker.
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Parallelism.

According to psychophysical parallelism, mental

and physical phenomena are correlated in a regular
way but without

any causal connection.

Leibniz took the occasionalist "two clocks"

analogy and made them perfect mechanisms synchronized by God at
their origin so that they remain forever in phase without

intervention in virtue of the pre-established harmony.

While

parallelists relieve themselves of the burden of explaining causal
interaction, they now have the burden of explaining constant

correlation.

Epiphenomenalism .

According to epiphenomenalism, the causal

connection between body and mind goes only in one direction: from
body to mind, or from physical to mental phenomena.

This theory

avoids the problems presented by accounting for the action of mind
on body, but still has to account for how bodily action can produce

mental phenomena.

Mental events are sometimes compared to the smoke

of a steam engine or to a movie on a screen.

One way to explain the

causal efficacy of mental events is to say that when
seems to cause a physical event, as when
a

a

a

mental event

sensation of pain causes

wince, the same brain event which causes the pain also causes the

wince.

Epiphenomenalism has been defended by

George Santayana.

18

T.

H.

Huxley^^ and
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1.3.6

Conclusion
This concludes my discussion of dualism.

Greek conceptions.

First,

I

looked at

Especially noteworthy here is the fact that the

early Greeks did not have

a

word corresponding to our 'mind' but

they did distinguish what today we would call several elements
of
the mind from bodily elements.

I

next discussed Plato, saying that

he was the architect of dualism in that he identified the soul with

the intellect of man or mind and argued that the soul exists before

birth and also survives death.
note of Descartes'
his mind.

The discussion of Descartes took

unclarity about the relation between himself and

It also credits Descartes with being the inventor of the

mind-body problem in that he laid down the categories of mind and
body in terms of which this problem is still discussed today.

Finally,

I

summarized four types of dualistic theories which are

distinguished based on the account each gives of interaction between
mind and body.

I

now discuss materialism.

1.4

Materialism

Another important view on the mind-body problem is monism.

Monism is the view that there is fundamentally one type of entity or

phenomenon in the universe.

Materialistic monism, or materialism

.

holds that this type of entity or phenomenon is material or physical
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in nature.

Like dualism, however, materialism has a
conceptual and

an ontological interpretation.

Ontologically

,

materialism can be

stated as follows:
M(o).

M(o)

.

There is fundamentally one type of entity in the
universe and that type of entity is physical or
material.
There is fundamentally one type of phenomenon in
the universe and that type of phenomenon is
physical or material.

Conceptually, materialism can be stated as follows:
M(c)

.

The term 'mind' as applied to phenomena represents
a category of the same type as is represented by
the term body
'

M(c)'.

I

'

The term 'mental' as applied to phenomena
represents a category of the same type as is
represented by the terms 'physical' and 'material'.

now discuss three philosophers who advocated some version of

materialism: Aristotle, Hobbes, and La Mettrie.

1.4.1

Aristotle
It should not be surprising that in a philosopher whose works

are as extensive as those of Aristotle that we should find that he

advocates more than one conception of "soul".

However,

it is the

views Aristotle defends in De Anima that are generally identified as

representing his mature and most characteristic thought.
Consequently,

I

mainly discuss Aristotle's De Anima views in this

section.

Aristotle states the view that the soul is the form of the body
in the following passage:
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But since It IS also a body of such
and such a kind, viz.,
having life, the body cannot be soul;
the body is the
subject or matter, not what is attributed
to it.
Hence
the soul must be a substance in the
sense of the form of a
natural body having life potentially within
it.
But
substance is actuality, and thus soul is the
actuality of
a body as above characterized.
Now the word actuality has
two senses corresponding respectively to the
possession of
knowledge and the actual exercise of knowledge.
It is
obvious that the soul is actuality in the first
sense,
VIZ. that of knowledge as possessed, for both
sleeping and
waking presuppose the existence of soul, and of
these
waking corresponds to actual knowing, sleeping to
knowledge possessed but not employed, and, in the history
of the individual, knowledge comes before its
employment
or exercise. . .

We have now given an answer to the question. What is
soul? an answer which applies to it in its full extent.
It is substance in the sense which corresponds to the
definitive formula of a thing's essence. That means that
it is assigned the 'essential whatness' of a body of the
character just assigned.
Suppose that what is literally
an 'organ', like an axe, were a natural body, its
'essential whatness', would have been its essence, and so
its soul; if this disappeared from it, it would have
ceased to be an axe, except in name. As it is, it is just
an axe; it wants the character which is required to make
its whatness or formulable essence a soul; for that, it
would have had to be a natural body of a particular kind,
viz. one having in itself the power of setting itself in
movement and arresting itself. Next, apply this doctrine
in the case of the 'parts' of the living body.
Suppose
that the eye were an animal sight would have been its
soul, for sight is the substance or essence of the eye
which corresponds to the formula, the eye being merely the
matter of seeing; when seeing is removed the eye is no
longer an eye, except in name it is no more a real eye
than the eye of a statue or of a painted figure. We must
now extend our consideration from the 'parts' to the whole
living body; for what the departmental sense is to the
bodily part which is its organ, that the whole faculty of
sense is to the whole sensitive body as such.

—

—

—

Aristotle here is espousing

a

view quite different from the

identity theory; in fact, he dismisses the mind-body question as we

understand it today as meaningless:

20
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We can wholly dismiss as unnecessary the
question whether
the soul and the body are one: it is as
meaningless as to
ask whether the wax and the shape given to
it by the stamp
are one, or generally the matter of a thing
and that of
which it is the matter,

Aristotle's view is materialistic in that he does not
regard the
soul as a substance existing apart from body and
does regard it as

incapable of existence apart from body.

The form of a body is for

Aristotle the essence which makes it the type of body it is.

Just

as sight is the form or essence of the eye, so the faculty
of sense
is the form or essence of the body.

The soul, then, is dependent on

the body for its existence and is not an independent substance but
it is the soul which makes the body the type of body it is.
It should be clear from this discussion that the type of

contemporary materialism Aristotle's views are closest to is
functionalism.

Today we would say that sight is the function of the

eye instead of the form of the eye.

Because functionalism is the

subject of Chapter IV, there is no need to critically evaluate

Aristotle's views here.

Before leaving Aristotle, however,

I

make

several more comments.
In the above paragraph, Aristotle distinguishes between a

natural and an artificial body.

In Chapter VI

I

draw the same

distinction and say that artificial objects (artefacts) have an
essential property which is mental since it is essential to

artefacts that they have
a

a

certain function which makes reference to

metal phenomenon such as an intention.

For example, it is

essential to a cup that it be used for drinking or that someone have
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intended that it be used for drinking.

Aristotelian claim.

However,

I

claim for the following reason.

Clearly, this is an

do not take it as a materialistic
If a statement of the function

essentially involves reference to a mental phenomenon
such as an
intention, then whether this function is mental or
physical depends
on how one analyzes the mental element.

Aristotle would analyze

this intention as the form or function of some bodily
state whereas
I

regard an intention as irreducibly distinct in kind from a
bodily

state.

Hence a functional analysis of artefacts or even of neural

states or mental states can be materialistic, dualistic, or even

pluralistic depending on the ontological status of the entities
involved.

Aristotle's concern with living organisms and with biology gave
him a very different perspective on person, mind, and body from our

contemporary Cartesian perspective.

Although Aristotle's views are

most correctly described as materialistic, his materialism is not of
the same type as the identity theory.

We could even classify his

theory as dualistic in that the form (soul) of the body is viewed as

distinct from the body.

Aristotle also was aware of the importance

of accounting for the organism or person as distinct from the mind
or body.

He also recognized the importance of the distinction

between living and non-living things.

However, my purpose here is

to briefly sketch Aristotle's view on the mind-body problem and to
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say what contemporary theory his theory
most resembles.

have accomplished this purpose,

I

Since

I

proceed to a consideration of a

more modern materialist: Thomas Hobbes.

1.4.2

Hobbes
Hobbes' political philosophy was more influential than
his

philosophy of mind.

However, his philosophy of mind merits

discussion since it represents a simple, uncompromising form of

ontological materialism that is similar in spirit to the views of
those who advocate the identity theory today.

Hobbes was a

contemporary of Descartes, and was the author of the Third Set of

Objections to the Meditations

.

In Objection II, he quickly objects

that one cannot infer from "I am exercising thought" to "I am
thought", just as one cannot infer "I am the walking" from "I am

walking
T

1

•
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II

.

Descartes replies that he meant what is endowed with

the faculty of thinking i.e. mind, but it still does not follow that

Descartes has shown his self to be identical to his mind.
next conclusion is less sagacious.

Hobbes'

He says that Descartes'

demonstration that he is essentially a thinking thing shows that
that which thinks is material rather than immaterial.

His reasoning

is that knowledge of "I exist" depends on knowledge of "I think",

which in turn depends upon the fact that we cannot separate thought
from a matter that thinks

22

There are several sources for Hobbes' psychology.

Book

I

23

However,

of the Leviathan gives a good idea of his basic principles.
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He begins the Introduction to the
Leviathan with a statement more

characteristic of mechanism than of ontological
materialism.^^
Nature (the Art whereby God hath made and governes
the
World) is by the Art of man, as in many other
things, so
in this also imitated, that it can make an
Artificial
Animal.
For seeing life is but a motion of Limbs, the
beginning whereof is in some principall part within;
why
may we not say, that all Automata (Engines that
move
themselves by springs and wheeles as doth a watch) have
an
artificial life? For what is the Heart but a Spring
and
the Nerves , but so many Strings and the Joynts but
so
many Wheeles , giving motion to the whole Body, such as
was
intended by the Artificer?
goes yet further, imitating
that Rationall and most excellent worke of Nature, Man.
,

;

;

,

In the first chapter he speaks of sensible qualities and
makes clear

that his view is that they are nothing but bodies in motion:^^

All which qualities called Sensible , are in the object
that causeth them, but so many several motions of the
matter, by which it presseth our organs diversely.
Neither in us that are pressed, are they any thing else
but divers motions; (for motion, produceth nothing but
motion.) .But their appearance to us is Fancy, the same
waking, that dreaming. And as pressing, rubbing, or
striking the Eye makes us fancy a light; and pressing the
Eare, produceth a dinne; so do the bodies we see, or hear,
produce the same thing by their strong, though unobserved
action.
Finally, in Chapter VI he reiterates his view that sensation is

bodily motion.

Today, materialists would say that sensation is

u
brain
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•

processes:

There be in animals, two sorts of Motions peculiar to
them: one called Vitall begun in generation, and
continued without interruption throughout their whole
life; such as are the course of the Bloud the Pulse the
Breathing , the Concoction Nutrition , Excretion &c.; to
which Motions there needs no help of Imagination. The
other is Animall motion otherwise called Voluntary
motion ; as to
to speak , to moye any of our limbes, in
such manner as is first fancied in our minds. That Sense,
is Motion in the organs and interiour parts of mans body.
;

,

,

,

,

,

36

caused by the action of the things we See, Heare,
&c; And
that Fancy is but the Reliques of the same
Motion,
remaining after Sense, has been already sayd in
the first
and second Chapters.
Part

I

of the Leviathan is an attempt to give an account
of man

which prepares the way for his account of the state in
Parts II and
II.

It is interesting to note the contrast with Plato:
Plato based

his account of the tri-partite nature of the soul in part
on his

analysis of the state and society.

Hobbes, by contrast, uses his

account of the psychology of human beings as the basis for his
account of the state.

Hobbes thought that men are naturally

competitive, diffident, and glory-seeking, and this leads to

a

state

of nature in which it is to everyone's advantage to lay down some

liberty and form
in Part

I

a

commonwealth.
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The psychology Hobbes develops

is somewhat like that developed by Descartes in Passions

of the Soul in that it is an attempt to classify some of the

passions and other mental phenomena and show how they relate to each
other.

Much of this is independent of Hobbes' materialism, and is

of interest in its own right.
I

have already said that Hobbes' views most resemble those of

today's identity theorists.
in Chapter II and VI,

I

Because

I

discuss the identity theory

move on to briefly consider

of materialist: the mechanist La Mettrie.

a

different sort
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1.4.3

La Mettrie
In the next section

theory.

I

distinguish five type of materialistic

One of these, mechanism, seems to be of
a different type

from the other four.

Mechanism is the view that human beings are

machines or machine-like, and that their behavior
can be described,
explained, and predicted using mechanical principles.

The

difference between mechanism and other forms of materialism
is that
these other forms of materialism are theories about
what type of

entity or phenomenon

a

mental entity or phenomenon is.

These

theories hold that a mental entity or phenomenon is identical
to a
physical entity or phenomenon, or can be reduced to or is a function
of some physical entity or phenomenon.

Mechanism is a theory about

the explanation, description, and prediction of mental phenomena

which does have implications about their nature.

However, one might

be an identity theorist or a functionalist and still hold that

mental phenomena are to be explained on organic principles or even

psychological laws - maintaining that these are reducible to
physical but not necessarily mechanical laws.
Those who today argue for computer models of the mind would do

well to read Julien La Mettrie.

La Mettrie's L'Homme Machine , first

published in 1747, is a classic defense of the mechanistic view
which today is associated with cybernetics and computer models of
the mind.

La Mettrie's view was that man is a machine and that his

behavior can be explained on mechanical principles.

It is surely
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great ironies of history
that Descartes should
be the
doctrine that is quite contrary
to his own philosophy.

However, Descartes' view on
animals was that they are
machines, and
It is not difficult to
see how this view could be
extended to hu.an
beings.
This is what we find in the
following quotation:^®
Let us then permit the
so-called Mr ch^rr.
u
philosophers who regard animals as
^achlnL. Cer?alnly“^
'
Descartes as a man who is
respLtab[r?n“r
espectable in every regard.
if he had not been born
in a
entury so in need of enlightenment
he would have earned
emphasis on experience, observation,
an^th
and
the danger of setting them
aside.
But let me make a
^^^e sake of
all those
ihor^r^^r
little philosophers, bad jokers,
and poor
instead of laughing impudently at
the birth of Descartes, would
would be far better off
recognizing that without him the
field of philosophy, like
that of the spirit without Newton,
might be largely
^
^
undeveloped.
t

It IS true that this celebrated
philosopher made many
errors; no one denies that.
Yet he did come to know the
nature of animals, and was the first
to perfectly
demonstrate that animals are pure machines.
After a
discovery of such importance, and one that
requires such
sagacity,
the least we can do is forgive him
all his

er rorsl

In my opinion he compensates for
all his errors with this
major recognition. For while he makes much
of the
distinction between the two substances, it is
obviously
simply a skillful device, a stylistic ruse, to
make
palatable to the theologians a poison hidden in the
shadow
of an analogy which strikes everyone, and
which only they
fail to see.
For it is truly this striking analogy that
forces all intellectuals and true judges of mankind
to
admit that these proud and vain creatures, more
distinguished by their pride than their name of Man
despite attempts to raise themselves, are fundamentally
only animals, and machines that crawl perpendicularly.
They all have this marvelous instinct that becomes spirit
through education, and which is seated in the brain, or in
its place, if this is lacking, or becomes ossified, in the

I
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elongated marrow, and never in the cerebellum;
for I have
seen it considerably damaged. .without
causing the soul to
cease its functions.
.

Here La Mettrie credits Descartes with
the view that animals are

machines, and extends this view to human
beings.

His concluding

remarks begin as follows:^^

We therefore boldly conclude that man is a
machine; and
there is in the entire universe only a single
substance
that is diversely modified.
La Mettrie, then, was ontologically a materialist,
but his form of

materialism was mechanism.
I

have already said that La Mettrie's mechanism has

implications for the nature of mental phenomena.

However, it is far

from clear that these implications take the form of logical
entailments.

Aram Vartanian,

a

recent interpreter of La Mettrie,

believes that La Mettrie has provided

a

picture or mechanical model

of the human mind but not its essence.
La Mettrie himself neglects, it is true, to discuss directly or
to fix with care the scope and meaning of the materialism
present in I'homme machine a fact that has helped many of his
critics to go astray. Nevertheless, he has scattered in the
text a sufficient number of clues to reveal to a circumspect
reader the spirit of his thought.
Perhaps the most telling of
these is the assertion that "la Nature du mouvement nous est
aussi inconnue que celle de la matiere."
If such is the case,
then the nature of the "machine" with which man is
hypothetically equated would likewise be unknown, and there
could be no question of raising the correspondence between
organic and psychic phenomena to the level of identity an
opinion which, in fact. La Mettrie nowhere attempts to

—

—

establish.

. .

The homme machine idea gives us, therefore, no more than a
mechanical model, or a picturable analogy, of the mind not its
essence.

—
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La Mettrie should not be thought of as a
forerunner of identity

theory but rather of contemporary philosophers
and psychologists who

construct mechanical models of the mind, particularly
computer
models.

There also seems to be some unclarity on the part of
those who

construct or argue for computer models of the mind on
whether they
are stating the essence of mind, saying what mind is, or
merely

providing analogies and models for the mind, saying what mind
is
like.

Participants in these discussions seem to regard theories

according to which the mind works like a computer as being
materialistic; yet it does not seem contradictory to be

ontologically a dualist and yet hold that the mind works like a
computer or employs computer-like methods.

One might hold, for

example, that the brain stores memories in a way similar to the way
a computer stores memories on a disk,

and that the search procedure

for recalling memories is similar; the brain is mapped out into

addressable locations and a particular location is accessed

according to its address.

Such a model or picture does not

logically require ontological materialism: the states which result
from these searches do not have to be brain states.

One might even

be a dualist for computers and hold that certain internal computer

states such as the computer's analyzing this week's payroll is not

identical to a state of the hardware but rather is a distinct type
of state.

Hence, the association of mechanism with ontological

materialism may be due more to the fact that most advocates of
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mechanism and computer models of the mind
are materialists rather
than due to any logical entailment of one
by the other.

Mechanism as a philosophy of mind and computer
models of the

mind do not play

a

major role in later chapters.

Nevertheless, La

Mettrie's work is important to take note of in this
historical
survey, both in virtue of its links with present
day discussion of

computer models of the mind and in virtue of its links
with
Descartes.

We have already seen that the idea of I'homme machine

originated in Descartes' view that animals are machines.

1.4.4

Five Types of Materialism

The discussion of La Mettrie concludes my historical discussion
of materialism.

The purpose of this discussion has obviously not

been to trace the history of materialism from Homer to the present,
but rather to pick out several important philosophers from earlier

periods and show how their views resemble views being discussed
today.

Of the three I have discussed, Aristotle's theory is closest

to what today we call functionalism, while Hobbes' theory most

closely resembles the identity thesis.
mechanist.

Hobbes was apparently also a

La Mettrie was a mechanist, as we have seen, and his

views most closely resemble those of philosophers today who

construct and defend computer models of the mind.

I

said that La

Mettrie's mechanism, and mechanism in general, does not logically
entail materialism;

I

have classified it as

a

materialist view

because it is generally regarded as a form of materialism and
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because most mechanists are materialists.

Even it

a

mechanical

model of the mind does not give the
essence of mind, it does give a

material model.
The three forms of materialism discussed
in detail in later

chapters are the identity theory, anomalous
monism, and
functionalism.

I

have discussed Aristotle as an antecedent
to

functionalism and Hobbes as an antecedent to the
identity theory.
My survey seems to provide no historical
precedent for anomalous

monism, Donald Davidson's materialistic theory
which is the subject
of Chapter III.

Spinoza is the closest historical antecedent to

Davidson, and while his theory is monistic, it is not
a form of

materialism.

Hence

I

discuss Spinoza's theory as a separate type of

monism in the next section.

First, however,

I

distinguish five

types of contemporary materialism.
The Id entity Theory .

According to the identity theory, mental

events are identical to brain events.

This thesis can also be

formulated as the view that any individual mind is identical to some
brain, or that the person is identical to his body.

popular in the 1960
J.

C.

Smart

31

's,

This theory was

and was defended by philosophers such as J.

and D. M. Armstrong. 32

Philosophers advocating

this view used a notion they called "strict" identity 3 3 according
to which mental-physical identities satisfy the condition of

Leibniz's Law.

34

Criticisms of the identity theory led some

philosophers to retreat to theoretical materialism, functionalism.
or eliminative materialism.
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Th eoretical Materialism .

According to theoretical materialism,

statements of identity between mental and
physical events resemble

certain identifications found in physical
theories.

One example

sometimes used is the identification of
temperature with mean

molecular energy.

This type of identity is sometimes called

contingent identity since these statements are
supposed to be

contingently true, not necessarily true.
type of view in "Physicalism"

Thomas Nagel defends this

and Jaegwon Kim critically

discusses it in "On the Psycho-Physical Identity
Theory".

This

theory could be considered a different formulation
of the identity
theory, with a weaker sense of identity.

It is this form of

materialism that Saul Kripke argues against in Naming and
37
M
-u
Necessity
.

Functionalism .

According to functionalism, mental states are

correctly accounted for by giving a functional analysis or account
of physical (brain)

states.

Functionalism was developed in part in

response to the objection that a creature unlike human beings might
have similar mental states even though its neural structure is quite

unlike ours.
similar.

The functions of its brain states might still be

Functionalism was developed also in response to computer

models of the mind, and has been defended by Hilary Putnam 3 8 and
Daniel Dennett.
Chapter IV.

39
I

discuss Dennett's version of functionalism in
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E liminative Materialism .

According to eliminative materialism,

terms which refer to apparently mental phenomena
in fact refer to

physical phenomena.

Just as the progress of science revealed
that

there are no witches, so progress in describing
and explaining

mental phenomena will reveal that phenomena which
were thought to be

mental are really physical.

In this way, talk of mental phenomena

will be eliminated from our vocabulary.

view is Richard Rorty

.

Since

Probably the chief defender
I

version of materialism in later chapters,

do not discuss this
I

will point out here that

the analogy it draws between mental phenomena and witches and
demons

does not withstand serious examination.

This does not mean that

there is never any circumstance in which a mental term is replaced
or is found to be inapplicable.

Homeric conceptions of thymos

,

We have already seen that the
noos, and psyche were replaced in

Plato's time by a conception according to which these elements are

elements of a unity called "soul" or "mind" rather than being
separate organs which are no part of

a

greater whole.

But to admit

this analogy is quite different from admitting an analogy whereby
all our mental terminology could be eliminated.

Mechanism

.

Mechanism is the view that human and animal

behavior is to be explained, predicted, and described according to

mechanical principles.

In La Mettrie's time philosophers used

clocks as models of human behavior and mental phenomena; today they
use computers.

Because this theory is about explanations and models

of what human beings do rather than about the nature of mental
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phenomena, it is not logically inconsistent with dualism.

However,

it is generally considered to be a materialistic theory,
perhaps

because most of its advocates are materialists.

We saw that Hobbes

was a mechanist, and that La Mettrie is the classic exponent of

mechanism.

A mechanical concept of mind has been defended in recent

times by A. M. Turing"^^ and by Hilary Putnam.

1.4.5

Summary

This completes my discussion of materialism.

I

discussed

Aristotle as a forerunner of contemporary functionalism, Hobbes as a

forerunner of the identity theory, and La Mettrie as

a

mechanist and

a forerunner of theories which involve constructing computer models

of the mind.

I

also distinguished five different materialist

theories: the identity theory, theoretical materialism,

functionalism, eliminative materialism, and mechanism.

I

now

discuss the the views of another monist whose form of monism is not

materialistic: the plural aspect monism of Benedict de Spinoza.

1.5

Plural Attribute Monism

In my discussion of dualism,

I

made

a

distinction between

dualism of substance and dualism of properties.
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I

then went on

to state my intention to use the term 'phenomena' as a general term
to cover properties, events, states, conditions, abilities,
capacities, and other phenomena other than entities that can be
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either mental or physical.

Of course, there are still important

distinctions within the class of phenomena

as I have described it.

There will still be occasions when we need to pick out some subclass
of this class for special attention.

We still may wish to single

out dualism of properties or dualism of events, for example.
Such is the case in relation to Spinoza, who held a view best

described as plural attribute monism.

I

have selected Spinoza for

discussion because his view is an antecedent of Donald Davidson's
view, which is discussed in Chapter III.

ontological form of his theory,

I

Though Spinoza defended an

state both an ontological and a

conceptual version of plural attribute monism;
A(o)

A(o)

.'

Minds and bodies are modes of the attributes of
thought and extension. They are two of many
attributes, all of which attributes are attributes
of a single underlying substance.

Mental and physical attributes are two of many
types of attributes, all of which attributes are
attributes of a single underlying substance.

Conceptually, plural attribute monism can be stated as follows:
A(c).

A(c)'.

The terms 'mind' and 'body' represent two
irreducibly distinct conceptual categories of
These are two of many such
attribute modes.
irreducibly distinct conceptual categories of
There is a single conceptual
attribute modes.
category of substance which these conceptual
categories of attribute modes apply to.
The terms 'mental' and 'physical' represent two
irreducibly distinct conceptual categories of
attributes. These are two of many such
irreducibly distinct conceptual categories of
attributes. There is a single conceptual category
of substance which these conceptual categories of
attributes apply to.
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1»5.1

Spinoza

Spinoza lived from 1632
and La Hettrie.

-

1677. placing him between
Descartes

He was heavily influenced
by Descartes and, like

.nany

philosophers of his time, developed
many of his views in
response to those of Descartes.
His form of monism cannot be

described either as materialism or
idealism, but it is only a form
of ontological monism.

He did believe that there is
only one

substance in the universe, and he
identified this substance with
God.

He held that this one substance,
God, has infinitely many

attributes, including mind and body.

It is his view that God has

infinitely many attributes that makes
him

a

plural asr.ect monist.

Spinoza's view of substance is central
to his philosophy.
held that the essence of a substance
Involves existence:^^

PROPOSITION VII.
to exist,

It pertains to the nature of

sii

hsranca

Demonstration
There is nothing by which substance can be
produced. .. .It will therefore be the cause of
itself, that
is to say... its essence necessarily involves
existence,
or, in other words, it pertains to its nature
to
.

exist.

— Q.E.D.

He denies that man is a substance in these remarks

PROPOSITION X. The being of substance does not pertain
to
essence of man , or, in other words, substance does not
constitute the form of man.

_yie

Demonstra t ion. The being of substance involves necessary
existence.,.. If, therefore, the being of substance
pertained to the essence of man, the existence of man
would necessarily follow from the existence of
substance.,., and conseguently he would necessarily exist,
which... is an absurdity.
Therefore the being of substance
does not pertain, etc.--Q.E.D.

He
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Finally, he makes it clear that God is the only
Substance:^^

PROPOSITION XIV,
be conceived.

can
~Besides God no substance
“

be nor ca n

Demonstration
Since God is Being absolutely infinite, of
whom no attribute can be denied which expresses the
essence of substance.
and since He necessarily
exists..., it follows that if there were any substance
besides God, it would have to be explained by some'
attribute of God, and thus two substances would exist
possessing the same attribute, which is absurd; and
therefore there cannot be any substance except God, and
consequently none other can be conceived. For if any
other could be conceived, it would necessarily be
conceived as existing, and this (by the first part of this
demonstration) is absurd. Therefore, besides God no
substance can be nor can be conceived. Q.E.D.
.

. . ,

—

Spinoza not only held that an individual mind, an individual
body, and an individual person are not substances, he also held that

mind as a whole and body as

a

whole are not substances but rather

attributes of the one infinite substance; God.
the following propositions:

PROPOSITION

I,

This is clear from
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Thought is an attribute of God, or God is

a thinking thing.

PROPOSITION II. Extension is an attribute of God, or God
is an extended thing.
Spinoza is probably the only philosopher

I

discuss who would

understand the question "What is the relation between minds and
body?" as a question about the relation between mind-as-a-whole and

body-as-a-whole rather than as a question about the relation between
an individual mind and an individual body.
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human mind is a part of the intellect of God".

He says that "the
49

Although Spinoza

does seem to recognize the existence of individual minds and bodies.
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these individuals are not substances
and ace correctly understood
as
modes of the attributes of thought
and extension, which are

attributes of God.
Spinoza's definition of 'attribute'
is as follows:^^
By attribute I understand that which
the intellect
perceives of substance as constituting
its essence.
IV.

He applies this definition to thought
and extension in these

remarks
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Substance thinking and substance extended
are one and the
same substance, which is now comprehended
under this
attribute and now under that ... .Whether we think
of Nature
under the attribute of extension or under
the attribute of
thought or under any other attribute whatever,
we shall
discover one and the same order or one and the
same
connection of causes, that is to say, in every case
the
same sequence of things
when things are considered as
modes of thought we must explain the order of the
whole of
Nature or the connection of causes by the attribute
of
thought alone, and when things are considered as modes
of
extension, the order of the whole of Nature must be
explained through the attribute of extension alone, and so
with other attributes.
Spinoza's view, then, is that God can be conceived either under
the

mode of thought or under the mode of extension.

Extension is an

attribute of God as conceived under this mode and thought is an
attribute of God as conceived under the mode of thought.

Today we

might say that the categories of mental and physical represent two

points of view in terms of which persons or objects can be described.
I

maintain during discussion of Davidson that Spinoza's view is

an ancestor of Davidson's anomalous monism.

following reason.

This is so for the

Davidson has referred to his view as

a

combination of conceptual dualism and ontological monism. 5 2

He
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does not employ the notion of a point of
view, but he does introduce
the idea of a conceptual domain.

Davidson thinks that the mental

conceptual domain is irreducible to the physical
conceptual domain,
and vice versa.

This is similar to Spinoza's view that extension

and thought are two distinct modes for conceiving
substance.
However, Davidson is a conceptual dualist, not a
conceptual

pluralist: he does not recognize the existence of conceptual
domains

other than the mental and physical conceptual domains.

Furthermore,

his form of monism is materialism; he does not believe that his

conceptual dualism implies ontological dualism and he argues for the
identity theory.

For Spinoza, on the other hand, his one substance

has infinitely many attributes and it is not just extended and

thinking but also necessarily existing, indivisible, etc.

The true

sense, then, in which Spinoza is a monist is that he held that there
is only one substance but he is a pluralist in that he held that

this one substance has infinitely many attributes.

1.6

Idealism

Idealism is a radically different form of monism in that

according to idealism the single type of substance in the universe
is mental rather than physical.

The classic defense of this view is

given in Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge
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.

The spirit

of idealism is still alive today in the form of phenomenalism, an

epistemological theory which attempts to reduce material objects to
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sense-data.

Phenomenalism has been defended in this century by

Bertrand Russell 54 and by

^

J. Ayer.

A.

Because

I

do not

discuss either idealism or phenomenalism in later
chapters,
discuss them further here.

I

do not

Notice, however, that both materialism

and idealism depend on the existence of the mental-physical

distinction for the very statement of their respective theories.

1. 7

Pluralism

Pluralism is sometimes identified with the view that there are
many irreducibly distinct individuals in the universe.

While few

philosophers would be inclined to deny this today, we have just seen
that Spinoza held that there is only one substance in the universe,

and this substance is God.

Descartes held that what we might think

of as individual bodies are modes of one extended substance.

The

view that there are many irreducibly distinct individuals in the

universe is pluralism of individuals

.

This view might also be

described as pluralism of entities or substances.

Even a

materialist who believes that there is only one type of entity in
the universe, viz. material entities, might still hold that there
are many such individual entities.

Such a person would be a monist

in types of entities and a pluralist of individual entities.
The type of pluralism which is of most interest in relation to

this discussion of the mind-body problem is pluralism in types of

entities and phenomena.

'his

is the view that there are many

52

fundamentally distinct types of entity
or phenomena in the universe,
where this number is greater than
two.
Like monism and dualism,

pluralism of types has an ontological
and a conceptual
interpretation
P(o).

There are many fundamentally distinct
types of
entities in the universe.

P(o)'.

There are many fundamentally distinct
types of
phenomena in the universe.

Conceptually, this view can be formulated as
follows:
P(c).

The terms 'mind* and 'body' represent two
of many
irreducibly distinct categories or conceptual
domains which apply to entities in the universe.

P(c)'.

The terms 'mental* and 'physical' represent
two of
many irreducibly distinct categories or conceptual
domains which apply to entities in the universe.

P(c)''.

The terms 'mental' and 'physical' represent two of
many irreducibly distinct categories or conceptual
domains which apply to types of phenomena in the
universe

We have just seen that Spinoza would deny P(o) since he held
that there is only one substance in the universe.

He would ascribe

to P(o)', however, in light of his view that here are infinitely

many attributes in the universe.

Just as he would deny P(o), he

would deny P(c), reading "substance" for 'entity'; however, he would
accept P(c)'.

We can say, then, that Spinoza accepted conceptual

and ontological plurality of phenomena but denied conceptual and

ontological plurality of substance.

accepted plurality of attributes.

Spinoza would say that he
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1.7.1

Leibniz
I

have already made note of the fact
that Leibniz was

parallelist in section 1.3.5.

a

since Leibniz held that bodies are

phenomenal in nature he is often counted
as a phenomenalist or
idealist.

My concern here is not with either of
these strains of

his thought, but with his view on points
of view: Leibniz was

a

pluralist with respect to points of view or
perspectives.
Leibniz held that each monad has

a

different point of view:^^

'^his connection of all created things
with every
single one of them and their adaptation to every
single
one, as well as the connection to every single
one, as
well as the connection and adaptation of every
single
thing to all others, has the result that every
single
substance stands in relations which express all the
others.
Whence every single substance is a perpetual
living mirror of the the universe.

Just as the same city regarded from different sides
guite different aspects, and thus appears
multiplied by the perspective so it also happens that the
infinite multitude of simple substances creates the
appearance of as many different universes. Yet they are
but perspectives of a single universe, varied according to
the points of view which differ in each monad.
57.

,

,

58.
This is the means of obtaining the greatest possible
variety, together with the greatest possible order; in
other words, it is the means of obtaining as much
perfection as possible.

Leibniz's view that each monad has

a

different point of view both

provides a principle of individuation for monads and provides a
basis for plurality of monads and substances.

Leibniz says that the

same city viewed from different sides offers different aspects so
he,

like Spinoza, can be described as having a plural aspect view.
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unlike Spinoza, he held that there
is an infinity of individual
substances, so he held that there are
infinitely many individual

substances each having infinitely many
aspects.

Conclusion

1* 8

To summarize,

I

began this historical survey with an

introduction to the mind-body problem as a
philosophical problem.
The main body of the chapter was concerned
with an examination of

dualism, three types of materialism, and pluralism.
I

In section 1.3

described the views of Plato and Descartes as examples
of

conceptual and ontological dualism.

Aristotle as

a

In section 1.4

identified

I

historical antecedent of contemporary functionalism,

and Hobbes as a historical antecedent of the identity theory.

discussed the views of both these materialists.
La Mettrie as the classic exponent of mechanism.

considered Spinoza as

a

I

I

also considered
In section 1.5

I

historical antecedent of anomalous monism.

After taking note of idealism,

I

considered Leibniz in section 1.7

as a pluralist in points of view.

This concludes my historical survey of the mind-body problem.
The main purpose of this survey has been to show that the four

contemporary theories on the mind-body problem which

I

examine in

succeeding chapters: dualism, the identity theory, anomalous monism,
and functionalism are all contemporary formulations of traditional

theories on this problem.

Hence, many of my criticisms of
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contemporary views should apply to these
traditional theories as
well.

A secondary purpose has been to show
where these four

theories stand in relation to other theories
on the mind-body
problem.

In some cases, criticisms of a version
of one type of

theory such as the identity theory apply to
other versions of the
same type of theory such as functionalism.

Hence,

I

believe that

the discussion in the remaining chapters represents
a fairly broad

discussion of the mind-body problem which has implications
beyond
its implications for the four particular theories

I

examine.
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FOOTNOTES

Obviously, there are many problems
traditionally discussed by
philosophers in non-philosophical contexts
which are not
philosophical problems. The main point here
is to introduce
e mind-body problem as a philosophical
problem rather than a
practical problem.
I take dualism to be a claim
about what types of entities or
phenomena there are in the universe
Philosophers sometimes
use the term 'world' in what I take to be a
synonym for
^universe^ For example, there is talk of "possible
worlds",
in which it is imagined that history remains
the same except
that one event or sequence of events is different.
These kinds
of discussions sometimes occur in relation to
considering
counterfactuals.
Since the history of our earth includes its
relations to other entities in the universe, such examples
are
about possible universes, not merely possible earths
or
possible solar systems. A mind-body theory which limited
itself to saying what entities or phenomena exist on our
earth
but had nothing to say about the rest of the universe
would be
of only limited interest.
In this chapter and in succeeding
chapters, I use the term 'world' as a synonym for 'universe'
unless I specify otherwise or unless the context makes it clear
that I am using it in some other sense.
.
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CHAPTER

II

SAUL KRIPKE'S DEFENSE OF
DUALISM

2

•

1

Introduction

Dualism is one solution to the
mind-body problem that has had
many capable defenders in the past,
including

Descartes, Locke, and

Hume.

Like many other theories, dualism
has been more popular at

some times than others.

It has not been a popular theory
in this

century, however, interest in dualism
has increased in the past ten
years, partially in response to criticisms
made of materialism and

behaviorism.

Dualism has also recently found a capable
exponent in

Saul Kripke, whose views ate a consequence
of his views in theory of

reference and proper names.
In this chapter,

I

state two related arguments for dualism that

Saul Kripke presented recently in Naming and
Necessity .^

Because

these arguments follow from Kripke's theory of
proper names,
by explaining this theory.

I

I

begin

then examine some important criticisms

of these arguments advanced by Fred Feldman in
several recent
-

^
articles.

2

In the last section,

I

discuss what

I

take to be the

most serious problem for dualism: the problem of interaction.
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I
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conclude with several observations
which seem to show that mind
and
body are more closely related
than they might appear to be
at first

sight

2*2

Kripke's Theory of Proper Namps

In Mining and Necessity, Kripke
presents an argument against

several versions of the identity thesis.

This thesis as it is

usually formulated is a form of materialism
which claims either that
a

person is identical to his body, that each
mind is identical to

some body, or that mental states or events
are identical to brain

states or bodily states or events.

The claim that mental states or

events are identical to brain states or bodily
states is sometimes

formulated in terms of particular states, and
sometimes in terms of
states of some kind.

Kripke's argument makes use of some concepts

that he developed in order to formulate his theory
of proper names.

Because these concepts play
the identity thesis,

I

a

key role in Kripke's argument against

begin by explicating Kripke's theory of

proper names and general terms.
Kripke's theory of proper names represents a break from the

tradition of Gottlieb Frege^ and Bertrand Russell,^ according to

which proper names are abbreviated descriptions; Kripke's theory is

much closer to John Stuart Mill's,
denotation but no connotation.

who held that names have

Kripke's theory is actually somewhat

complex, and for our purposes it is sufficient to discuss those
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aspects that relate directly to the
mind-body argument.

Those

related aspects particularly include the
view that names and some

general terms are rigid designators, that
identity statements
between rigid designators are, if true,
necessarily true, and that
the origin of a thing is an essential
property of that thing.

Names and Some G eneral Terms are Rigid
Designators
I

begin by discussing designators.

^
comments

Kripke makes the following

6

One of the intuitive these I will maintain in these
talks
is that names are rigid designators.
Certainly they seem
to satisfy the intuitive test mentioned above;
although
someone other than the U.S. President in 1970 (e.g.
Humphrey might have) , no one other than Nixon might have
been Nixon.
In the same way, a rigid designator rigidly
designates a certain object if it designates that object
wherever the object exists.

The distinction Kripke draws here is between a rigid (necessary)
designator, which designates the same object in every world in which
the object exists, and a non-rigid (accidental) designator which may

designate different objects in different possible situations (or
"possible worlds").

Kripke holds that proper names, such as

'Nixon', are rigid designators, while definite descriptions, such as

"The U.S. President in 1970", are non-rigid.

One difference is

that, while one can imagine situations in which the term 'The U.S.

President in 1970' does not denote Nixon, the term 'Nixon' always
refers to the same man in every imaginable situation.

Kripke also apparently believes that some general terms, such
as 'gold' and 'tiger' are rigid designators.

He says that:

7
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According to the view I
advocate ' hh^:^n terms
for natural
kinds are much closer ho nr^r.
names than is ordinarily
supposed.
The old term
<-

appLprlate

fL predicL.r“°^."“"’

kinds, such as 'cow' or
tige^
also, however, to certain
m«s ^er!,
such as .gold', 'water.:
arthfukef

natural
apply

'

Elsewhere, he says:^

-~t kind of thin^, where
the kind^cai b^i^nt
if ied^'bi^
is not
s»ethingl!c::d^::tV:n"gr“:trvf
^
^ Huantative dictionary
d"^rdefinition,
*

Kripke rejects the view that
aih;^c: as
'tiqer'
=0 its
ciger nas
meaning a
conjunction or disjunction of
properties, of which some or
all must
the term to be applicable
to something.
Rather, certain
general terms refer to some kind
of thing, where the kind
of thing
•

can be shown by example, and
where the kind remains uniform
across
all possible worlds.
In order to elucidate this
claim, Kripke contrasts "fixing
the

reference" of an expression with
"giving the meaning" of it.

Using

the Wlttgenstelnlan example
of the standard meter, he states
that

someone who stipulates that a stick
s which is to serve as a
standard of length for the term 'meter'
is not laying down a

definition of 'meter', but, rather,
fixing its reference.

Hence,

the phrase 'one meter' is not
synonymous with the phrase 'the length
of S at t"; rather,

'one meter' denotes the same length in
all

possible worlds.
The importance of Kripke's view that some
general terms are
rigid designators will become apparent shortly
when

I

consider his

65

claim that 'pain' is a rigid
designator.

For now,

I

summarize his

view as follows
1

.

2

.

3.

Names and some general terms
are rigid designators.
A rigid designator is
a term which denotes
the same
object in all possible worlds.

A rigid designator is not
synonymous with a definite
description denoting its reference
or with some c uster
Of properties; but its
reference can be fixed via ^
definite

r

description.

Statements Be twe en Rigid Designators
are

Kripke not only holds that names
and some general terms are
rigid designators, but he also
holds that Identity statements

between rigid designators, if true,
are necessarily true.
tells us:

Kripke

9

old the following about the general
case.
First, that
characteristic theoretical identifications
like 'Heat is
the motion of molecules'
are not contingent truths but
necessary truths, and here of course I don't
mean just
physically necessary, but necessary in the
highest degree
- whatever that means.
,

Elsewhere Kripke says that 'heat' is

rigid designator, so "Heat is

a

the motion of molecules" is apparently an
example of a necessary

truth between two rigid designators.

The difference between

necessarily true identity statements and contingently
true identity
statements is that, for the latter, at least one of
the terms on
either side is an accidental designator, and hence
does not denote
the same object in all possible worlds.

But if the terms are rigid,

then, they must designate the same object in all possible
worlds,

and hence the identity is necessary.

An example of an accidentally
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true Identity statement is -Benjamin
Franklin is the inventor of
bifocals , while an example of a
necessarily true identity statement
is "Hesperus is Phosphorus",

Kripke's view that Identity statements
between rigid

designators are necessarily true plays
a key role in his argument
against the identity thesis.

For the moment, his view can be

summarized as follows:
4.

An identity statement of the form 'a =
b' is, if true
necessarily true, if -a* and 'b' are rigid
designators.

5.

An identity statement of the form 'a =
b' is, if true
accidentally true if either 'a* or 'b' is a
non-rigid'
designator.

Q^^i’^in

is an Essential Property

Another aspect of Kripke's metaphysical views that have
implications for his mind-body argument is his view that the
origin
of a thing is an essential property of the thing.

Considering the

example of a wooden table, Kripke comments:^^
In the case of this table, we may not know what block
of
wood the table came from. Now could this table have been
made from a completely different block of wood, or even of
water cleverly hardened into ice - water taken from the
Thames River? We could conceivably discover that,
contrary to what we now think, this table is indeed made
of ice from the river.
But let us suppose that it is
not.
Then, though we can imagine making a table out of
another block of wood or even from ice, identical in
appearance with this one, and though we could have put it
in this very position in the room, it seems to me that
this is not to imagine this table as made of wood or ice,
but rather it is to imagine another table, resembling this
one in all external details, made of another block of
wood, or even of ice.

Kripke also considers the question whether Queen Elizabeth could
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have been born of different parents
from the parents from whom she

actually came.

He concludes that "Anything coming
from a different

origin would not be this object".

“

Kripke cites these cases as

examples of examples of essential properties,
and does not attempt
to state a general theory about origin
and essence.

However, it

does seem clear that he endorses the following
principle in these
(and related) passages in Naming and Necessity
6.

;

The origin of a thing is an essential property
of the
thing.

This principle will become important as

I

consider questions about

the origin of mental and physical events.

However,

summarize the general discussion of Kripke'

s

I

will now

metaphysical views and

then turn to a consideration of his arguments against
the identity
thesis.

2.2.4

Summary of Kripke'
I

s

Metaphysical Views

have now formulated six general principles that Kripke

endorses in Naming and Necessity , and that relate to his view on the

mind-body problem.

These principles are as follows:

1,

Names and some general terms are rigid designators.

2.

A rigid designator is a term that denotes the same
object in all possible worlds.

3,

A rigid designator is not synonymous with a definite
description denoting its reference or with some cluster
of properties; but its reference can be fixed via a

definite description.
4.

An identity statement of the form 'a = b' is, if true,
necessarily true, if 'a' and 'b' are rigid designators.
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5.

An identity statement of the
form

'a =

b'

is

if trnp

^

'

"" essential property of the

thing!‘"'"

do not discuss criticisms of
these principles now, or questions
about their meaning or their
precise formulation. Rather, I move
on
to a consideration of Kripke's
argument against the identity thesis.
I

While keeping these principles in
mind.

K.J^ipke's

In this section,

Arguments Against the Identity Theses

I

state two different arguments that
Kripke

formulates against the identity thesis.

The conclusion of the first

argument is that a person is distinct from his
body, while the

conclusion of the second argument is that
distinct from a brain state.

I

a

feeling of pain is

consider some criticisms which have

been made of these arguments in section 2.4.

jjt.ipke's

Argumen t that

a

Person is Distinct from his Body

One form the identity thesis takes is the claim that
is identical to his body.

a

person

Kripke states an argument against this

claim in the following passage:

19

Descartes, and others following him, argued that a person
or mind is distinct from his body, since the mind could
exist without the body. He might equally well have argued
the same conclusion from the premise that the body could
have existed without the mind. Now the one response which
I regard as plainly inadmissible is the response which
cheerfully accepts the Cartesian premise while denying the
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Cartesian conclusion. Let
'Descartes' be a name, or rlald
esignator, of a certain person,
and let 's' be a rigid
designator of his body. Then if
Descartes were indeed
Identical to B, the supposed identity,
being an identity
between two rigid designators would
be necessary, and
Descartes could not exist without B
and B could not exist
is not at all comparable to
the an
l'3®"tity of the first Postmaster
General
GeLral^wrth^th
with the inventor of bifocals.
True, this
Identity obtains despite the fact
that there could have
been a first Postmaster General even
though bifocals had
never been invented. The reason
is that -the inventor of
ifocals IS not a rigid designator; a
world in which no
facto a world in which
Franklin did not exist. The alleged
analogy therefore
collapses; a philosopher who wishes to
refute the
Cartesian conclusion must refute the
Cartesian premise,
and the latter task is not trivial.
Here Kripke presents the following argument:
1.

If 'a' and 'b' are rigid designators,
then statements
of the form 'a = b' are, if true, necessarily
true.

2.
8.

Let 'Descartes' be a rigid designator of
Descartes.

3.

Let 'B' be a rigid designator of Descartes'
body.

4.

Hence, if "Descartes = B"
true. (1,2, and 3)

5.

(xHy)(If X can exists at some time t and
y does not
exist at t, then "x = y" is not necessarily true).

6.

it is necessarily

It is possible for Descartes'

time
7.

is true,

t

body to exist at some
even though Descartes does not exist at t.

Therefore, "Descartes

= B"

is not necessarily true.

= B"

is not true.

(5,6)

Therefore, "Descartes

(4,7)

The above argument is, as Kripke acknowledges, a contemporary

formulation of

a

"conceivability-type" argument for dualism which

originates with Descartes.

In a famous Sixth Meditation passage.

Descartes argues from his ability to form a clear and distinct
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conception of himself or his mind
as distinct from his body to
the
conclusion that he or his mind really
is distinct from his

body.“

Here Kripke simply argues that
he can exist without his

body, and that his body can exist
without him.

argument has been variously criticized,

“

while this type of

it does represent one of

the strongest possible arguments
lot dualism: hence, it is worth

considering in some details.

Before

I

do so, however,

I

will look

at a similar argument, formulated in
terms of mental events.

2,3.2

Event Identity

The identity thesis is also formulated as
a theory about the

relation between types of physical events and types
of mental
events, as well as a theory about the relation
between particular

mental events and particular physical events.

The identity thesis

asserts that this relation is one of identity.

Kripke formulates an

argument against the identity thesis, conceived as

a

claim about the

relation between particular mental and physical events:^^
Let 'A' name a particular pain sensation, and let 'B' name
the corresponding brain state, or the brain state some
identity theorist wishes to identify with A.
Prima facie,
it would seem that it is at least logically possible that
B should have existed (Jones's brain could have been in
exactly that state at the time in question) without Jones
feeling any pain at all, and thus without the presence of
A.
Once again, the identity theorist cannot admit the
possibility cheerfully and proceed from there;
consistency, and the principle of identities using rigid
designators, disallows any such course.
It A and B were
identical, the identity would have to be necessary.

The above argument can be formulated as follows:
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1

.

2

.

f
a
and b are both rigid designators,
then any
statement of the form 'a = b', if
true ' is necessarily
true.

Let 'A' be a rigid designator for
sensation.

a

particular pain

3.

Let 'B' be a rigid designator for
a corresponding brain
state.

4.

Hence, "A
and 3)

B"

if true,

,

is necessarily true.

(1,

2,

5.

(x)(y)(lf it is possible for x to exist at
some time t
and y does not exist at that time, then
"x = y" is not
necessarily true)

6.

It is possible for B to exist at some
time
though A does not exist at t.

7.

Therefore, "A

8.

= B"

is not necessarily true.

Therefore, "A = b" is not true.

(4,

t

even

(5,

6)

7)

Because both of the above arguments will come into
clearer focus
when

I

consider criticisms of them,

I

now consider some criticisms

of these two arguments which have been raised in the
literature.

2

In this section,

Fred Feldman.

I

.

4

Feldman's Criticisms

consider several criticisms of Kripke by

Feldman is writing from

a

materialist perspective,

and his criticisms primarily focus on premise

arguments.

6

in the above two
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Feldman formalizes two versions
of Kripke's argument that
a
person is distinct from his body
(the first of the two
arguments
just presented), and refers
to them as -Argument A- and
-Argument
B".

He then goes on to comment:^^

Arguments A and B are valid.
Furthermore, in each case
the conclusion is inconsistent
with person-body
materialism. Nevertheless, neither
argument is very
persuasive: in each case anyone
predisposed to believe in
person-body materialism would be right
to claim that the
argument either begs the question
or else is based on a
allure to understand what person-body
materialism amounts
uo•
Person-body materialism is the doctrine
that people are
Identical to their bodies.
In other words, anything that
IS a person is identical to the
body of that
person:

7

.

(x)(t)(Pxt '-3>Oy)(Byt

&

Oyxt

&

x =

y)

)

Any clear headed proponent of this view
would undoubtedly
say that death usually does not make people
cease to
exist.
Since, on this view, people are their bodies,
the
conditions of survival of any person must be the
same as
those of his or her body. This is not to say
that anyone
adopting materialism would be saddled with the view
that
there must be some sort of life after death. Far
from it,
this form of materialism doesn't even imply that
people
continue being people after they die. But what's
important here is that, on this view, the property of
being alive is an accidental property of the things
that
have it.
Something can have it for a while, and then
cease to have it, without thereby ceasing to exist. Thus,
the things that are people can continue to exist after
death.
Here Feldman is attempting to refute premises in his arguments
A and
B which are equivalent to premise
6.

6

in the first argument above:

It is possible for Descartes'

time

t

body to exist at some
even though Descartes does not exist at t.

It is curious to see an advocate of materialism advocate a view
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which many have argued is unintelligible,
and which is usually
associated with the strong form of
dualism: the view that a person
can survive his own death!
I now consider the
doctrine motivating
this view: that a person is identical
to his body.

The first point to make about
Feldman's comments here is that
he implicitly appeals to a distinction
he does not explain: a

distinction between being alive and existing.
mode of existence which characterizes
namely, an organism.

a

Being alive is the

certain type of thing,

Of course, some things can exist without
being

alive (e.g. tables and chairs), but if
Feldman wishes to claim that
I

can exist without being alive, then he should
provide an account

of this distinction.

Secondly, Feldman claims that being alive is not
an essential

property of the things that have it.
a

If Feldman wishes to make such

claim, then he should make it clear what his view
of essential

properties is.

Kripke gives the following criterion for essential

properties
If we can t imagine a possible world in which Nixon
doesn't have a certain property, then it's a necessary
condition of someone being Nixon. Or a necessary property
of Nixon that he [has] that property.

Here Kripke advocates an

"

imaginibility" criterion for essential

properties: if we can't imagine something without
that property is essential to it (here

I

18

property, then

am interpreting 'necessary

condition' to refer to essential properties).
say:

a

Kripke goes on to
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For example, supposinq
Nixon

i

<?

i

n

u

=

.J.^ronrL:rre:; r^sr„
eing
Then it will be a necessary
fact about Nixon that
in all possible worlds
where he exists at all
ho
1
or anyway he is not an
inanimate object!
Here Kripke explicitly rejects
the possibility that a
person could
be an inanimate object (e.g.
a corpse).
l think he would,
on the
same basis, also reject the
possibility that a person could
exist
without being alive. Hence, if
Feldman wishes to take this view
about essential properties, he
owes us an explanation of what
his
view is.
Of course, some dualists do
believe that a person can survive

death.

However, such persons often identify
the person with an

immaterial substance or soul which can
survive the dissolution of
the body.

It is not clear whether such
theorists would regard being

alive as an essential or accidental
property of a person; but

clearly Feldman cannot appeal to this
type of view to support his
argument since this is the type of view
he is arguing against.
Third, there are strong reasons for rejecting
the

identification of a person with his or her body.

One reason is that

we often attribute to the body functions
we do not attribute to the

self, or person.

For example, my body circulates the blood,
digests

food, and fights infection.
its own, not things

I

do.

These are all things my body does on

The fact that we distinguish in this way

things our body does from things we do is

identifying a person with his body.

a

strong reason for not
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Likewise, we attribute properties
to ourselves which we don't
attribute to our bodies. For example,
a person can be sick even
though there is nothing wrong with
his body.
I can be tired even

though my body is not, and

I

can be a cold person even though
my

body is normal temperature, or is
feverish.

These are all examples

of properties we attribute to ourselves
and not out bodies, and

provide an additional reason for not
identifying a person with his
body.

Finally, if

I

am identical to my body, then my body is
the

subject of all my psychological states.

Thus, even if we don't

ordinarily say this, it should make sense to say
"My body is angry"
instead of "I am angry", or "My body is bored"
instead of
bored".

meaning.

"I

am

But these substitutions yield statements with no
clear
And, in some cases, this would result in
quite different

meanings; for example to say "You are boring" is quite
different
from "Your body is boring".

And desiring another person's body is

quite different from desiring the other person himself or herself.
Of course, it might be that a materialist could satisfactorily

deal with all the above objections.

But the general point here is

that Feldman is no better off than he claims Kripke is, since all he

has done is to state some very controversial consequences of

materialist doctrine in reply to Kripke.

Feldman claims that

Kripke's argument begs the question, but it seems clear that his own
comments, by making use of the unexplained distinction between being
alive and existing, and by appealing to an unexplained notion
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essential property

,

are as question-begging as
Kripke's.

Furthermore, there are strong reasons
for rejecting Feldman's

identification of person and body, which
Feldman does not take into
account. Hence, I conclude that
these comments by Feldman fail
to
provide any reason for rejecting
Kripke's argument.
Of course, it might be that a
materialist could satisfactorily

deal with all the above objections.

But the general point here is

that Feldman is no better off than he
claims Kripke is, since all he
has done is to state some very
controversial consequences of

materialist doctrine in reply to Kripke.

Feldman claims that

Kripke's argument begs the question, but it
seems clear that his own
comments, by making use of the unexplained
distinction between being

alive and existing, and by appealing to an
unexplained notion of
"essential property", are as question-begging as Kripke's.
Furthermore, there are strong reasons for rejecting Feldman's

identification of person and body, which Feldman does not take
into
account.

Hence,

I

conclude that these comments by Feldman fail to

provide any reason for rejecting Kripke's argument.
Feldman does say: 19
The problem with Kripke's arguments, then, is that in each
case the argument seems to presuppose that at death the
person literally ceases to exist, whether the body does or
not

Feldman is right if he means that Kripke's argument does imply that
the person ceases to exists after death, although

I

don't believe

that Feldman has given us a single good reason to doubt this claim.

However,

I

defer for now the question whether Kripke needs to argue
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for this slain,, or whether
he has saeoeeded in establishing
it.
now, I turn to Feldman's
second line of reasoning.

For

Perhaps Feldman senses the
implausibillty of the position he
ascribes to 'any clear-headed
proponent of [materialism]’, lor he
now shifts ground as follows:^^

Perhaps Kripke or someone wishing
to defend these
arguments would say that the property
of being alive is an
essential property of the things that
have it. We can
understand this to mean that everything
that is alive is
such that, necessarily, for any time
t, if it exists at t,
then It IS alive at t:
(8)

(x) (t) (Axt

O

D(t' (Ext'
)

O

Axt'

)

From this it would follow that, when
Descartes dies, he
literally ceased to exist. This might be
thought to
provide support for (8).

Feldman goes on to object;
Surely, Descartes's body was alive when Descartes
was.
If
being alive is essential to the things that have
it, then,
just as death marked the end of Descartes, so
must it have
marked the end of his body as well. On this view
the
corpse must be construed as a new entity, brought
into
existence by "substantial change". Hence, far from
providing support for it, the claim that everything is
alive is essentially so actually lends overwhelming
support to the denial of [premise 6].
The Kripkean thus has to say, if he wants to adopt this
line of defense for [premise 6], that being alive is not
an essential property of his body, even though it is a
property his body has.
Hence, the body can survive death,
while Descartes cannot.

Feldman is right in saying that someone who wishes to defend

dualistic position might argue from the fact that

a

a

person is

essentially alive and the body is not to the distinctness of person
and body.

But Feldman claims that such a defense makes Kripke's

argument superfluous.

He then shows that one can also construct an
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arg^ent to the conclusion that

a

person is distinct fro™ his
body

by making use of Leibniz's
Law:^^
d has the property of being
essentially alive.

9.

10.

b

11*

X = y

12.

d

does not have the property of
being essentially alive.

/

iff (F)(FX iff Fy)

h.

Feldman is right that premises
defense of premise
Leibniz's Law.

statements

9

.

6

9

and 10 can be used either in

or as premises in an argument
employing

The difference is that, in Kripke's
argument,

and 10 are used in support of a
premise which is

conjoined with other statements in such

a

way as to prove the

desired conclusion independent of Leibniz's
Law.

This does not

render Kripke's argument superfluous; it
simply means that there may
be more than one way to prove that a
person is distinct from his

body.

Feldman also claims that "no argument has been
given for

9

"^^

(the statement that d has the property of being
essentially alive).

While Feldman may be right that Kripke has not given
an argument for
this claim, we saw above that Feldman has not given
a single good

reason to reject this claim.

And no serious dualist would accept

Feldman's "intuition" that "Surely, Descartes' body was alive";
he

would say that Descartes' body was a living thing, but this is
not
to say that his body was alive.

Hence, Feldman's comments up to

this point represent little more than philosophical name-calling.
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Criticisms o f Kripke on Event Irt^nni-Y

Feldman also considers Krlpke's
argument against the identity
thesis formulated in terms of the
identity of mental events and

brain events.

Necessity 23

Feldman quotes the following passage
from Naming and
^

:

Pr ima facie., it would seem
that it is at least logically
possible that b should have existed
(Jones's brain could
'''
question)
without Jones feeling any pain at all,
and thus without
the presence of [a].
Once again, the identity theorist
cannot admit the possibility cheerfully
and proceed from
there; consistency, and the principle
of the necessity of
rue] Identity [i Jes using rigid
designators disallows any
^
such course.

Feldman formulates Kripke'
follows.

(29)

argument, which he calls argument H, as

Here 'Oxt' means "x occurs at

pain-event at
(28)

s

t"

and 'Pxt' means "x is a

t"

<>(3t)(0bt &.r^(3x)(Pxt

&

Oxt))

(t)(Oat DPat)

(3 0)

^(3t)(Obt &-^Oat)

(31)

O(5t)(0xt

(32)

C (a

/

b)

&

-^Oyt)

(28,2 9)

^0(x

y)

(30,31)

Feldman objects that "(28) and (29) do not entail (30)-.
•

continues
r.

24

It does not follow, from the fact that there is a possible
world in which b occurs without anything that is there a
pain-event, and the fact that a is a pain-event in this
world, that there is a world in which b occurs without a.
For if a, which is a pain-event in this world, occurs in
other worlds without being a pain-event, then perhaps a
does occur wherever b does.
So the argument turns on the
question whether a, which is a pain-event in the actual

He

world, is a pain-event in
every world in whi oh

question^wheth^r

xi> eijsenciaiiy a
rifesientiany^fp^^''"'^''''
pain-event.

Feldman is correct in saying
that Kripke's claim that
is essentially painful is
crucial to his a rgument.
say that: 25

a

pain-event

He goes on to

recognize that his view
of the essence of a
oai^ev
pain-event.
Pain-events are experienced as they
are only
as a result of contingent
laws of nature. .Certain
contingent that they are
enh.

is

T

.

He finally concludes that Kripke's
argument "turns on an undefended

controversial premise that materialists
have, and should have,
rejected"

Kripke's argument, according to Feldman,
depends on the

unsupported intuition that being a pain is an
essential property of
a

feeling of pain.

Feldman does not refute this claim; he contents

himself, once again, with pointing out that
this intuition is

inconsistent with

a

materialist point of view.

However,

that there is a serious difficulty in Kripke's
argument.

Kripke's argument be stated in

a

I

believe
Can

way which does not seem simply to

appeal to our intuitions?

Kripke apparently believes that an appeal to intuitions is
one
of the most forceful ways of presenting a philosophical
argument.

However,

one

s

I

believe that, with respect to the mind-body problem,

intuitions are influenced by his philosophical point of view.

Hence it may be that, if the truth about the mind-body problem
rests, in the final analysis, on intuition, that it cannot be solved
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Furthermore,

I

see some merit in Feldman's
objection that it is

not an essential property of a
feeling of pain that it is painful.

Pains certainly vary in intensity,
and one characteristic of pain
is
that it often involves an "overload"
of our nervous system.
Thus,
we can put pressure on a certain
part of our body, and slowly

increase the pressure until it becomes
painful.
this,

I

In a situation like

don't think it is implausible to argue
that we have the same

feeling all along, but that it suddenly
becomes painful.

First, it

might be a feeling of pressure on our hand,
but as the pressure
increases, the feeling becomes painful.

On this analysis, the very

same feeling at first is not painful, but
then, as the pressure is

increased, that very feeling becomes painful.

Hence, a single

feeling can at one point not be painful, and then
become
of pain.

If

feeling

this is right, being painful is merely a contingent

property of some feelings, which
and not have at another time t'.
a

a

feeling might have at one time

a

t

On this view, then, painfulness is

merely contingent property of feelings.
I

believe, however, that Kripke's argument can be stated in a

way that avoids this difficulty.

For, even if pain is a merely

contingent property of some feelings,

a

painful and another time is not is still

feeling which is at one time
a

feeling of some kind.

Hence, even if painfulness is not an essential property of feelings,
at least being a feeling is an essential property, and Kripke's

argument can be stated as before, except that instead of "pain"
being an essential property, "being

a

feeling" is an essential
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property,

so even it „e grant Feldman's
claim that painfulness is a

contingent property of some feelings,
we can formulate Kripke's
argument, substituting -being a
feeling- for -painfulness- as

the

essential property.

Feldman grants that, if we change
29 to 29'
(29)') Q(t)(Oat

o

:

Pat)

that Kripke's argument is valid.

Let us reformulate Kripke's

argument to accomodate the above point,
substituting (Fa)
feeling-)
(30) for (Pa)

(

Q(t)(Oat

3

&

Oxt)

31)

O

(3t) (Oxt

(24) <^(a

Z'

is a

)

Fat)

'0(^t)(Obt&''^Oat)
(

"a

"a is a pain-event");

(28) <>(3t)(0bt & rv(3x)(Fxt
(29)

(

&

(28)

'^Oyt) 3<i-(x

(29)

y)

b)

(3Q)

^

Perhaps Feldman would not be convinced by this
reformulated
argument.

His general strategy seems to be, to argue for

candidate essential property p of

property of

x,

x,

that p is really an accidental

since what appears to be

and p is an accidental property of y.
is only accidentally alive,

a

x

is really fundamentally y,

Thus, he argued that a person

and that someone might continue to exist

after death, event though he or it was no longer

a

person.

might be expected to reply there that a feeling is just

a

Feldman
kind of

event, and that some events are and others are not feelings.

Furthermore, he might say, the very same event that is

a

one world is not a feeling in another world; hence, being

feeling in
a

feeling
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is a merely contingent property of
some events.

This argument would

parallel his argument on pain.

Z^l<3man's Three Conceptions of Events

^

Feldman does make an argument similar to the one
just sketched
elsewhere.

In a recent paper, he distinguishes three
conceptions of

what an event is.

considers, the

While he concedes that, on the first two views he

propositional" view and the "structural" view, the

identity thesis does not seem plausible, yet, he maintains, on the
"concrete" events view, Kripke's argument does not succeed.

Feldman

tells us very little about concrete events, except to say that

events are more

coarse~grained" on this conception than they are on

other conceptions.

The idea seems to be to treat each event as a

concrete individual.
After introducing this concept, Feldman argues as follows:
If a^ and ^ are concrete events, then, so far as I can see,
Kripke's point can not be established. Event ^ is a case
of someone being amused.
But why should it be essentially
so?
It is as concrete an individual as Jones himself.
Surely no one would say that Jones is essentially someone
who is amused.
Just as being amused is a contingent
property of Jones, so being a case of someone being amused
may be a contingent property of a^.
If we are to have a coherent version of the contingent
psycho-physical event identity theory, then it seems most
reasonable to assume that the events in question are
concrete events. And if we do this, then Kripke's
argument loses its foothold. He has no way to show that ^
For all we
is essentially a case of someone being amused.
know, that very event could have occurred without anyone
being amused.
Hence, the fact that we can imagine ^

?

ft
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occurring without anyone being
amused does not
b occurring
wUhou^ri!'"
If we substitute "Jones'

having a feeling- for "Jones'
being

amused", we get the claim that
the very event of Jones' having
a
feeling could occur without anyone
having a feeling.
But surely
this IS not the case.

It is easy to see how Jones
can exist

unamused; it is not easy to see how the
event of Jones' having a

feeling could exist if no one had

a

feeling,

plausible to argue that being amused is
of certain feelings;
a

a

it might be somewhat

merely contingent property

it is not at all plausible to
argue that being

feeling is a merely contingent property of
certain events.
In order to see why this is so, consider
what a feeling is on

the concrete events view,

of the structural view, Feldman says:^^

According to the structural view, events are structures
of
property, individual, and time. They ate individuated
by
reference to their components. We have the same event
if
and only if we have the same property, individual and
time.

Concrete events are apparently like structural events,
except that
they are more "coarse-grained".

I

interpret this to mean that the

for what counts as the same event are less rigid.

For

example, Feldman says that the very same concrete event could
make
both the following statements true:
1.

Jones is very amused.

2.

Jones is amused about what happened to the chickens.

Concrete events still appear to be
property, and

a time;

a

structure of an individual,

a

the difference seems to be that the criteria
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for -same property-

(and perhaps also for "same
individual- and

•same time-) are less rigid (looser).

Using this conception of an event,
it is easy to see how

Feldman might become convinced that
being amused is

a

merely

contingent property of certain events
which consists in a person's
having a feeling at some time t.

For if the same event can make

-being very amused- and -being amused
about what happened to the

chickens- true, then perhaps the very
same event could make

something similar true like -being entertained
by the story about
the chickens', which perhaps does not
imply being amused, but is

nonetheless similar.

In such a case,

argue that Jones' being amused is

a

it might seem plausible to

contingent property of the event

which makes both 'Jones is entertained' and
'Jones is amused" true.
Hence, there is a world in which this event occurs
without anyone's

being amused.
However, if the property involved is not "being amused" (having
a particular feeling)

Feldman

s

but "having a feeling",

argument can be made.

i

do not see how

For Feldman has to argue that the

^®ty same event which constitutes Jones' having a feeling can occur

without anyone'

s

having a feeling.

Perhaps Feldman would argue that

Jones' having a feeling is an accidental property of some event more

generally described, such as Jones' having

a

perception.

But

feeling, if it is a form of perception at all, is a very different
form of perception from other forms of perception such as seeing and
hearing, and no plausible criterion of event identity would be so
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broad that seeing a chair makes
-I have a feeling- true
(unless
'feeling' has been given a greatly
expanded sense).

The problem

with Feldman's argument is that
it must be possible for the
very
same event which consists in Jones'
having a feeling at

even though Jones has no feeling at
all.
t

instead.

t

to occur

Perhaps he sees a chair at

But Jones' seeing a chair is a
different event

altogether from Jones' having a feeling;
if no one has a feeling at
t,

then certainly Jones doesn't either,
and the event of Jones

having a feeling doesn't occur.

Hence, this is not an example of

a

possible world in which the very same event
occurs but Jones does
not have a feeling.

Feldman is perhaps right that for any candidate
essential

property of some individual

a,

it is possible to redescribe a in a

more general way to that e appears to be a merely
accidental

property of
really

a.

b,

the newly described a, and then claim that b is

It is this type of reasoning according to which
being

alive and even being a person is

a

merely contingent property of

someone (or something), who might continue to exist after death
even
though he (or it) is no longer alive or

Feldman does not say what

I

really am if

person.

a
I

(Of course,

am not a person)

.

While

this type of reasoning might work at a fairly specific level of

description,

it does not continue to work indefinitely.

For

eventually, the redescription becomes so general that it is no
longer plausible to maintain the identity between the old

individual, a, and the newly described individual,

b.

Thus, in the
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case of having

a

feeling, it is implausible to
maintain that having

feeling is really just an accidental
property of a mote generally
described event such as having a
perception.
For even if feeling is
a form of perception, it is
a very specific type of
perception, and
a

seeing a chair (a different form
of perception) could not
possibly

count as the very same event as having a
feeling of pain on any

reasonable criterion of event identity.
I

conclude, then, that Feldman's "de-essentialization
by

redescription" does not work in every instance,
and hence that

Kripke's premise

2,

if construed to read "having a feeling-

of -having a feeling of pain",

instead

is not susceptible to Feldman's

refutation.

Furthermore, Feldman states that Kripke's argument
rests on an

undefended intuition about essential properties.
well point out that Feldman's argument rests on

One might just as
a

poorly defined and

unclear conception of events, and that, if he is going
to be

successful in refuting Kripke's argument, he owes us

a

better

explanation of his conception of "concrete events".

2. 6

Even if
premise

5,

is sound.
it.

I

Other Issues Relating to Duali sm

have shown that Feldman has failed to refute Kripke's

of course,

I

have not demonstrated that either argument

My defense of premise

However, premise

2

5

constitutes indirect support for

is also important:

the claim that certain
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terms which designate mental
states are rigid designators.

This

question seems to turn on the question
whether being a pain is an
essential property of a feeling of
pain, while we saw that this
may
not be the case, yet being a feeling
does seem to be an essential

property, so the argument works with
'feeling' substituted for
'

pain'

The Problem of Interaction
Even if Kripke's argument

B

is sound,

however,

it at most

constitutes an argument for some form of property
dualism,
of events,

not the "full-blooded"

Descartes advocated.

a

dualism

substantial dualism which

However, even if an argument for

a

theory

cannot be refuted, if the theory has insuperable
difficulties
elsewhere, then the best possible argument will not
get us very
far.

It

is believed by many people that interaction
is such an

insuperable problem for dualism, so that even if one can
give

a

sound and apparently non-trivial argument for dualism, yet the

problem of interaction has sometimes frightened away even the most
loyal of defenders.

There are several different arguments which purport to show
that interaction between mind and body cannot be explained on

dualist account.

One is the argument from conservation of energy.

Michael Levin states one formulation of this argument in the
following passage:

a

30
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Another traditional argument.
. .does
seem to show
decisively that the causal
relations between the mind
as
it and the body are
impossible!
OrJoinanf
originally my leg, which has
mass w, is motionless
Then
It moves distance d.
Enough work was done rrmo^^a
m!L
w a distance d. where did
the energy come £10!?%^ t
empirical tact, the law o£ the
conservation orenergy
=°'"^“here, and not o^ly
does U%omrir
preceding physical event, no
i
possibly supply mechanical
^
apply no physical force to the
leg
contraction of the hamstring muscle
supplies
lust the right amount - and the
bodily event jus^irL
motion of an object of mass w through
distance d. ~hus
the contraction of the muscle
is the cause of e.
if there
were non-physical causes of
physical events, the energy in
the universe would increase.

T

•

The main point is that an immaterial
object cannot impart motion to
a material object.

If a thought is an immaterial
object with no

material properties, then it seems
impossible to conceive that

a

thought could impart physical motion to
my arm, or to any physical
body.

Of course, interaction seems to be an
undeniable fact of

life.

A thought of embarrassment can make
my face turn red, while

my poor physical condition can cause me to
become depressed.
it seems,

Yet,

this interaction cannot be accounted for on
dualist

principles.
Why is interaction seemingly unsolvable within
a dualist

framework?

The chief reason for this is that dualists and

materialists both accept

a

common conception of what mind or

mental event is and what a body or physical event is.

a

They then

proceed to debate whether, based on these conceptions, mind and body
are identical or distinct.

Often, these conceptions are Cartesian

in nature: body is extended, material, and exists in space while
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mind is unextended, inmaterial,
and does not exist in space.
Given
these assumptions, it is no
wonder that the mind-body
problem seems
unsolvable, or that interaction
presents a problem for the dualist.
For, by accepting these
conceptions of mind and body, the
dualist is

forced to argue that something
which essentially has a property
(e.g. a material object), can
interact with something which

essentially lacks that property (e.g.
an immaterial object).

This

might be possible if either object
had other properties through

which they might interact, but,
unfortunately, mental and physical

events are often conceived as having only
one essential property (in
fact, that this is so was a cardinal
doctrine of Descartes).

This

conception of mind and body makes it possible
to use Leibnix's Law
to quickly demonstrate distinctness of
mind and body.

However, the

price of having such a conception of mind and body
is that

interaction is difficult if not impossible to account
for.
Of course, a dualist is simply committed to the
distinctness of

mind and body, or of mental events and physical
events.

It is not

inconsistent with the principles of dualism to draw the
mind-body or

mental-physical distinction in such
dichotomy.

Because

I

a

way that it marks out a

believe that it is fruitless to try to solve

the problem of interaction until the mental-physical distinction

itself is examined more closely,

issue until Chapter

6,

distinction in Chapter

after
5.

I

I

defer further discussion of this

discuss the mental-physical
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Consequence of Krip ke's

View.<.

on

unfortunately, Kripke does not,
to my knowledge, comment
on the
problem of interaction. Furthermore,
he does not say how he
thinks
the distinction between mental
events and physical events should
be
drawn.

However,

it is worth pointing out
one apparent consequence

of his theory that the origin
of something is an essential
property
of that thing.

It seems fairly clear that
some mental states

originate in the body.
pinched nerve, and

a

For example, a headache might
originate in

toothache originates in

a

tooth.

a

Furthermore,

it seems that we distinguish
between mental states according to

their different physical origins.

Thus, a headache which originates

in a different pinched nerve is
counted a different headache, even
if

It is roughly in the same phenomenal
location as the first.

Likewise, toothaches that originate in
different teeth are different

toothaches.

If

Kripke is right that the origin of something
is one

of Its essential properties,

then it may turn out that some mental

states have at least one physical property essentially,
viz. that
they originate in some particular part of the body.

Furthermore,

this consequence seems consistent with the way we do in
fact

individuate mental events such as feelings.

If

this is correct,

then Kripke may be committed to a more complicated view than

straight-forward dualism.
The relation between

a

feeling and the bodily state in which it

originates is typically described as being that of cause and
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effect.

For example, it might be said that
a pinched nerve causes

my headache, instead of saying that
my headache originates in a

pinched nerve.
although

It is not clear that these claims
are consistent,

origin

and 'cause' are not synonymous.

that the origin of

x

One difference is

is sometimes the very first of a
chain of

events which ultimately lead to x, while the
cause of something

usually immediately precedes
man sometimes focus on

a

x.

Thus, questions about the origin of

"missing link" which would bridge the gulf

between man and beast; if such a missing link were
discovered, it
would not be described as the cause of mankind, although
it would be

plausible to claim that mankind originated in this creature.

From a

poiut of view, of course, human life originated in the

Garden of Eden.
If it is objected that the above consequence of Kripke's
views

about origin depend on an undefended and controversial distinction

between the physical cause and the physical origin which Kripke
might not accept,

I

reply that Kripke does explicitly argue that it

is an essential property of a person that he came from the sperm and

egg that he in fact came from.

And a sperm and egg would ordinarily

be taken to be physical things (at least they have physical

properties: whether they are "purely" physical depends on how one

analyzes the fact that they are living things)

.

Hence, Kripke is

certainly committed to the claim that a person has at least on
essential property which is physical: viz. that he came into being
in virtue of the union of two particular physical things,

i.e. a
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certain sperm and a certain egg.

Furthermore, Kripke seems to

accept a general similarity between
the types of arguments which

purport to show person-body distinctness
and mental-physical
distinctness.

Hence,

I

believe he would accept this
consequence for

mental states as well (that they
essentially originate in some
particular bodily state).

once this consequence has been pointed
out, it begins to appear
that -mental- and -physical- are more
Intimately intertwined than
the formulations of the mind-body
problem would lead us to believe.

To use another example of this, let us
consider premise

3

in

Kripke's argument for dualism:
3.

Let 'B' be a rigid designator of Descartes'
body or of
some bodily state.

The problem here is that, in an argument purporting
to show the

distinctness of Descartes from his body, Descartes' body
is
Identified by reference to Descartes.

While it might be thought

that Descartes' body could be identified in some other way
(e.g.

ostensively)

,

the problem is even greater when one considers the

problem of saying which bodily state one wishes to designate by
'B'.

If one says "the bodily state associated with some feeling
of

pain", then he has relied on the feeling of pain to individuate the

bodily state.

But this is to assume their distinctness.

For if

x

is identical to y, then y cannot be the individuating principle of
X.

In other words,

nothing can be its own individuating principle.

This problem is usually side-stepped in favor of some

description such as "C-fiber firings".

However, it is

a

generally
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accepted fact that it is not possible
to find a physiological state
Which correlates strictly with
pain.
Hence, the description of
-C-fiber firings- to pick out the
bodily state is based on a

misconception.

Furthermore, even if C-fiber firings
did correlate

with pain, it would be necessary to
specify which C-fiber firings
one wanted to pick out as being
correlated with some particular

feeling of pain.

And one would also have to specify
what other

parts or states of the body he wished
to include in the reference of
•bodily state B'.

The only way to distinguish among bodily
states

IS by picking out those that contribute
in some way to the feeling

of pain.

But, once again, this is to use the mental
state whose

distinctness from the bodily state is being proved
as

individuation for the bodily state.

a

principle of

Of course, one might say "the

total bodily state", but then the issue would be formulated
as being

whether a particular feeling of pain is identical to or distinct
from the entire bodily state of some body.

But no clear-minded

materialist would want to identify a feeling of pain with

a total

bodily state — for then if any other mental events were occurring
simultaneously, there would be nothing to identity them with.

And

now one must still specify the state of which body he wishes to

identify with pain.

But this is the same type of circularity we

were trying to avoid]

The problem of identifying some bodily state which "correlates"
with pain may appear to be
3,

a

problem for Kripke in stating premise

but it's really more a problem for the identity theorist.

For
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Kripke-s argument can apply to any
bodily state the identity
theorist wishes to choose, while the
latter must specify some bodily
state to identify with any feeling
which might be considered. This
creates a serious problem for the
Identity theorist because there
is
no non-circular way of specifying
which brain state is to be
identified with (e.g.) pain.
(e.g.,

Either he uses some mental criterion

-the bodily state correlated with
pain-), or he doesn't,

he uses a mental criterion,

if

then he has already conceded the

argument to dualism, for the individuating
principle must be
distinct from x, otherwise it could not
serve as
designator.

a

rigid

One the other hand, if he doesn't rely
on a mental

criterion of some kind, he will never succeed
in picking out the
right brain state, for then the materialist
must devise some purely

physical criterion for picking out the brain state.

Because there

is no bodily state that correlates strictly
with pain,

how this can be done.

I

do not see
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CHAPTER

III

DONALD DAVIDSON'S ANOMALOUS MONISM

3

•

1

Introduction

some philosophers have rejected both
dualism and materialism in
favor of views which try to find a
middle ground between these two
positions.

Donald Davidson is an example of such

philosopher.

a

While Davidson is well-known for his work
on action theory and on
causation, he has also published several
articles which relate

directly to the mind-body issue.
articles.

While

I

In this chapter,

I

discuss these

mainly discuss "Mental Events",

I

also refer to

"Philosophy as Psychology" and "The Material Mind".^
Davidson's primary purpose in "Mental Events" is to show how
three principles he believes are true can be rendered
consistent
with one another.

In section 3.2,

I

state these three principles.

Davidson believes that these principles can be reconciled by
adopting what he calls anomalous monism.

This view can roughly be

stated as saying that no mental descriptions instantiate

deterministic scientific law.

I

a strict,

formulate this principle of

anomalous monism in section 3.2 and show how it resolves the
apparent inconsistency.
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Most Of this chapter is devoted
to examining the merits of
anomalous monism as Davidson formulates
It.
In section 3.3, i

formulate what
monism.

I

take to be Davidson's main argument
for anomalous

This argument has as its conclusion
the claim that there

are no psychophysical laws, from
this conclusion one can derive
anomalous monism with only a few additional
assumptions.
One factor on which the plausibility
of Davidson’s defense of

anomalous monism depends is the correctness
of and way in which he
draws the distinction between mental and
physical events.

this issue in section 3.4.

l

discuss

I

argue that Davidson's conception of

mental events is too restricted and that his
criterion that an event
is mental just in case it falls under a
mental description leads to

unacceptable results.
Davidson's argument for anomalous monism also depends for
its

soundness on the claim that any scientific law must draw on
homonomic domain.

a

This claim, together with Davidson's claim that

the physical conceptual domain is homonomic, has important

consequences for Davidson's theory and for scientific law.
examine this claim and these consequences in section 3.5.

I

One

consequence is that the physical conceptual domain includes only the
languages of chemistry and physics and does not include the
languages of biology and neurology which are heteronomic.

It also

means that Davidson must identify mental events with molecular
events rather than with brain events.

consequences in this section.

I

discuss these and other
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In section 3.6

I

place Davidson's claim that a
scientific law

must draw on a homonomic domain
within the context of his argument
that there are no psychophysical
laws.
The claim that there are no

psychophysical laws is the main result he
needs to justify anomalous
monism.
I conclude that since
Davidson does not argue for the claim
that scientific laws must draw on a
homonomic domain, and since
there are reasons for doubting that
this is so, that he has failed
to establish anomalous monism and that
there are good reasons for

doubting that anomalous monism is true.

Furthermore, since it is by

adopting the principle of anomalous monism
that Davidson reconciles
the apparent inconsistency in the three
principles he believes to be

true,

I

conclude that Davidson has failed to establish
that his way

of reconciling these principles is correct.

This is not, however,

to deny that he has provided a way of reading these
principles which

renders them logically consistent with each other.

Davidson also gives
and physical events.

demonstration of the identity of mental

a

In section 3.7

as an explicit argument.

I

I

formulate this demonstration

conclude that this demonstration fails

because it depends on two claims which Davidson has not established
and which seem very dubious.

The first claim is the one discussed

in section 3.4 which states that an event is physical just in case
it has a physical description.

The second claim is the principle of

anomalous monism, which is discussed in section 3.5.
In section 3.8

I

briefly summarize the chapter.

I

conclude

that Davidson has failed to establish either the "anomalous" part or
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the

monism" part of anomalous monism,

Furthermore, there are good

reasons for doubting anomalous
monism.

^•2

Davidson's Views in "Mental Events*

In "Mental Events", Davidson
formulates three principles which

he believes to be true but which seem
to be inconsistent with each

other.

2

I.

II.

III.

These principles are as follows:
At least some mental events interact
causally with
physical events (the Principle of Causal
Interaction).

Where there is causality, there must be a
law: events
related as cause and effect fall under strict
deterministic laws, (the Principle of the Nomological
Character of Causality)
There are no strict deterministic laws on the
basis of
which mental events can be predicted and explained.
(the Anomalism of the Mental).

Although the inconsistency is not formal and explicit in the

above three statements, it can be made explicit as follows:
1.

There exists at least one mental event m and physical
event p such that m causes p, and there exists at least
one physical event p' and mental event m' such that p'
causes m'

2.

For any events x and y, if x causes y or y causes x,
then there exists some strict deterministic law L such
that X and y fall under L.

3.

There exists no strict deterministic law
any mental event falls under L.

4.

Therefore, there exists some strict deterministic law
such that mental event m and physical event p fall
under L'
(1,2)
L'

.

L

such that
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statement
1

and

4,

which contradicts statement

3,

follows from statements

2.

Davidson attempts to resolve the
apparent inconsistency in the
above three principles by revising
li, the principle of the

Homological Character of Causality, and
III, the Anomalism of the
Mental.

Fundamental to his solution is his claim
that events are

mental only as described.

Davidson believes that

have both a physical description and

a

a

single event can

mental description, and that

whether an event is mental or physical depends
on how it is
described.

This allows him to say that principle III
applies to

events only described as mental.

He then reads principle II as

saying that when events are related as cause
and effect, they have

descriptions that instantiate

a law.

now reformulate Davidson's principles to show how
the

I

inconsistency is eliminated:
I'. At least some mental events interact causally
with

physical events,
II'

.

•

Now

I'

(the Principle of Causal Interaction).

For any events x and y, if x causes y or
y causes x,
then, there exists a strict deterministic law L and a
description d(x) such that d(x) and d(y) instantiate L.

There is no strict deterministic law L and description
d(x) of any event x such that d(x) instantiates L,
where d(x) is a mental description of x.
and II'

together only imply that:

IV. There exists

a description d(x) and a description d(y)
and law L such that d(x) and d(y) instantiate L.

IV

does not contradict III', since

IV

does not assert that d(x)
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and d(y) must be

ment^

descriptions,

m

fact, as „e shall see

Davidson maintains they must be
physical.

Davidson's Argument for Anomalou.<^ Mnnicr.

In order to reconcile the three
principles which he cites,

Davidson adopts a position he calls
anomalous monism.

He

characterizes this position as follows:^

Anomalous monism resembles materialism
in its claim that
all events are physical, but rejects
the thesis, usually
considered essential to materialism, that
mental phenomena
can be given purely physical explanations.
Anomalous
monism shows an ontological bias only in
that it allows
the possibility that not all events are
mental, while
insisting that all events are physical.

Davidson has characterized his position as

a

conceptual dualism and ontological monism.^

combination of
It is conceptual

dualism in that he does not believe that mental descriptions
can be
reduced to physical descriptions, or vice versa.

It is

ontologically monistic in that he believes that mental events are
identical to physical events.

The form of monism is materialism; he

believes that, ontologically speaking, mental and physical events
are physical events, even if they have mental descriptions.
In addition to conceptual dualism and ontological materialism,

Davidson's anomalous monism involves the view that there are no

psychophysical laws.

which formulates

a

A psychophysical law for Davidson would be one

lawlike connection between

a

psychological event
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and a physical event,

m

fact, principle

in'

as formulated above

explicitly states this view:
<^®terministlc law L and description
of any event x such that d(x)
instantiates L,
where d(x) is a mental description
of

dU)

x.

in this section,

1

primarily discuss Davidson's argument
for III'.

Davidson devotes much of "Mental Events"
to defending in'.
While he does not formally state his
argument, it is possible to

construct a formal argument on the basis
of several passages.
•

>

include
.a

5

In our daily traffic with events
and actions that must be
foreseen or understood, we perforce make use
of the
sketchy summary generalization, for we do
not know a more
accurate law, or if we do, we lack a description
of the
particular events in which we are interested that
would
show the relevance of the law. But there
is an important
distinction to be made within the category of the
rude
rule of thumb.
On the one hand, there are generalizations
whose positive instances give us reason to believe
the
generalization itself could be improved be adding further
provisos and conditions stated in the same general
vocabulary as the original generalization. Such a
generalization points to the form and vocabulary of the
finished law: we may say that it is a homonomic
generalization. On the other hand there are
generalizations which when instantiated may give us reason
to believe there is a precise law at work, but one that
can be stated only by shifting to a different vocabulary.
We may call such generalizations heteronomic.

suppose most of our practical lore (and science) is
heteronomic. This is because a law can hope to be
precise, explicit, and as exceptionless as possible only
if it draws its concepts from a comprehensive closed
theory.
This ideal theory may or may not be
deterministic, but it is if any true theory is. Within
the physical sciences we do find homonomic
generalizations, generalizations such that if the evidence
supports them, we then have reason to believe they may be
sharpened indefinitely be drawing upon further physical
concepts: there is a theoretical asymptote of perfect
coherence with all the evidence, perfect predictability
I

These
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total explanation (again
under the terms of the system).
Or perhaps the ultimate
theory IS probabilistic, and the
asymptote is less than
perfection; but in that case there
will be no better to be

f

Elsewhere, he says:

There are no strict psychophysical
laws because of the
disparate commitments of the mental and
the physical
schemes.
It is a feature of physical
reality that
physical change can be explained by
laws that connect it
with other changes and conditions
physically described.
It is a feature of the mental
that the attribution of
mental phenomena must be responsible to
the background of
reasons, beliefs, and intentions of the
individual.
There
cannot be tight connections between
the realms if each is
to retain allegiance to its proper
source of evidence.
Based on the above passages, the following
argument can be

4.

constructed
1

.

For any scientific law L which exists,
there exists a
set of terms and descriptions which forms
a closed,

homonomic domain whose elements are drawn on by

L.

2.

There exist scientific physical laws.

3.

Therefore, there exists a set of terms
and descriptions
which forms a closed, homonomic (physical)
domain which
physical laws draw on. (1,2)
If there exists a scientific
psychophysical law L',

then there exists a set of terms and descriptions
which
forms a closed, homonomic domain which is drawn
on bv
^

L'

5.

.

The set of terms and descriptions drawn on by a
psychophysical law is not a closed homonomic domain.
,

6.

Therefore, no psychophysical laws exist. (4,5)

Does this argument, whose conclusion is that there are no

psychophysical laws, provide

a

defense of III', the principle that

no mental descriptions instantiate a law?

Davidson says that the

claim that there cannot be psychophysical laws "is not quite the
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principle of the anomalism of the
e mencai, but on
reasonable
assumptions entai Is it-.^ Such
an argument can be
constructed as
follows
^ ^

deterministic law L and description
instantiates L,
wherP^dfT-^'"^''^
re d(x) IS a mental description
of x, only if L is
psychophysical law or a psychological
law.

*

""

8.

There are no psychophysical
laws.

9.

There are no psychological laws.

10

.

a

Therefore, there IS no strict
deterministic law L and
description d(x) of any event x such
that d(x)
instantiates L, where d(x) is a mental
description of
X.
(7,8,9)

Davidson would undoubtedly give the
same argument for

9

gives for 8: that psychological laws
do not draw on

homonomic

domain.

Hence, statements

1

-

a

that he

10 together constitute an
argument

for III', the principle of
anomalous monism.

Clearly, however, the

argument for the claim that there
are no psychological laws
(statement

6)

is the most important part
of the argument.

now consider the argument for this
claim, statements

1

-

Hence,
6

I

above.

There are several important issues
and claims relating to this
argument.

One is the issue regarding how to draw
the distinction

between mental and physical events and between
mental and physical
descriptions.

Another is Davidson's claim that

a

scientific law

must draw on a set of concepts and descriptions
which forms
closed, homonomic domain.

a

He also claims that the set of physical

concepts and descriptions does, and the set of mental
concepts and
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descriptions does not, form such

a

closed homonomic domain,

i

discuss these issues and claims in
the following two sections.

^Q^J-dson's View o f Mental and Physical
Events

One fundamental assumption which seems
implicit in most

discussions of the mind-body problem,
including Davidson's, is that
there is a definite and definable
distinction between what is mental
and what is physical, and between the
terms 'mental' and

•physical'.

Davidson explicitly directs his discussion
towards

mental and physical events, but similar
questions arise in relation
to distinguishing between mental and
physical descriptions,

substances, processes, states, attributes, objects,
subjects,
phenomena, causes, effects, and properties.

Even those who admit

that they cannot provide a satisfactory way of drawing
"the"

mental-physical distinction nevertheless insist it can be done,
at
least "in principle".

How someone who discusses the mind-body problem draws the

mental-physical distinction is very important in relation to the
discussion.

For there is a variety of mental phenomena, and it is

easy for someone to make the mistake of thinking he or she has given
and account of all mental phenomena, when what is said applies only
to one type.

For example, supporters of the identity thesis tend to

use sensations as their "paradigm" mental phenomenon; if they

considered emotions they would find that their arguments are less
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compelling.

Davidson restricts his discussion
to mental events.

indeed to ones having intentionality.

Like many philosophers, he

assumes the primary problem is to
characterise "the mental-, while

characterizing the -physical- is a secondary
problem which follows

naturally from solving the primary
problem.^
I

now consider Davidson's attempt to
distinguish between mental

and physical events.

He begins by suggesting that "an
event is

physical if it is describable in

a

purely physical vocabulary,

mental if describable in mental terms'.^

He rejects this

criterion if it means that an event is physical
if some physical
predicate is true of it.

He does so on the grounds that:^^

Every event is truly describable either by 'x
took place
at Noosa Heads' or 'x did not take place at
Noosa Heads'.

Next Davidson offers the following criterion for distinguishing
mental verbs from non-mental verbs:^^

We may call those verbs mental that express propositional
attitudes like believing, intending, desiring, hoping,
knowing, perceiving, noticing, remembering, and so on.
Such verbs are characterized by the fact that they
sometimes figure in sentences with subjects that refer to
persons, and are completed by embedded sentences in which
the usual rules of substitution appear to break down.
He then offers an example to show that it includes many events we

would intuitively accept as physical:
However, the criterion actually covers not only the
havings of pain and afterimages, but much more besides.
Take some event one would intuitively accept as physical,
let's say the collision of two stars in distant space.
There must be a purely physical predicate 'Px' true of
this collision, and of others, but true of only this one
at the time it occurred.
This particular time, though,
may be pinpointed as the same time that Jones notices that
a pencil starts to roll across his desk.
The distant
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stellar collision is thus Uie
event x such that Px and x
IS simultaneous with Jones's
noticing that a pencil starts
collision has
bee^
mental description and must be
v-tJUMi.eu
counted
db
as
Tmenf
a
mental event.

L

Davidson correctly concludes that
-this strategy will probably
worK
to show every event to be mental",
A similar strategy shows
every event to be physical.

Simply

reverse the example and take as an
intuitively mental event Jones'

noticing that a pencil starts to roll
across his desk.

Suppose that

there is a purely mental predicate
'Mx' true of this act of

noticing, and of others, but true of only
this one at the time it

occurred.

This particular time, though, may be
pinpointed as the

same time two stars collide in distant
space.
is thus Uie event x such that Mx and

collision of two distant stars.

picked out be

a

x

The act of noticing

is simultaneous with the

This act of noticing has now been

physical description and must be counted as

a

physical event.
Davidson's criterion seems to leave us with the conclusion
that
every event is mental and every event is physical.

This may not be

an undesirable result, but it requires further examination.

Ordinarily, "x is mental" is thought to rule out "x is physical";
they are regarded as being mutually exclusive categories.

Davidson

appears to accept this conception of the relation between "mental"
and "physical".

Commenting on the strategy which shows every event

to be mental, he says "it would be instructive to try to mend this

trouble".

14
I

now consider how this could be done.
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According to Davidson*s criterion,
an event is cental if and
only if it can be picked out
be a mental description
or open
sentence, where this is one which
contains at least one mental
verb
essentially. Often a description
picks out some property or
feature
Which an event can have or relation
it can stand in, and ascribes
this property, feature, or
relation to the event. One reason

Davidson's criterion doesn't work
is because mental events can
stand
in relations to physical events,
and physical events can stand
in
relations to mental events,

m

Davidson's example, the distant

stellar collision stands in the
relation of simultaneity to Jones'
act of noticing that a pencil started
to roll across his desk.

Likewise (though this reciprocity doesn't
hold for all relations),
Jones' noticing act stands in the
relation of simultaneity to the

distant stellar collision.

Hence, the distant stellar collision can

be picked out by a description which specifies
this relation of

simultaneity to the act of noticing, and vice versa.
These examples are not idiosyncratic; in fact, every
mental
event and every physical event stands in many types of
relation.

Some are more trivial than others, but this does not mean
they do
not obtain.

A new Rolls Royce which is the grand prize in a
drawing

might be the object of the desires of hundreds, thousands, or
even

millions of people.

An astronomical event such as a solar eclipse

can be viewed by millions of people; this event is the object of

perception by them.

We can pick out

a

physical object by saying

Ill
It s the one I'm lookinq
>!ing at"
at

in
In alli t-u
these examples, mental and

.

Physical events stand in relations
to each other.
It might be suggested
that we rule out descriptions
which

ascribe relations to events in
our criterion for mental
and physical
events. Besides being arbitrary,
it would often be difficult
to
specify location or place.

For example, suppose a group
of

identical bottles (identical in
type) is being processed
through a
bottling plant. The most natural
way, and perhaps the only way,
to
distinguish them is by their position
or their relation(s) to some

other thing.

For example, one might say "The
bottle in the front

row, second from the left".

This is to identify the bottle by

appealing to its position in the row.

identify objects without specifying

a

Of course,

sometimes we can

relation, as if only one

bottle is cracked, we can say "the cracked
bottle".

But in cases in

which a number of objects look the same, we
rely on relational
ascriptions.
The suggestion that we rule out relational
ascriptions is even
less attractive when applied to mental events.

For Davidson makes

intentionality his criterion of the mental, and intentional
verbs
carry a relational component.

This is sometimes expressed by saying

they have "aboutness", or they are "about" something.
that

I

might take the train and

I

think that

I

If

I

think

might take my car,

the difference between these thoughts us that one is about
the train

and the other is about my car.

objects of my thought.

The train and the car are the

Likewise,

I

might be angry at Jones, or have
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love for my best friend,
of intentional objects,

Identifying

a

while philosophers have debated the nature
it seems clear that in many cases at
least,

mental event requires making

a

relational ascription.

Often the relation ascribed is to the object of
the mental event,
which is physical in many cases.
It seems,

then,

that we cannot fix Davidson's criterion by

ruling out descriptions of relations from the set of
eligible

descriptions.

This still leaves us with Davidson's original

criterion, which seems to have unacceptable consequences.

Bernard

Katz spells out another, though similar, consequence of
Davidson's

criterion in these remarks: 15
Suppose m, a mental event, caused or was caused by
p, a
physical event. Then there will be a physical description
P which designates p, and m will be describable as 'the
cause of P' or 'the effect of P'
So if we accept the
additional claim that every mental event either caused or
was caused by a physical event, it will follow almost
immediately that every mental event has a physical
description.
This procedure for providing physical
descriptions to mental events is, no doubt, a trivial
one.
It does, however, accomplish the task Davidson sets
out for a proponent of the identity theory. Of course, if
this is what the identity theory comes to, one wants to
know who ever denied it.
.

Here Katz demonstrates another way of showing that it follows from

Davidson's criterion that events which we intuitively take to be

mental are physical, and vice versa; indeed, that all events (or at
least all those with physical or mental causes or effects) are both

mental and physical.

Davidson is certainly right in saying about the problem with
his criterion that "it would be instructive to try to mend this
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trouble-.

For what trying to mend this
trouble show is that the

very assumption that the ontological
distinction between mental and

physical events can be correctly drawn
by
suspect.

a

linguistic criterion is

Indeed, Davidson's assumption that
one can make the

effortless inference from

"x

has a mental description" to "x
is a

mental event" has unacceptable consequences.

Bernard Katz points

out two consequences of this assumption,
which he characterizes,

following Davidson, as "an event is mental
only under
description".

a

One way of reading this, he says, is "an
event is

mental only if it is correctly described by
means of
description".

a

mental

He says:^"^

Suppose M, a mental description, and P, a physical
description, are singular terms which designate the
same
event.
On this interpretation 'M is a mental event'
will
be true, while 'P is a mental event' will be
false.
A
consequence of this would be that mental events do not
form a well-defined set of events.
(If there were such a
set, the event designated by M would be a member
of it,
while the event designated by P would not; which is to
say
one and the same event would both be a member and not be a
member of the set.) Another consequence would be that the
central thesis of the identity theory - that every mental
event is identical with some physical event - would not
make clear sense. That claim, understood literally, could
be put as follows;
(Vx)(x is a mental event
event
x = y)

A

—^

(3y)(y is

a

physical

The truth conditions of this quantified sentence make
reference to the set of events which satisfy the
antecedent of the open sentence obtained by deleting the
initial quantifier.
That set, of course, is the set
defined by the open sentence 'x is a mental event', As we
have just seen, however, there is no such set.
Katz goes on to consider

a

different reading:^®
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A different reading of the
claim that events are mental
only as described might be that
mental events are just

those events which have mental
descriptions; that is
mental events form the subset of events
which have mental
descriptions.
If this is what is intended,
however, it
seems odd to say that events are "mental
only as
described": surely a mental event will be
mental (that is,
a member of the relevant subset)
regardless of how it is
described.
In any case, a problem with
Davidson's use of
this understanding of "mental events" is
that it should
come as a conclusion toward the end of an
argument in
favor the identity theory, and not as a
premiss at the
outset.
The assumption that there really is not any
ontological distinction to be made at all, or
that [the]
mental/physical distinction is only a linguistic one,
begs
the question.
For it presupposes the truth of an
important part of what is in dispute - namely, that
interesting forms of dualism (versions which assert
ontological as opposed to linguistic dualism) are mistaken.
As Katz says, by assuming in advance that the
mental-physical

distinction is only linguistic and not ontological, Davidson
assumes
the falsehood of ontological dualism.

But this is precisely the

question at issue.
I

conclude, then, that Davidson has failed to provide an

adequate criterion for distinguishing mental from physical events,
and that attempts to mend his criterion only further undermine the

assumption underlying it: that it is possible to provide

a

linguistic criterion for making the ontological distinction between
mental and physical events.

Not only does this assumption have

unacceptable consequences, but it also seems to beg the question
against the ontological dualist.
One fact which does emerge from the above discussion, however,
is one already alluded to in chapter II; namely,

that the concepts

"mental" and "physical" are much more closely interconnected than
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most discussions of the mind-body
problem indicate.

For these

discussions generally presuppose, as
Davidson's does, that there is
a clearly definable set of
mental events, objects, properties,
etc.
which is distinct from

a

objects, properties, etc.

clearly definable set of physical
events,
In fact,

it is this assumption which
has,

in large part, made the mind-body
problem seem unsolvable.

chapter V

I

discuss several attempts to find

identifying mental phenomena.

conceptions of what is physical.

single criterion for

a

In chapter VI,

In

i

distinguish three

If there are three conceptions of

what is physical, then there is not one clearly
definable set of

physical events, objects, properties, etc.

^

^

Ds^idson's Mental and Physical Domains

The first premise of Davidson's argument for premise III,
which

formulates anomalous monism, reads as follows:
1.

For every scientific law L there exists a set of
concepts and descriptions which forms a closed,
homonomic domain whose elements are drawn on by L.

This is the key premise in Davidson's argument, since, once this

premise is accepted, he goes on to argue that physical laws satisfy
this condition while psychophysical laws do not.

apparently believes that there is

a

Davidson

physical domain drawn on by

physical laws; this domain is homonomic.

The mental domain is not

homonomic, so any "laws" which must draw on this domain do not
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satisfy

necessary condition of scientific laws.

a

not scientific laws.
I

In this section,

I

Hence, they are

discuss premise

1.

argued in section 3.4 that Davidson
has not provided an

adequate or accurate way of distinguishing
mental from physical
events.

Arguments in section 3.4 also cast doubt
on his assumption

that the ontological mental-physical
distinction can be drawn by a

linguistic criterion.

The task in this section is linguistic
rather

than ontological: to consider whether there
is a homonomic physical

domain made up of physical concepts and descriptions
which is
distinct from a mental domain made up of mental terms
and
descriptions.

Then

I

will consider whether

a

scientific law must

draw on a homonomic domain.
First

I

consider whether there is a homonomic conceptual domain

of the physical made up of physical terms and descriptions.

question turns on whether there is

a set of

physical terms and

descriptions which is homonomic in Davidson's sense.
considering whether there is

a set of

This

I

begin by

physical terms and

descriptions.

Unfortunately, Davidson does not make any positive attempt to

characterize what is "physical".

He says this problem is

"recessive" in relation to characterizing what is "mental".

Davidson characterizes mental events by way of mental descriptions,
and mental descriptions are ones which contain at least one mental

verb essentially.

19

He says that "we may call those verbs mental

that express propositional attitudes like believing, intending.
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desiring, hoping, knowing, perceiving,
noticing, remembering, and so
20
«
on .
He admits that his criterion
does not include "events that

have often been considered paradigmatic
of the mental"^^ such as
feeling a pain or having an afterimage.

However, he does not choose

to modify his criterion.
If

Davidson is right that characterizing

a

physical vocabulary

IS -recessive" in relation to characterizing
the mental vocabulary,

then we might suppose he means that all verbs
which do not exhibit

intentionality are physical.

This does not seem acceptable,

however, even apart from mental verbs he admits
do not fit his

criterion such as 'to feel' as in "to feel

when what is seen is an afterimage.
'to be',

'lack',

'live'

market),

evolve',

do not seem

and "to see",

There are other verbs such as

(as in "He lives"),

neuter', 'boom', 'crash'

a pain"

'function', 'grow',

(both of which two can apply to the stock

'has', and 'pump' which are not intentional but

physical" either.

Let us see whether we can give a

positive characterization of a physical verb, or, more broadly,

a

physical vocabulary.

When some philosophers talk about
mean "the language of physics".

a

physical vocabulary, they

However, since Davidson's

discussion is directed towards the human brain and body,

I

doubt

whether he wants to restrict his description of neural events to

descriptions of mechanics, heat, acoustics, optics, electricity,
magnetism, and atomic structure.

If he does,

the physical events

would be molecular in nature, and certainly no one has succeeded in

reducing neurology to
V.
pjiybics.
physics

similar considerations
bimilar
rule out

saying "the language of chemistry
and physics",

such

a

ohacactetization would leave the statements
of the neurologist in
limbo between the mental and physical
domains.

Perhaps Davidson means be a physical
vocabulary "the language
Of the physical sciences'.

Let us suppose this, and suppose
what

i

not obvious: that biology and neurology,
as well as physics and

chemistry

,

are included in this domain.

What about the "vocabulary" or "domain"
part of our attempt to

define a physical vocabulary or domain?

Davidson originally draws

the homonomic/heteronomic distinction as
being between two types of

generalizations, but his talk of a physical "vocabulary"
makes it
clear that a conceptual domain is

a

subset of

a

broader language.

Hence, a conceptual domain must include certain logical
and

mathematical terms which are neither physical nor mental,
also have

a

syntax.

22

it will

This leaves the descriptive terms as being

the ones which make a conceptual domain of a certain type.

The

physical domain, then, will contain at least the following elements
1.

Logical terms ('and',

2.

Mathematical terms ('number', 'line', 'point', etc.).

'or',

'if, etc.)
The

mathematics chosen can be governed by pragmatic
considerations.
3.

Syntactic rules.

4.

Physical terms which are descriptive.
nouns, verbs, adjectives, or adverbs.

These terms can be
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Obviously, it is condition
a

4

which makes the above

physical domain; it is possible to construct

a

description of

description of

a

a

mental domain (and perhaps of other types as
well) by replacing the
term 'physical' with the term 'mental'

Given this conception of

a

(or some other term).

physical domain,

now consider

I

whether this domain is a closed, homonomic domain.

For the moment,

at least the languages of physics, chemistry,
biology, and neurology

are included within this domain (these are among the
physical

sciences); hence, the question turns on whether the
descriptive

terms and generalizations of these sciences are homonomic.
^

fi^st consider biology.

A widely accepted conception of

biology is that it is the study of living things or organisms.

Biologists study human beings, animals, and plants.
terms that occurs in biology is 'organ'

One descriptive

Examples of organs are

.

sense organs such as the eye, ear, nose, and the touch and taste
receptors.

Terms for biological organs exhibit

a

feature that is

common among biological terms: they are functionally defined.
means they apply by definition to things which perform
function.

a

This

certain

And in the case of a sense organ, the terms apply to

particular types of tissue that perform

a

mental function.

For

example, the ear is by definition a tissue of a certain type whose

function is to enable the organism to hear.

Likewise, the eye is by

definition an organ whose function is to enable the organism to see.
etc.

Hence, certain fundamental descriptive terms of biology

120

contain an implicit reference to the
mental domain, and could not be
allowed in a purely physical vocabulary.
Of course, the term 'eye' does refer
to an organ which has

physical aspect.

a

The eye is a mass of tissue, and
perhaps it can

also be considered as simply a piece of
matter.
were only to study the eye as

a

But if biologists

piece of matter, independent of its

mental function, they would really be treating
it from the viewpoint
of physics.

And from this viewpoint they would be unable
to account

for most of its interesting properties.

Hence, proposing to save

the homonomic nature of biological terms and
generalizations by

stripping these terms of their implicit mental reference
would be to

strip biology of much of its explanatory and descriptive
ability.
The following quotation from a discussion of human
vision helps

substantiate this point:

23

Hubei and Wiesel suggest that the interaction between
simple and complex cells may be important for the
allowing] issue:... the perception of patterns
irrespective of where they fall on the retina. Take a
vertical line--or an object with vertical edges--that is
located in front of you.
The vertical edge (or the line)
will excite a population of simple cells and a population
of complex ones, each with a vertical axis of
orientation.
A slight (saccadic) movement of your eye or
of the object will call into play a new population of
simple cells (because these cells are very sensitive to
the exact position of the line in the receptive field).
However, for a small movement the stimulus will still
excite the original population of complex cells (because
these cells are less sensitive to movement within the
receptive field)....

The following discussion of color vision by Peter Gouras also shows
how important the use of terms containing

a

mental reference are in

describing and explaining how human and animal eyes work: 24

Animals with color vision simply have great
perceptual
capability, and this presumably has great
survival value.
Think for a moment of a black and white
version of a work
by a colorist such as Turner, Monet, or
Renoir; almost a
million nuances of contrasting shapes are lost
by an
achromatic rendition of one of their works. This
high
degree of discrimination in color vision can
actually be
understood in quantitative terms. The subjective
experience of color can be broken down into three
semi-independent sensibilities: (1) hue, (2) saturation,
and (3) brightness. All color experience is composed
of
these three psychological impressions.
has the strongest effect on color and is the major
determinant of principal colors such as red, yellow,
green, and blue.
It is what we ordinarily mean by
color
This impression is determined by the proportion
in which the three cone mechanisms are activated by the
object and its background. The brain must keep track of
how much each of the three photoreceptor systems
contributes to the detection of an object. Most of us
have names for only a family of hues, but actually about
200 varieties can be distinguished.
The second distinct
quality of color is saturation which reflects how much a
hue has been diluted by grayness; this is determined by
the degree to which all three cone mechanisms are
stimulated in common by the object and by the background.
There are about 20 distinguishable steps of saturation for
each hue.
The third quality of color, bright ness is a sensation
shared with achromatic visual systems.
It is due to the
total effect on all three cone mechanisms of an object
relative to its background. We shall see later that one
of the three cone mechanisms (the so-called blue
mechanism) makes little or no contribution to brightness.
It is the brightness factor that turns orange into brown
and gray into black or white.
There are about 500
distinguishable steps of brightness for every hue and
grade of saturation.
In contrast to achromatic vision
with only 500 steps, color vision has more than 1 million
gradations with which to detect the contours of shapes in
the external world.... It is no wonder that natural
selection uncovered its power.
By the latter part of the eighteenth century it was
realized that the ability to experience myriad different
colors might not be due to an equivalent number of
detectors in the retina but to a minimum
number--three--with every color determined by the
proportions in which each of these three detectors
responds to light.
.

,

,
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The issue raised here regarding the
use of terms with a mental

reference in biology is related to a more
general issue discussed at
some length in the literature of the
philosophy of science.

This

issue is the one of functional explanation
within science.

There is also discussion of whether biology
can be "reduced" to
physics.

One important consideration in relation
to any such

reduction" is whether it is possible to give
a physical explanation
or definition of the concept of "life", a
fundamental concept in

biology.

While

I

won't pursue these more general questions here,

I

believe the discussion does show, as did the discussion
in chapter
II,

that 'mental' and 'physical' are more closely
interconnected

than they appear to be.

This result is examined in more detail in

chapter VII.
A more specific conclusion is that Davidson cannot include the

language of biology within his physical domain and also maintain
that this domain is homonomic.

Perhaps he could provide a

conception of "physical" which somehow disallows the above
objection.

But since he has not even provided a concept of what is

"physical",

I

conclude that either Davidson's physical domain is not

homonomic or else it does not include the language of biology.
Because the basis for Davidson's argument for anomalous monism is
his claim that the physical domain is homonomic,

I

believe he would

prefer to shrink his domain than to give up the homonomic nature of
the physical domain.

However, this leaves the language of biology
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in a nebulous middle domain between
the mental and the physical

domains.

Similar considerations show that the descriptive
terms of

neurology cannot be included in Davidson's
homonomic physical
domain.

The brain itself can be defined as the
part of the central

nervous system associated with thought, perception,
and emotion.
This is a definition in terms of a mental function.

Also, specific

parts of the brain are defined in relation to the mental
functions
they perform.

The cerebrum is the part associated with conscious

mental processes.

Other parts of the central nervous system such as

the touch and heat receptors are defined by their mental
function.
Hence, the language of neurology cannot be included in Davidson's

homonomic physical domain either.
This problem is related to one raised at the end of chapter
II.

Here

I

pointed out that if

a

materialist wishes to specify some

brain state to be identified with a mental state, he must either do
so via a mental criterion or a physical criterion.

If he uses a

mental criterion (e.g. "the bodily state correlated with pain"),
then he has already acknowledged the distinctness of pain from the

bodily state (since the individuating principle of

distinct from x).

x

must be

However, he cannot use a physical criterion since

there is no bodily state which correlates strictly with pain.

It

seems clear that a neurologist, who must succeed in picking out

neurological structures, does so in many cases via
criterion.

a

mental

Once he has picked them out, he can proceed to study how
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they function in relation to the rest
of the body, and in relation
to other mental functions.

Perhaps Davidson would reply that many
of the terms for the

mental functions such as 'seeing',

'hearing',

'touching', and

'tasting' by reference to which certain
organic structures are

defined do not exhibit intentionality and hence
do not fit his

criterion for being mental terms.

If this is so,

then terms which

implicitly refer to these supposedly mental functions
will still be
homonomic since the reference will still be to the
physical domain.
If Davidson wished to argue in this fashion,

it would be surprising,

since he lists 'perceiving' as a mental verb.^®

However, this

reply mostly shows the inadequacy of his criterion since
any

criterion which makes terms such as 'seeing', 'hearing', and
'feeling'

(which Davidson admits are paradigmatic of the mental)

non-mental is almost certainly wrong.
I

Finally, not all the examples

have given are of non-intentional verbs; for example, the cerebrum

was defined as being the part of the brain associated with conscious

mental processes.

Actually, many of these terms have intentional

and non-intentional uses (as Davidson acknowledges), so that

Davidson's criterion makes it difficult to decide whether

a

given

term is in an abstract conceptual domain or not.

Davidson might also reply that it is incorrect to view "the
organ of hearing" as

a

definition of 'ear'

,

and so on for the other

examples; that these are at most true descriptions of these organs.

While

I

don't accept this reply, it wouldn't help Davidson defend
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the homonomic character of biology
and neurology, since, on his own

principles, any event with a mental
description is a mental event.
Hence, generalizations such as "The
function of the ear is hearingand -The function of the cerebrum is to
enable the person to think-

will not be a part of the physical domain
because they are not
homonomic.

However, we saw earlier that a biology or
neurology

stripped of all reference to mental events would
really be physics
and would be so impoverished that it would not
accomplish the

purposes of its science.
If the languages of biology and neurology
are not to be

included in the physical domain, we seem to be left with
the

languages of chemistry and physics.

physical sciences;

I

(Of course, there are other

am picking representative examples).

The

question whether the conceptual domain consisting of the languages
of chemistry and physics is homonomic depends on whether the

descriptive terms of the fields are homonomic in the sense that they
do not contain a reference to any non-physical domain.

Examples of

such terms are 'kilogram',

'mass',

'energy',

'proton',

'gas',

'heat',

'field',

'wave',

'particle',

'calorie',

'watt', mile', etc.

The

objection raised for biological terms does not apply here since
these terms are not defined by reference to

a

mental function.

I

believe that one can raise important questions about these
phenomena; for example, they don't all fit the standard Cartesian

conception that physical things are extended.

Force fields, waves.

and rays do not seem to be extended in any obvious sense.

However,
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I

Win

not discuss this issue here and

win

grant that the language

of chemistry and physics forms
a closed, homonomic domain.

Let us recall the premise under
discussion:
1.

Now that

For every scientific law L there
exists a set of
concepts and descriptions which forms
a closed,
homonomic domain whose elements are
drawn on by L.
I

have discussed in some detail what
a homonomic conceptual

domain might look like, and have tried to
determine what Davidson's
homonomic physical domain is,

I

will look at Davidson's more general

claim that every scientific law must draw
on

D avidson's C laim that Every
a Homonomic Domain

a

homonomic domain.

Scientific Law Must Draw o n
~~
~~

Davidson does not argue for the claim that every
scientific law
must draw on a homonomic domain, but it has some
interesting

consequences.

One is that there are no scientific laws of biology,

neurology, psychology, history, sociology, or economics since
these

disciplines all draw on heteronomic conceptual domains.

Davidson

acknowledges this consequence in "Psychology as Philosophy"
The nomological i rreducibility of the psychological means,
if I am right, that the social sciences cannot be expected
to develop in ways exactly parallel to the physical
sciences, nor can we expect ever to be able to explain and
predict human behaviour with the kind of precision that is
possible in principle for physical phenomena.

Davidson also saysi^S
world impinges on a person, or he moves to modify
his environment, the interactions can be recorded and
codified in ways that have been refined by the social
sciences and common sense.
But what emerge are not the
VJhen the
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strict quantitative laws embedded in sophisticated
theory
that we confidently expect in physics, but
irreducibly
statistical correlations that resist, and resist
in
principle, improvement without limit.

This quotation invites the observation that Davidson
may be

operating with an outmoded conception of physical laws.

Since the

advent of quantum theory, scientists have come to believe
that many
laws of physics are statistical in nature; if this is
so, the

deterministic model of scientific law may be incorrect or only

partially correct.

Davidson says elsewhere of this that "perhaps

the ultimate theory is probabilistic and the asymptote is less than

perfection; but in that case there will be no better to be
had".

29

But if his basis for rejecting psychological laws is that

they are only statistical and cannot be improved without limit, then

perhaps probabilistic laws in physics should be rejected too.
Perhaps the problem is not the concept of probabilistic law but

Davidson's conception of scientific law.
The claim that scientific laws must draw on a homonomic domain

(premise

1

of Davidson's argument for principle III, which

formulates anomalous monism), is not only unargued for; it is not
self-evident or obviously true, as Ted Honderich observes: 3 0

There are then two descriptive domains or systems,
depending upon disparate connections between the systems.
There can be no psychophysical lawlike connections.
There is no gainsaying the difference between the two
domains, and the account given of the mental is perhaps
more impressive than any predecessor.... Still, we are not
given a reason for thinking that the given conclusion
follows from the description of the two domains. As
others have asked, what reason is there for thinking an
item which falls in one domain, and whose description then
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depends on X, cannot be in lawlike connection
with an item
in the other domain, whose description
then depends on Y?
There is no clear general truth to the
effect that there
cannot be lawlike connection between
items whose
descriptions have different necessary conditions.
There
appears to be no relevant sense in which two
domains can
be said to be 'closed' and which
precludes lawlike
connection without begging the question. What
then is the
relevant feature of this admittedly unique pair
of
domains? Davidson remarks that his argument
is not
proof.
It must also be said, I think, that
his argument
is at least crucially incomplete.

Davidson's requirement that scientific laws draw on

a

homonomic

domain also has an important consequence for his claim
that mental
events are identical to physical events.

For according to Davidson,

if some physical event F causes a mental event,

then there is a

physical description of the mental event which, together with

instantiates

a

physical law that draws on

a

F,

homonomic domain.

However, we saw above that the biological and neurological domains
are not homonomic, so that the physical event which the mental event
is identical to will not be a brain event but a chemical event or an

event involving concepts from physics such as mass, weight, or

atomic structure.

Furthermore, the physical event which causes the

mental event must be of this type as well.

This is not a happy

consequence for someone who finds it difficult to defend the view
that a mental event is identical to some "high-level" brain event.

Identifying

a

mental event with some molecular event is even less

plausible.

Bruce Goldberg comments on this tension within Davidson's use
of 'physical' and concludes that he is using this term in two

senses.

He begins with a quote from Davidson:
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The demonstration of identity
follows easily. Suppose
a mental event, caused
p, a physical event; then
under some description m and
p instantiate a law.
This
law can only be physical
But if m falls under a
physical law it has a physical description;
which is to
say It IS a physical event. 32
m,

The difficulty with this argument is
that it appears to
equivocate between two different senses of
the term
•physical'.
In one sense, that in which every
physical
event falls under a law, it is not clear
that mental
events do cause physical events.
In the other, that in
which there are clear classes of mental
events causing
physical ones, it is not clear that the physical
events
fall under any law.
An example of the sense of 'physical' according
to which
mental events cause physical events would be
Davidson's
case of a physical event, namely a certain bodily
movement, causing the sinking of a ship:
...and the fact that someone sank the Bismarck entails
that he moved his body in a way that was caused by
mental events of certain sorts, and that this bodily
movement caused the Bismarck to sink. 33
But a different sense of 'physical' that in which every
physical event falls under a law, appears to be involved
in the following passage, where Davidson is concerned with
the notion of an ultimate physical theory:

Physical theory promises to provide a comprehensive
closed system guaranteed to yield a standardized,
unique description of every physical event couched in
vocabulary amenable to law. 34

Davidson's requirement, then, that physical laws draw on

a

a

homonomi

domain entails that he use 'physical' in the sense of "physical
theory", while his attempt to solve problems of causation of mental

events leads him to use 'physical' in the sense in which the bodily

movement of
I

a

person is

a

physical event.

conclude the following with respect to premise

scientific law must draw on

a

homonomic domain)

1

(that a
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1.

Davidson has not established this premise
since he does
not argue for it.

2.

The premise is not obviously true, and
there are
reasons for doubting it.

3.

When this claim is coupled with Davidson's claim
that
the physical conceptual domain is homonomic,
the result
is that Davidson's physical domain shrinks to
the
languages of chemistry and physics.
This is so because
the conceptual domains of biology and neurology
are not
homonomic

4.

The premise is based on a deterministic conception
of
scientific law which does not take into account the
probabilistic nature of some laws of physics and
psychology.

5.

The premise has the consequence that there are no
scientific laws of biology, neurology, psychology,
history, or economics.
In order to defend this
consequence, an anomalous monist would have to give a
more convincing account of laws and explanation in
these sciences than Davidson's account in "Psychology
as Philosophy".

6.

This premise has undesirable consequences for
Davidson's identity claim, since Davidson is committed
to identifying mental events not with brain events but
with molecular events.

7.

This claim generates a fundamental tension within
Davidson's discussion between a restricted sense of
'physical' (as in the language of physics and
chemistry) and a broader sense in which a bodily
movement made by a person is a physical event.

3. 6

Davidson's Argument for Anomalous Monism

Let us now put premise

general argument.

1

in the context of Davidson's more

This premise is the first in an argument whose

conclusion is that there are no psychophysical laws:
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1.

For any scientific law L which exists,
there exists a
set of terms and descriptions which
forms a closed,
homonomic domain whose elements are drawn
on by
L.

I

2.

Physical laws exist.

3.

Therefore, there exists a set of terms and
descriptions
which forms a closed, homonomic (physical)
domain which
physical laws draw on. (1,2)

4.

If there exists a psychophysical law L'
then there
,
exists a set of terms and descriptions which
forms a
closed, homonomic domain that L' draws on.

5.

The set of terms and descriptions that a
psychophysical
law draws on is not a closed, homonomic domain.

6.

Therefore, no psychophysical law exists. (4,5)

also formulated the following four statements to make
complete an

argument for principle III'
10.

:

7.

There is

8.

There are no psychophysical laws.

9.

There are no psychological laws.

a strict deterministic law L and description
d(x) of any event x such that d(x) instantiates L,
where d(x) is a mental description of x, only if L is a
psychophysical law or a psychological law.

Therefore, there is no strict deterministic law L and
description d(x) of any event x such that d(x)
instantiates L, where d(x) is a mental description of
X.

(7,8,9)

Principle III', together with principles

I'

and II', represent

Davidson's way of reconciling three apparently incompatible
principles:
I

'

.

II'

.

At least some mental events interact causally with
physical events, (the Principle of Causal Interaction).

For any events x and y, if x causes y or y causes x,
then, there exists a strict deterministic law L and a
description d(x) such that d(x) and d(y) instantiate L.
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III'. There is no strict deterministic
law L and description
d(x) of any event x such that d(x)
instantiates L,
where d(x) is a mental description of
x.

Without premise

1

to help justify III',

Davidson has failed to establish III'.

i

conclude that

This does not mean that I',

II', and III' do not together form a
possible resolution of an

apparent contradiction.

It does mean, however,

that Davidson has

failed to establish that III' is true; furthermore,
there are
reasons to doubt that it is true.

These reasons to doubt it are

primarily the reasons listed above to doubt premise
scientific laws must draw on
based.

(that

homonomic domain) on which it is

These reason include the seemingly unacceptable consequences

of premise 1.

monism,

a

1

I

Since principle III' formulates Davidson's anomalous

conclude that Davidson has failed to establish anomalous

monism, and that there are good reasons for doubting that anomalous

monism is true.

3.7

Davidson's Demonstration of Identity

The monistic part of anomalous monism is the claim that mental

events are identical to physical events.

Davidson states his

demonstration as follows:^^
The demonstration of identity follows easily. Suppose m,
a mental event, caused p, a physical event; then, under
some description m and p instantiate a strict law. This
law can only be physical, according to the previous
paragraph.
But if m falls under a physical law, it has a
physical description; which is to say it is a physical
event. An analogous argument works when a physical event
causes a mental event.
So every mental event that is
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causally related to a physical event
is a
n order to establish anomalous
monism in
It would be sufficient to show
that every
cause or effect of some physical event;
I
attempt this.

physical event.
full generality
mental event is
shall not

We can construct the following argument
based on this passage:
1.

Suppose m, a mental event, causes
p, a physical event.

2.

If m causes p, then under some
descriptions d(m) and
d(p), m and p instantiate a strict law L.

3.

There is no strict deterministic law L and
description
d(x) of any event x such that d(x)
instantiates L,
where d(x) is a mental description of x.
'^he

only strict laws are physical laws.

5.

L

6.

If m falls under a physical law, it has a
physical
description.

7.

Therefore m,
event

is a physical law.

a

(1,2, 3, 4)

mental event, is identical to

There are two main objections to this argument.
to do with premise

7.

a

physical

The first has

We saw above that the quick inference from "x

has a physical description" to "x is a physical event" is

unacceptable.

It is unacceptable because it is possible to give a

mental description of any physical event.

Davidson sees this

problem but thinks it can be mended; on the contrary, the attempt to
mend it simply further exhibits the reasons why it is untenable.
this criterion, most and perhaps all events are both mental and

physical.

This conclusion might be acceptable to Davidson as

conceptual claim, but not as an ontological claim.
stellar collision should not be and is not
is, as Davidson admits,

if one assumes that

a

a

A distant

mental event. -Yet it
"x has a

mental

On
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description- justifies the inference to
"x is

a

mental event".

This

linguistic criterion should not be
mended; it should be abandoned.
Secondly, we saw above the Davidson
has failed to establish

anomalous monism, which is stated as premise

3.

Hence, Davidson has

not demonstrated that one can infer
from the fact that "m and p

instantiate

a

physical".

Davidson has failed to justify this crucial
step in his

strict law" to the claim that "that law
can only be

argument, and there are reasons for believing
that this inference is

fallacious.

premise

1

These reasons are the same as the reasons
for doubting

above, that scientific laws must draw on a
homonomic

domain.
In conclusion,

it seems clear that Davidson's "demonstration"

of identity relies on two very dubious claims: that
"x has a

physical description" implies "x is

a

that there are no psychophysical laws.

physical event" and the claim
The first claim seems

clearly unacceptable, while Davidson has not established the second
claim.

Furthermore, there are good reasons for believing that this

claim is false.

Hence,

I

conclude that Davidson has failed to

demonstrate the identity of mental events and physical events, and
that there are good reasons for doubting the correctness of his

attempt
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3*8

Conclusion

Davidson formulates anomalous
monism as a way of reconciling
three apparently incompatible
principles.

anomalous- part and

a •monistic- part,

Anomalous monism has an

and can be stated as follows:

law L and description
d(x) of any event x such that
d(x) instantiates L,
where d(x) is a mental description
of x.
2.

Mental events are identical to
physical events.

In this chapter,

I

have considered both these claims,

i

conclude

that Davidson fails to establish
either one of them, and that there

are good reasons for doubting his
arguments for both of them.

Thus,

unless further, different arguments are
made, there are good reasons
for doubting anomalous monism.
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CHAPTER

IV

DANIEL DENNETT'S DEFENSE OF FUNCTIONALISM

4.1

Introduction

In Brainstorms, Daniel Dennett gives
an account of mental

phenomena that is functional or intentional in
nature,

while the

book is a collection of essays, it nevertheless
constitutes a

sustained, if not completely systematic, attempt to
defend
of mind that he at one point calls "type
intentionalism"

a

theory

.

Dennett distinguishes this view from several other theories
which
have been variously advocated, including type identity theory,

Turing machine functionalism, and token functionalism.

apparently regards his theory as

Dennett

form of physicalism, and is

a

concerned to distinguish his formulation of physicalism from others
that have been offered.

Dennett characterizes type intentionalism as follows:^
If one insisted on giving a name to this theory, it could
be called type intentionalism every mental event is some
functional, physical event or other, and the types are
captured but by any reductionist language but by a
regimentation of the terms we ordinarily use - we explain
what beliefs are by systematizing the notion of a
believing-system, for instance.
:

In later chapters he makes an attempt to give such a systematized

account of a number of different mental phenomena, including
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consciousness, mental images, beliefs,
experience, and pain.

His

account of pain is one of the most
interesting, since pain is what
has been called a program-resistant’
feature of mentality.^ That
is,

it does not seem implausible to
suppose that computers can

simulate or duplicate certain -intellectualfeatures of mind such
as chess-playing or theorem-proving,
it seems much less plausible,
however, to ascribe other phenomena
such as feelings and emotions to
a computer.

Dennett's Flowchart of Pain

What

I

primarily wish to do here is to examine Dennett's

account of pain.

He devotes chapter 11 to giving such an account,

and it is given in terms of the language of cognitive
psychology.

Dennett begins by noting that, contrary to Turing,

a

computer

simulation need not be indistinguishable from what it models.

considers the example of a computer simulation of

a

He

hurricane, which

responds to descriptions of meteorological conditions with
descr iptions of subsequent hurricane behavior.
a

He compares to this

computer program which responds to descriptions of painful

occurrences which happen to
that person has.

a

person with descriptions of the pain

He goes on to say that what is needed is not a

simulation of pain but the actual synthesis of pain in

a

robot.

In

other words, the robot must actually be in pain, not merely simulate

or describe pain behavior.

Much of the rest of the paper
is devoted

to a discussion of this possibility.

Rather than claiming at the outset
that he can show how to

design a pain-feeling robot, Dennett
says he will attempt to

describe such

a

robot in terms of current physiological
theory

relating to pain, and then see how close
this description is to a

description of a pain-feeling robot.

He proceeds to draw a

flowchart making use of notions from cognitive
psychology, and then

discusses whether any system realizing this
flowchart would be in
pain.

While

I

am not so much concerned with the physiological

details of his account,

I

do wish to examine to what extent Dennett

has succeeded in giving an account of pain.

Dennett's flowchart looks like this:"^
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Figure 4-1.

Dennett's Flowchart of Pain

Here the journey of physiological response begins at the skin with
the nociceptors.

The outputs from these travel through either the

A-fibers or the C-fibers.

At the Melzack-Wall gate, according to

the Melzack-Wall theory,^ the A-fibers act to inhibit the effect
of the C-fibers.

The T-cell transmissions which are the output of
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this gate go either to the older portion
of the brain, the limbic

system, or through the thalamus to the
neocortex, the

phylogenetically newer part of the brain.
At this point, Dennett says that "we
must abandon the pretence

that our boxes represent anatomically
salient structures, and

proceed with
system-.^

a

purely functional, abstract breakdown of the

He then draws in a filtering system in
the "new high"

path to account for the fact that distracting
one's attention

diminishes pain.

The purpose of the belief box is to account
for

the fact that "when we have a pain we believe we
have a pain (at

least normally)".

The belief box is really

a

memory and belief

box, since "pains can be remembered, usually, for
some time".^

The "goals and desires" box, labeled 'desire', is there
in virtue of
the fact that pains are a reliable form of punishment.

The

ratiocination box reflects the "oft-used myth. ..that higher controls
in human beings is accomplished by something like logical processing
of the material in the belief and desire boxes"^

Finally, the

purpose of the boxes underneath the control center is to reflect the
control center's effects on behavior.
After discussing ways in which the above model can account for

various facts about pain, Dennett makes the following remarks:^*^
A related, but somewhat different question is this: can we
locate pain, as distinct from its typical causes and
effects, on the flow chart? The flow chart gives us a
functional description at what I have called the
sub-personal level.
I have labelled the various boxes
"belief", "desire", "action" and so forth, but that was
taking a liberty. The flow chart deals directly not with
a person's acts, beliefs, thoughts, feelings, but with the
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behind-the-scenes machinery that governs
speech and the
convenient to talk as if the obiects of
our attention, what we pay attention
to, were impulse
trains in the nervous system, to talk
as if the muffled
outputs from the filter were the
diminished pains, to talk
as If we recognize or fail to
recognize a neural signal as
a pain, but this is loose talk,
and the conceptual
confusions it invites are not inconsequential,
when we
retell the subpersonal story without
taking these
liberties we seem to be leaving something
out.

~

Since Dennett has given us what is supposed
to be a flowchart

description of pain, it is important to know
either where the place
for pain is on the flowchart or what the
relation is between pain

and the different phenomena on the flowchart.

Dennett considers the possibility of adding

a

"pain-box"^^

The silence of the sub-personal account here is
due simply
to the fact that pain itself does not appear
on our
flowchart, which seems to concern itself solely with
the
clauses and e ffects of pain.
As we trace through the chart
we find the causal contributions include nociceptor and
C fiber stimulation, T— cell activity, the
process of
perceptual analysis and the contributions thereto of old
low path activity; and among the effects we find muscle
contraction, avoidance reactions and. .powerful goal
modifications. The absence of a "pain" box might seem to
be a simple omission, easily corrected. The most
plausible place to insert a pain box is between the
perceptual analysis box and the higher control centers.
Isn't pain the result of perceptual analysis and the cause
of our reactions to discomfort?
Let us call the inserted
the pain center
Now what does it do? If one claims
its function is simply to serve as the locus for the
transmissions just mentioned, the go-between,
then
contrary to our suspicion, pain was already represented in
our model; we simply had not drawn a line around it.
If
the point is rather that there is a separable and terrible
something we had hitherto left out how could possibly add
it with this box?
.

.

Here Dennett suggests that it would be pointless to add a "pain-box"
-

either the pain was already there or the addition of such

would be pointless.

a

box

Dennett concludes that: 12
There is no way of adding a pain center
to the
sub-personal level without committing
flagrant category
mistakes, by confusing the personal
and sub-personal
levels of explanation.
He then suggests:!^

Let us consider instead the hypothesis
suggested by it,
VIZ., that we have simply not sent the
woods for the
trees, that pain is not to be found in
any one box of our
flowchart, but is a function or combination
somehow of the
elements already present.

This appears to be the position Dennett wishes
to adopt, although
this statement needs qualification.

For he goes on to argue that

our intuitions about pain are inconsistent and
hence that no living

creature or robot could instantiate "the true theory"
of pain.
However, then he says this;^^
If and when a good physiological sub-personal theory
of
pain is developed, a robot could in principle be
constructed to instantiate it. Such advances in science
would probably bring in their train wide-scale changes in
what we found intuitive about pain, so that the charge
that our robot only suffered what we artificially called
pain would lose its persuasiveness.
In the meantime, (if
there were a cultural lag) thoughtful people would refrain
from kicking such a robot.

Here Dennett endorses the view that a robot could instantiate

sub-personal theory of pain
feel pain.

-

a

in other words, that a robot could

The plausibility of Dennett's conclusion depends on

whether he has succeeded in showing that our intuitions about pain
are inconsistent, and in whether it is plausible to maintain that

pain is a function of
two claims.

a

sub-personal flowchart.

I

now discuss thes
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Pers onal/Sub-personal Distin^Mnn

Because the distinction between
the personal and sub-personal
levels of explanation Is important
to understanding Dennett’s

analysis of pain,

I

begin by discussing this
distinction.

In his

account of consciousness, Dennett
describes the sub-personal
level

Functionalist theories are theories
of what I have called
the sub personal level.
Sub-personal theories proceed by
analyzing a person into an organization
of subsystems
(organs, routines, nerves, faculties,
components-even
atoms) and attempting to explain
the behavior of the whole
person as the outcome of the interaction
of these
subsystems.
Thus in the present instance the
shortcoming
emerged because the two access notions
introduced,
computational access _simpliciter and the
computational
access of a print-out faculty, were
defined at the
sub-personal level; if introduced into a
psychological
theory they would characterize relations
not between a
person and a body, or a person and a state
of affairs or a
person and anything at all, but
rather, at best, relations
between £arts of persons (or their
bodies) and other
mgs. So far as I can see, however, every
cognitivist
theory currently defended or envisaged,
functionalist or
not, IS a theory of the sub-personal
level.
It is not at
all clear to me, indeed, how a
psychological theory--as
distinct from a philosophical theory—
could fail to be a
sub-personal theory. So the functionalists'
problem of
capturing the person as subject of experience
must arise
as well for these cognitivist theories.
At best a
sub-personal theory will see to give us no
grounds for
believing its instantiations would be subjects
of
experience, and at worst (as we have seen) a
sub-personal
theory will seem to permit instantiations that
obviously
_a_re not subjects of experience.
Take your favorite
inchoate cognitivist theory and imagine it completed
and
improved along the lines of its infancy; is it not
always
easy to imagine the completed theory instantiated
or
realized by an entity--an engineer's contraption, for
instance, or some kind of inner zombie to which we have
no inclination to grant an inner, conscious life?
Intuition then, proclaims that any sub-personal theory
must leave out something vital, something unobtainable
moreover with subpersonal resources.
Intuitions can

—
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sometimes be appeased or made to
go away, however, and
that is the task I set myself
here.
I propose to
sub-personal parts by
oxrioitiL\h““‘h^®"®^‘^
-cess already
InLodncel.
The personal/sub-personal
distinction, then, is a distinction
between two levels of description,
as well as between two levels
of
explanation.

We can describe some event at the
sub-personal level,

e.g. we can say -Neuron N fired
at time

explanation of anything,

or,

f

independent of giving an

this statement could also serve as
an

explanation of why some other brain-event
occurred.
level involves descriptions and explanations
of

The personal

person while the

a

sub-personal level involves descriptions and
explanations of parts
Of person and their bodies.

How can we characterize this distinction more
precisely?

every description or explanation of

a

Is

person at the personal level?

It seems reasonable to say that
psychological ascriptions such as "I

feel tired" or "He is angry" are at the personal
level, but how

about non-psychological predicates such as
tall" or "He weighs 148 pounds"?

"I

5

feet

5

inches

There are also uses of the

possessive pronouns which imply personhood
is equivalent to "I have a red chair".

— thus,

"My chair is red"

Even statements about

seemingly sub-personal elements can carry such
implication.

am

a

personal

Thus "My C-fibers are conducting impulses" is

equivalent to "I have C— fibers which are conducting impulses".
Presumably, an equivalent statement without the personal reference,
e.g.

"C-fibers A, B, and C are transmitting impulses", would be at
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the sub-personal level.

Finally, Dennett writes as it
talk about

pains is at the personal level,
while talk about the mechanisms
of
pain is sub-personal.
But he also writes as if the
sub-personal
level is the level of components
and parts. And a person can
talk
about pain as an element or
component of his mind or of himself
ithout referring to himself.

feeling of pain is intense".

For example, someone might say
"This
How, then, shall we draw
Dennett's

distinction?

One difficulty with drawing Dennett's
distinction is that it
seems to cut across the distinctions
between the person/body and the

person/elements of
distinction.

In

a

person distinction and the mental/physical

^ntent and Consc iousness

,

Dennett contrasts "the

explanatory level of people and their sensations
with the

sub-personal level of brains and events in the
nervous system":^®
But when we abandon the personal level in a very
real
sense we abandon the subject matter of pains as
well.
When we abandon mental process talk for physical
process
talk we cannot say that the mental process analysis
of
£ajj\ is wrong, for our alternative analysis cannot
be an
analysis of pain at all, but rather of something else
the
motions of human bodies or the organization of the the
nervous system.

—

Here he seems to equate the personal/sub-personal distinction
with
the mental-physical distinction.
In Brainstorms , he says:^^

Sub-personal theories proceed by analyzing a person into
an organization of subsystems (organs, routines, nerves,
faculties, components even atoms) and attempting to
explain the behavior of the whose person as the outcome of
the interactions of these subsystems.

—

148

He then says that a theory at the
sub-personal level "would

characterize relations not between

a

person and

a body,

or a person

and a state of affairs or a person and
anything at all, but rather,
at best, relations between £a rts of
persons (or their bodies) and

other things". 18

a reference to the faculty of
sight would

ordinarily be taken to refer to something
mental, not something
physical, but it also refers to an element of
a person, or

subsystem.

Hence it would seem that even statements about
certain

mental phenomena can be at the sub-personal level,
provided they are
about subsystems which are or purport to be elements
of

a

person.

Dennett seems to be primarily interested in distinguishing

statements about persons from statements about their bodies,
parts
of their bodies,

or parts or elements of persons.

Hence we can say

that a statement is personal, or at the personal level,
if it

contains a reference, implicit or explicit, to

a person.

An example

of an explicit reference is "I am tired" or "Jones is tired", where
'Jones'

refers to some person.

An example of an implicit reference

is "My arms are tired", or "Jones' face is white".

A statement is

sub-personal if it contains an explicit or implicit reference to
some person's body, to a part or state of his body, or to some
element of

a

set of elements of a person.

Statements about physical

objects which are not bodies of persons will neither be personal not

sub-personal--we might call them a-personal.

Examples of

sub-personal statements are "Neuron N is firing", "That finger is
white", and "The heart is beating".

"Jones'

neurons are firing" and
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"His heart ia beating" are both
personal and sub-personal in virtue
o£ the implicit reference to a
person and the explicit reference
to
a bodily part or subsystem.
Hence, these terms cannot be
regarded
as mutually exclusive as applied
to statements when viewed in this
way.

^•

2.2

Dennett's Account of Pain
Having briefly discussed Dennett's
personal/subpersonal

distinction,
pain.

I

turn to a consideration of Dennett's
account of

Before criticizing this account at

a

more general level,

wish to make some specific comments about
Dennett's flowchart.

I

One

comment is that if Dennett's flowchart does give an
account of any
kind of pain, it does so only of physical pain,
and not of

psychological and emotional pain.

Psychological and emotional pain

are closer to being emotions than sensations and are not
so directly

connected to specific neuronal events.

The pain of an insult, the

pain of rejection, and the pain of knowing that you have been
betrayed by a friend are all instances of psychological and

emotional pain which are not (physical) sensations but rather
feelings of emotional hurt.

Hence, this "cognitive" kind of pain

should be analyzed similarly to the way emotions are analyzed.

While

I

do not wish here to defend the claim that one could not give

an analysis of emotional states like the one Dennett has given of

physical pain,
different.

I

believe that such an analysis would look quite

Hence,

I

believe

I

am at least justified in claiming
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that Dennett's account will not do
for emotional ot psychological
pain.

Perhaps this would not bother him, but
it is significant that

the same term 'pain' is used in both
contexts.

Secondly, the stimulation of the A and C
fibers is not

correlated with pain.

Peter Milner reports that:^^

During innocuous stimulation of the skin,
both A and C
afferents are stimulated and produce a net
excitatory
effect in cells of the substantia gelatinosa.
These cells
depolarize the terminals of both A and*C fibers
on the
transmission cells of the dorsal horn, producing
presynaptic inhibition and preventing those cells
from
being fired too vigorously.
If a noxious stimulus is
presented, however, though few extra A fibers will
be
recruited, many extra C fibers will fire, thus
increasing
the inhibition of substantia-gelatinosa cells and
reducing
the inhibition of the input to the dorsal horn
cells,
which will therefore fire at a much higher rate.

While the occurrence of pain is correlated with increased

C and A

fiber activity, the stimulation of these fibers is correlated
with
touch and warmth, not just pain.

Furthermore, Dennett's

"nociceptors" are not exclusively pain receptors.
says

As Kenneth Casey

20

The contention of von Frey in 1895, that free nerve
endings are "pain receptors" and that excitation of these
endings or receptors resulted in pain sensation gained
widespread acceptance. Subsequent physiological and
psychophy siological experiments implicated finely
myelinated and unmyelinated fibers as subserving
"epicritic" and "protopathic" pain mechanisms.
However,
current anatomical and psychological evidence indicates
that free nerve endings must function as receptors for
many other forms of somatic sensation and are not
exclusively "pain receptors".
Furthermore, recent
physiological studies have shown that the small diameter
afferents do not, as a group, respond only to intense
stimuli.
Indeed, the majority of those studied are quite
sensitive to thermal or mechanical stimuli, and many are
sensitive to both forms of energy.
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Finally, Donald Becker tells
us that

.-21

Since pain is such a ubiquitous
phenomenon, this relative
°
threshold units suggests that,
although
significantly higher th^esioj^s'
than ^the'r
concept of specific nociceptor
receptors
K
fibers
can be misleading.
Pain is not really a
modality like touch, temperature,
vision or audition.
Rather, pain should be defined
as an intensity
Phenomenon.
Excesses of any of the specific
modalities,
i.e. temperature extremes or
excessive pressure, may
result in pain perception.
As Noordenbos has suggested,
pain IS "too much".
Hence, stimulation of the 'noolceptorsis not exclusively

correlated with pain, since receptors
which are responsive to pain
Stimuli respond to other stimuli as
well.

Dennett does not explain what he means
by the "instantiation"
of the flowchart, but presumably,

in order for a pain to occur, a

system must not merely contain the "structures"
represented by the
flowchart; rather, the C-fibers must be conducting
impulses, etc.
But if the nociceptors and the A- and C-fibers
are correlated with

phenomena other than pain, such as touch, then the
flowchart can he
instantiated even though not pain, but some other phenomenon
is
occurring.

Hence, Dennett's flowchart does not distinguish pain

from certain other mental phenomena such as touch and
temperature
sensations.

Dennett's flowchart also does not account for all cases of
pain.

Much physical pain originates elsewhere than in the receptors

in the skin.

People have headaches, and also pain which is internal

to the body.

Hence, Dennett's flowchart represents only

restricted number of cases of pain.

a

Dennett would probably
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acknowledge this, but reply that his
flowchart is merely
and may need to be revised and
supplemented.

However,

a

sketch,

if Dennett is

seriously trying to give an account
of pain, it is significant to
observe how close he comes to achieving
this general goal, rather
than merely capturing a restricted
set of cases.

Finally, Dennett uses terms such as
'thalamus' and 'nociceptor'
in his flowchart which refer to organic
structures,

v^hile

Dennett

may feel that these entities can be functionally
defined,

independent of their structures, nevertheless
these terms do refer
to biochemical parts of the body.

And it is not clear that

functionally analogous entities in

a

creature would have the same names.
center of

a

mechanical, non-organic
For example, something in the

robot which serves as the power source of the robot
but

does not pump blood but rather sends electrical impulses throughout
the robot would not be called a heart.

Likewise, no fluid in a

non-living thing would be called blood, even if it were red (or
blue) and it circulated throughout the body.

Georges Rey makes a

similar point when he says: 22

One wouldn't suppose, that there might be machines that
engaged in digestion, but of a form quite unlike any such
processes that take place in humans and animals.
If, for
example, the process they underwent for production of
their energy was something more like the processes of an
internal combustion engine, then surely that wouldn't
count as digestion (cars don' t digest gasoline)
What
gets called digestion depends on its resemblances, in
natural respects, to what gets called digestion around
.

here.

The general point is that certain bodily parts and functions are

essentially parts and functions of living, organic beings, and hence
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that non-living mechanical robots
could not have the same parts
and
functions, even if their corresponding
parts and functions were

analogous in some way to those of

a living,

organic being.

Dennett would perhaps deny that it
is essential to any part of
the human body that it be part of
the body of a living thing;

probably he would claim that all these
parts can be functionally

defined independent of origin and
structure.

And it does not seem

ne cessarily wrong to refer to an
artificial arm, or even the

mechanical arm of

a robot,

as an arm.

Perhaps this is not

implausible in virtue of the fact that those
functions in terms of

which 'arm' is defined, such as grasping and
picking up objects, can
be performed by a non-living machine.

But terms such as 'heart' and

'blood' are essentially connected with life in
virtue of their

functions of helping to carry food to the organism, and
in virtue of
other life-sustaining functions.

And some of the terms on Dennett's

flowchart such as 'nociceptor', are essentially connected with
an

organism's ability to feel sensation and pain.

If these receptors

did not play a role in feeling and sensation, they would not be

nociceptors.

Hence, it seems that the issue of whether an organism

can feel pain and sensation needs to be settled before we draw our

flowchart, and cannot be settled in advance by stipulation.
It is doubtful,

then,

that a robot could be said to instantiate

Dennett's flowchart, containing as it does terms such as
'nociceptor',

construct

a

'thalamus', and 'speech'.

Perhaps Dennett could

more general flowchart which could apply both to men and
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machines by abstracting features
which are common to both.
use as a model, Roger Schank's
attempt to construct

He might

a

“language-free* representation of meaning
by attempting to reduce
the verbs of English down to fourteen
primitives.
The

difficulty with this is in preserving
common elements without losing
any elements necessary to Insure that
pain is really occurring.

4»2.3

Perceptual Analysis
Let us consider another aspect of Dennett's
flowchart.

One box

which he says very little about is the box
labelled "perceptual
analysis".

This box occurs after the "filter" box which
represents

our ability to diminish or banish pain by
distracting our attention
and before the "control" circle containing the
"belief", "desire",
and

ratiocination" boxes.

The following comments by Hubert Dreyfus

suggest that we evaluate the language of the flowchart
carefully.
Having distinguished between the neurological and
phenomenological
levels of description, he comments on an effort by Ulric Neisser
to

define an inf ormation— processing level of description:^^
As Neisser puts it, "the sensory input is not the page
itself; it is a pattern of light rays..."
So far so good,
but then, Neisser goes on to bring the physical and the

phenomenological levels together: "suitably focussed by
the lens. ..the rays fall on the sensitive retina, where
they initiate the neural processes that eventually lead to
seeing and reading and remembering
Here, however, things
are by no means obvious.
There are two senses of "lead
to".
Light waves falling on the retina eventually lead to
physical and chemical processes in the brain, but in this
sequential sense, the light rays and neural processes can
never eventually lead to seeing.
Seeing is not a chemical
process; thus it is not a final step in a series of such
processes.
If, on the other hand, "lead to" means
.
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necessary and sufficient condition
for", then either
seeing IS the whole chain or
something totally 'different
fron, the Chain or any link
of it.
In either
it I^no
longer clear why Neisser says we
have no immediate access
to the perceptual world.

Lsf

Dreyfus

point here is that seeing, and
hence perception in general,

IS not the final step in a
series of chemical and neural
processes

rather,

it occurs on the phenomenological
level, which

corresponds to Dennett's personal level.
that the

The relevant point here is

perceptual analysis" box cannot serve as
a connecting link

that begins at the neural level with
the stimulation of the

nociceptors.

remarks

Dennett seems to acknowledge this in the
following

25

Can we locate pain, as distinct from its
typical causes
and effects, on the flowchart? The flowchart
gives us a
functional description at what I have called the
sub-personal level.
I have labelled the various
boxes
"belief", "desire", "action" and so forth, but that
was
taking a liberty.
The flowchart deals directly not with
person's acts, beliefs, thoughts, feelings, but with the
behind-the-scenes machinery that governs speech
dispositions, motor subroutines, information storage and
retrieval, and the like.

a

Hence the perceptual analysis box really refers not to the
process
of perceptual analysis but to the physiological mechanisms
which

govern perceptual analysis.

For this reason,

the flowchart is at

the physiological level, not the personal or phenomenological
level.

The "perceptual analysis" box is significant because, in order
for input to be experienced as pain it must be interpreted or

analyzed as pain.

This does not refer to

a

cognitive process in the

case of pain; rather, it refers to the way in which the sensation is

perceived by the person.

In order for a sensation to be perceived
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as pain, rather than, for example,
mere touch, it must be perceived
as hutting. A sensation becomes
painful just at that point when it

begins to hurt.
it is useful.

Dennett does not deny this; he
merely denies that
He concludes that:^^

one does not distinguish the sensations
that hurt or are
painful by applying some criterion; one
simply
distinguishes them. Their only distinguishing
characteristic is painfulness, an unanalysable
quality
that can only be defined circularly.

However, in my view it is useful to point
out that pains are

sensations which hurt since then we have at
least performed some
analysis; now it is easier to understand why
we need a "perceptual
analysis" box in the flowchart.

For some sensations feel good, some

pleasant, and some neither good nor bad, pleasant nor
unpleasant.

Those and only those sensations which hurt are correctly
called pain
Unfortunately, the preceding discussion presents
for Dennett's flowchart.

a

difficulty

For if his flowchart, as he says it does,

represents the physiological mechanisms of perceptual analysis,
and
not that analysis itself, then only the physiological mechanisms

accompanying an analysis of a sensation as hurting, in other words,
as pain, can properly be said to instantiate the flowchart.

But it

is unlikely that we can identify any physiological mechanisms which

always and only accompany pain perception
that the trusted philosophers'

—

we have already seen

friend "C-fiber stimulation" will not

do.

At this point, one might wonder to what extent Dennett has

succeeded in giving an account of pain, in telling us what pain is.
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as opposed to merely giving us
the conditions under which it
occurs.

Dennett concedes that the flowchart
"seems to concern

Itself solely with the causes and and
effects of pain".^’

He

seems to want to reject this claim,
but it is not clear what his

basis for the rejection is.

After rejecting a homuncular

hypothesis, he suggests approvingly that
we do the followirng
.

Let us consider instead the hypothesis
suggested by it,
viz., that we have simply not seen the
woods for the
trees, that pain is not to be found in
any one box of our
flowchart, but is a function or combination
somehow of the
elements already present.
To say that pain is function or combination
of the elements in the

flowchart can,

I

I

believe, mean only one of two things;

1.

To be in pain just is to instantiate the
flowchart.

2.

Instantiating the flowchart is causally or
conditionally relevant to feeling pain.

now consider these two alternatives in turn.
What Dennett has really done is to give us

a

physiological and neurological mechanisms of pain.
same thing as telling us what pain is?

flowchart of the
But is this the

Someone could give

a

detailed flowchart of the mechanisms of sound production, say by
diagramming a stereo system, but would being

a

equivalent to instantiating this flowchart?

What one wants to say

sound just be

is that a stereo system produces sound, so that instantiating

Dennett's flowchart is being what produces pain, but is not being
sound itself.

Likewise, one might say that instantiating Dennett's

flowchart is being what produces pain, but is not being pain
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Itself.

In general, being a mechanism of
x is not being x, but

rather being what produces x.

This leads to the second alternative.

It would perhaps not be

correct to call Dennett's diagram a flowchart
of the cases of pain,
since these are usually events in the world
like finger-pricks and

instances of being burned.

If we are asked for the cause of our

pain we generally point to some external event
such as being nicked
while shaving or having our finger crushed.

We don't generally cite

the physiological causes, which might better be
called physiological

conditions of pain.

Nevertheless, these physiological conditions

are causally relevant to feeling pain.
If Dennett's flowchart is a diagram of the causally
relevant

conditions of pain, we might compare pain to the hum of
engine

a

well-tuned

it is a noise produced by the functioning car as a whole,

it isn' t identical to or produced by any part of the car, and it
is

not a mental epiphenomenon.
a

diagram of

a

Dennett's flowchart would then be like

car which, when running, produces a hum.

Likewise,

when neural impulses are conducted in the brain, pain is produced.
The difficulty with this solution is that is the flowchart is merely

conceived as giving the causally relevant conditions of pain, then
ontologically we are back to the old issue of physicalism vs.

dualism

—

dualists don't deny that pain may have physical causes;

what they deny is that it is essentially

a

physical phenomenon.

Pain, they argue, unlike the hum of an engine (depending on what

ontological status assigns to sounds)

,

is essentially mental,

and
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mental phenomena cannot be "reduced"
to or shown to be identical
to
physical phenomena.
Hence it is difficult to see how
Dennett's
account cuts any ice ontologically
if construed in this way.
,

^

^

Are Our Intuitions About Pain
InconsistPnh?

In the preceding

I

argued that Dennett's functionalist
account

of pain really tells us very little
about the ontological status of

pain.

Furthermore,

I

suggested that the possibility of

a robot

instantiation of a flow-chart of pain might at
least run counter to
intuitions we have about the application of terms
that refer

essentially to living organisms, rather than to
mechanical devices.
However, Dennett does make some explicit comments
about the

ontological issue, and he acknowledges that the idea
of robot pain
is counter to some of our intuitions.

He attributes this to an

incoherency in the ordinary concept of pain:^^
What then is this conclusion? It is that any robot
instantiation of any theory of pain will be vulnerable to
powerful objections that appeal to well-entrenched
intuitions about the nature of pain, but reliance on such
skeptical arguments would be short-sighted, for the
inability of a robot model to satisfy all our intuitive
demands may be due not to any irredeemable mysteriousness
about the phenomenon of pain, but to irredeemable
incoherency in our ordinary concept of pain.
Dennett says that our intuitions about pain are inconsistent:^^
If, as I have claimed, the intuitions we would have to
honor were we to honor them all do not form a consistent
set, there can be no true theory of pain, and so no
computer or robot could instantiate the true theory of
pain, which it would have to do to feel real pain.
Human
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eings and animals could no more
instantiate the true
theory of pain (there being none),
which lands us with the
outrageous conclusion that no one ever
feels pain.
But of
course we do.

These remarks seem consistent with his
position in Content and
Consciousness that 'pain' does not refer.
4T
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if our intuitions

about pain are inconsistent, then there
is no such thing as pain, at
least in the sense of something which
satisfies all our intuitions

about pain.

I

now examine the basis for Dennett's claim
that our

intuitions about pain are inconsistent.

Dennett gives several examples of what he considers
to be

inconsistent intuitions.

One example is the following:^^

1. Pains are essentially items of immediate
experiences of
consciousness: the subject's access to pain is privileged
3.
or infallible or incorrigible.

Pains are essentially abhorrent or awful
perfect misery, the worst of evils..."
2.

— "Pain

is

4.
Efforts to

capture both of these "essential" features in a
theory of pain are bound to fail; theories that contrive
to maintain both of these claims do so only at the expense
of equally well-entrenched claims from other quarters.

Dennett proposes capturing "at least part of what is compelling
about

1"

by this condition:
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It is a necessary condition of pain that we are
"incorrigible" about pain; i.e. if you believe you are in
pain, your belief is true; you are in pain.

He then says;

from (3) and
It is a necessary condition of pain that pains are awful

it follows that believing one is in pain is a sufficient
condition for really experiencing or undergoing (and not
merely believing one is experiencing or undergoing)
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something awful.

But the belief itself is not
the pain,

logically possible
“"“*1 earmarks
of belief
belLf that
ihaJ one is in pain, and
yet not be experiencing
or undergoing something awful. Not
only is this logically
instanced routinely by morphine subjects
anr^th*'

bfii /h-

Dennett need not cite examples in which
drugs are used to
provide examples in which people believe
they are in pain but are
not experiencing something awful.

Ordinary cases of pain

experienced during intense physical exercise,
or even of minor pains
such as pin-pricks or minor headaches are
examples of such cases.

A

Dogger might feel pain in his legs from running but
not mind it

because he realizes it is necessary to achieve his
goal of improved
health.

And minor pains may sometimes be unpleasant, but
they are

not awful.

But not all persons find pain either unpleasant or

awful, as the example of the masochist shows.

Unfortunately for Dennett's argument, however, these examples
are equally counterexamples to Dennett's condition

essentially awful.

2

- that

pain is

It is curious that Dennett should offer this as

an essential condition after he has discussed the example of

morphine.

Of course, Dennett may claim that according to "our"

intuitions, pain is essentially awful, but it is no argument for the

incoherence of a concept to cite
unref lectively

.

a

view that someone might hold

Someone who has never seen a Manx cat might hold

that it is essential to cats that they have tails, but we would not
for that reason conclude that the concept of cat is confused, or

that there are no cats.

Only if they refused to apply the term
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oaf whan faced

with this possibility would we
have a basis for

believing that tails are essential.

But descriptions of

morphine-accompanied pain unhesitatingly
ascribe pain to the
34
subject:
becomes
resistant to the drug.
But the drug produces a variety
of
different kinds of effects than what
we think of as
analgesia.
For instance, when you talk about
morphine to
people, they really don't have any
concept of what
morphine does, except that it blocks
pain.
And the
closest experience that most people have
to blockaded pain
IS that they go to the dentist,
he shoots some gunk down
around the fifth nerve and blocks it and
they're
anesthetized, and that to them is what
analgesia is - they
^
don' t feel pain.
Morphine doesn' t do that at all, because
under the
influence of an opiate/analgesic drug, people
feel their
pain.
They just interpret it in a different way.
It
doesn't bother them, it doesn't worry them.
They can go
to sleep in pain.
They're comfortable about pain.

Dennett has not been sufficiently discriminating
in his search for
an essential characteristic of pain; awfulness
is not a likely

candidate.

The above quotation about the effects of morphine
suggests

distinction between the intrinsic quality of
a

a

a

painful sensation and

person's interpretation of or feeling about this sensation or

quality.

If

I

worry about pain, or find it unpleasant,

certain feelings about the pain.

I

have

These feelings are distinct from

the qualities of the sensations itself.

Because people's reactions

to and feelings about pain vary so widely, given cases in which

people don't mind pain or even find that they like pain, it is
unlikely that we will find an essential feature of pain among

people's reactions to or feelings about it.

And awfulness is a

163

feeling about pain
as awful,

I

-

If

i

chataoterlze pain, or someone's
behavior,

am referring not to some
Intrinsic property of what Is

described, but to how

I

feel about It.

if we want to look for

essential features, we should look
to the Intrinsic features
of the
sensation itself,
Dennett uses the example of awfulness
because he is searching
for a criterion to distinguish
pain from other mental phenomena we

may be incorrigible about.

If we use as our

criterion the intrinsic

property that sensations must hurt in
order to be painful, then his

counterexample does not work.
"It hurts, but
If

For it is no contradiction to say,

don't mind it", or even "It hurts, and

I

I

like it".

morphine subjects feel pain, then what they
feel hurts, even if

they don't mind it.

don't mind it.

And what masochists feel hurts, even if
they

We can still maintain incorrigibility

- if

someone

believes he is in pain, then something hurts, even
if he doesn't
mind it.

Hence Dennett fails to show here that our intuitions
are

inconsistent because his example of an intuition is

a

poor choice

and if we replace it with a good choice we cannot generate
the

counterexample.

Dennett claims to find several other cases of inconsistency in
our intuitions.
•

1.
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Rather than discuss these cases in detail,

now discuss what the implications would be if he were right.

I

It

should not be surprising if not everyone's intuitions are the same
about a phenomenon which occurs as often and in as many forms as
pain.

However, even if a "good physiological sub-personal theory of
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pain- were developed,

I

doubt that if such a theory called
for

revisions in our concept of pain that the
revisions would make the

difference between robot pain and no robot
pain.

For even if we had

to drop some intuitions, such as an
intuition about whether pains

can exist unfelt, or even infallibility about
pains,

I

do not see

that this change would be so drastic as to
make robot pain

possible.

One reason robots cannot feel pain is that
they don't

have the kind of organic structure necessary
for this experience,
and until we are able to create living, organic
robots

I

do not see

the possibility of overcoming this obstacle to robot
pain.

As

Georges Rey says, "this, then, would seem to be the grain
of truth
in the common reaction that machines can't be persons:
they don't

have our feelings because they don't possess our relevant

physiology".

36

Creating

a

good sub-personal theory will not make

this possible, and neither will changing our intuitions about the

existence of unfelt pains or even about the awfulness of pain.

4.4

I

Robot Emotions

conclude with a few comments about the possibility of robot

emotions.

Materialists sometimes prefer talking about pain to

talking about more complex mental states because it is easier to

give a physiological account of pain than of emotions such as anger
or righteous indignation.

Not only is it impossible to find

physical states which are always correlated with such complex mental
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states, but these states often involve making
moral judgments.

example, if

I

For

get angry at Jones for taking my pen, then
my anger

involves a judgment that his act was unjustified,
and presupposes

a

complex circumstance involving the existence of
moral rules and

property rights.

Hence it is difficult to see how anger could be

reduced to the instantiation of a physiological flowchart.

Dennett acknowledges that even the concept of pain "is

inextricably bound up with our ethical intuitions, our senses
of
suffering, obligation, and evil".

However, he concludes that

these considerations, even if they make some difference, "do
not

make enough of a difference".
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Even if he is right about pain,

I

think that these considerations make more of a difference with

respect to anger and other emotions.

The reason is that these

emotions are not simply introspectible sensations but involve
cognitive judgments that presuppose an understanding of morality,
and presuppose that moral considerations apply to the subject of

emotions.

A full treatment of this issue would involve a discussion

of the extent to which robots can be regarded as rational agents,

and the extent to which moral rules would apply to such creatures.

While

I

will not engage in that discussion here, it is significant

to note that results about pain are not automatically generalizable

to emotional states.
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4.5

I

Summa ry

now summarize the main points in the preceding
sections.

After a brief introduction,
in section 4.2.

presented Dennett's flowchart of pain

I

In section 4.2.1,

personal/sub-personal distinction.
Dennett's account of pain.

l

discussed his
In section 4.2.2,

In section 4.2.3,

I

i

considered

argued that Dennett

has merely presented an account of the causes and
conditions of
pain, and not an account of pain itself.

In section 4.3,

i

discussed Dennett's claim that our intuitions about pain are
inconsistent, and talked about what the implications of this would
be.

Finally, in section 4.4

I

suggested that an account of pain

might not be generalizable to emotional states such as anger.
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CHAPTER
INCORRIGIBILITY AND INTENTIONALITY

5.1

Chapters

2,

2,

and

4

V

TWO CRITERIA FOR MENTAL PHENOMENA

Introduction

discuss dualism, anomalous monism, and

functionalism respectively,

while each theory has some merit, each

also has difficulties which may require that
the theory be revised
or abandoned.

The chief difficulty for dualism is in giving
an

account of mind-body interaction.

The chief difficulty for

anomalous monism is that internal tensions within
the theory
relating to Davidson's conception of physical events
and scientific
laws have the consequence that anomalous monism
applies to the

entities of physics and chemistry but not to events in the
brain.
The most serious difficulty for functionalism is in accounting
for

the qualities of subjective experience.
The mind-body theories

I

have discussed so far contain implicit

or explicit conceptions about the nature of mental and physical

phenomena.

What conceptions a mind-body theory contains about the

mind-body distinction and about the nature of mental and physical
phenomena has important consequences for the the theory.

For

example, materialists tend to view sensations as paradigmatic of

mental phenomena, while Davidson chooses intentionality
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.

Dualists,
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on the other hand, emphasize
the private, subjective
aspects of
mental phenomena. And, as became
apparent when discussing Davidson,
there may be more than one correct
conception of what is physical.
In this chapter,

I

take a look at two criteria for
mental

phenomena that have been discussed at
some length in this century:

incorrigibility and intentionality.

In Section 5.2

Richard Rorty's defense of incorrigibility
as
phenomena.

I

a

I

discuss

criterion for mental

conclude that while this criterion may
identify

small subset of mental phenomena, it is
not satisfactory as

criterion for all mental phenomena.

In Section 5.3

I

a

a

discuss

Roderick Chisholm's three criteria for identifying
intentional
sentences.

I

conclude that no formulation of

a

criterion for

intentional sentences will succeed in identifying all
and only
mental phenomena.

In Section 5.4

I

draw some conclusions from the

earlier discussion.

5.2

Incorrigibility

The members of one group of criteria for distinguishing mental
from physical phenomena that many philosophers have discussed since
the time of Descartes have in common the claim that conscious beings

have

a

special way of knowing mental phenomena.

This special way of

knowing is sometimes characterized as incorrigibility,

infallibility, indubitability

,

privileged access, or certainty.
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Rather than surveying all the members
of this group,

incorrigibility as a representative member.

I

have selected

The reasons lor my

choice are that incorrigibility is at least
as strong a candidate as

any of the others and because there are
several valuable discussions
Of this criterion in recent philosophical
literature.

One of the articles containing such

Richard Rorty in 1970.^

a

discussion was written by

In this article, he considers

incorrigibility as the mark of the mental.

In this section,

I

will

examine Rorty's discussion in this article and also
his discussion
in his later book entitled Philosophy and the Mirror
of Nature.^

5*2.1

Mental Events and Mental Features

Rorty begins by distinguishing two types of mental phenomena.
He calls these types mental events and mental features.

Rorty draws

this distinction in the following paragraph:^
In settling upon a mark of the mental, it is important
to begin by distinguishing between two different notions
of what counts as mental.
The distinction I have in mind
is that between the sort of mental entity that is an event
and the sort that is not.
In the first class fall,
paradigmatically and perhaps solely, thoughts and
sensations.
By "thoughts" here I mean not beliefs, but
occurrent, datable thoughts e.g.
the entity referred to
when one says "The thought that _£ suddenly struck me."
By
"sensations" here I mean not perceivings--not acquisitions
of beliefs--but simply the entities that are reported in
such ways as "Then I had a sensation of red" or "Then I
had a painful sensation in my leg."
These two sorts of
entities make up the content of the stream of
consciousness--what one finds when one asks "What's going
on in me now?"
In the second class fall all those mental
entities which are not events and which are only dubiously
"entities" at all--belief s, moods, emotions, desires,
purposes, intentions, motives, etc., etc. These might
better be called "mental features" than "mental

—

,

entities."

Not only are they not events, but
it strikes
peculiarly philosophical hypostatization
to
think of them as particulars of any
sort .

Rorty is certainly correct in saying
that it is important to
draw distinctions within the class of
mental phenomena.

Furthermore, his selection of thoughts and
sensations as

paradigmatic of one class and of beliefs,
emotions, and intentions
(among others) as paradigmatic of the other
class is

starting point.

a

useful

Rorty characterizes the class of mental events,
of

which thoughts and sensations are paradigm, as
the "sorts of

entities which make up the content of the stream of
consciousness".

I

will first examine this class of mental

phenomena, beginning with thoughts.

Rorty describes occurrent, datable thoughts as "e.g., the
entity referred to when one says 'The thought that
me'".

Perhaps he means this type of example.

£

suddenly struck

Yesterday

I

was

sitting at my desk when the thought that

I

scheduled to attend suddenly struck me.

What is the entity which

have referred to?

am missing a meeting

I

am
I

My thought has a certain content, which is that

am missing a scheduled meeting.
has a truth value.

This content is

a

I

proposition which

Presumably, Rorty is not just referring to the

content of my thought but to a sound image which is the thought and

which occurs over

a

brief period of time.

While a sound image which

is a thought is a phenomenal occurrence, the aspect of this sound

image Rorty is pointing to is that it is occurrent rather than

dispositional.

Rorty describes sensations in

Yesterday

I

had a headache",

I

a

similar way.

if

i

say

am reporting the past existence of
a

feeling that hurts viz. a feeling of
pain.

This is also

a

phenomenal mental event in that the presence
of pain is the
appearance of a hurtful sensation within my
mind or consciousness.
Again, however, it is the fact that a sensation
is an occurrence
that takes place over time that makes it
fall in Rorty's first class
of mental entities.
It is the occurrent character of thoughts
and sensations that

Rorty is apparently trying to characterize when he
says these

entities are

the contents of the stream of consciousness".^

He

cites "beliefs, moods, emotions, desires, purposes, intentions,
motives, etc."

features.

7

as members of another class he calls mental

What apparently unites mental features is that they are

dispositional, not occurrent, mental entities.

This has some

plausibility since, for example, it can be true of me that
someone at time

_t

However, if

I

_t.

love for them.

even though

I

I

love

am not thinking about that person at

love someone,

I

will at times have a feeling of

At those times,

I

have a feeling of love which is an

occurrent, datable experience.

Hence it appears that just as one

can have occurrent thoughts, so one can have occurrent emotional
feelings.

It seems,

then,

that even emotions can be occurrent

mental entities at certain times.
Desires exhibit

a

similar feature.

It is true of me that

have a desire to teach philosophy even though

I

I

am not experiencing
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this desire at a particular moment.

desk and

I

suddenly have

a

occurrent, datable desire.

However, if

i

am sitting at my

desire for Chinese food, this is an
In this case,

and have a felt inclination to have some.

I

think of Chinese food

Occurrent desires, like

occurrent emotional feelings, include occurrent
thoughts, and also
have a phenomenal aspect.

However, other conditions which are

present make them desires, not merely thoughts.

One way to analyze dispositional mental states is
that having

dispositional mental state is having
occurrent mental state or states.

a

a

disposition to have some

For example, being

dispositionally angry at someone is having a disposition to have
occurrent angry feelings for that person.
belief that

£

Having a dispositional

is having a disposition to occasionally have an

occurrent thought that £.

If this view of

dispositional mental

states is correct, then Rorty is wrong to use broad categories such
as

emotion", "belief", "emotion", and "desire" to characterize

mental features.

Since many of these mental entities can be either

dispositional or occurrent, Rorty should instead try to distinguish
when these mental entities are dispositional as opposed to when they
are occurrent.

Unless he can do this, Rorty has not drawn

a

meaningful distinction between mental events and mental features.

Rorty seems aware that his distinction between mental events
and mental features is not clear-cut:

g

As such mental features as beliefs and desires become more
particular and limited and, thus, approach the status of
episodes rather than dispositions, they become more
incorrigible. ... Belief s and desires about momentary
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matters tend to collapse into thoughts,
and momentary
emotions tend to collapse into sensations.
Short-run
beliefs, desires, emotions, and intentions
are less like
predictions of future behavior than like
avowals of
contemporaneous thoughts or sensations. That
is why they
are more like episodes than like
dispositions.
Here Rorty appeals to a mathematical analogy
of something drawing

near to a limit to explain how dispositions
approach occurrences.
The problem with this analogy is that some
desires and emotions

reach the limit and are occurrent events.

In such cases,

be classified as mental events, not mental
features.

they must

Hence, while

Rorty is pointing to an apparent and non-controversial
distinction
within the class of mental entities, viz. the distinction
between
occurrent and dispositional mental entities, he has not succeeded
in

characterizing this distinction accurately.

To do so, he must draw

the distinction between occurrent and dispositional mental entities

within broad categories such as "belief", "desire", and "emotion".

^•2.2

Rorty's Definition of Incorrigibility

Rorty draws his distinction between mental events and mental
features because he believes that only what he calls mental events
are incorrigible.

However, he believes that mental features have

near-incorrigibility, so he can account for them in terms of

incorrigibility as well.
incorrigibility.

I

will now consider his definition of
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Rorty gives the following definition
of incorrigibility:^
believes incorrigibly that
£ at t if and only if
S believes that
£ at _t
(ii)
There are no accepted procedures by
applying which
It would be rational to come to
believe that not-p,
given S's belief that
£ at t.

S

(i)

Before giving this definition, Rorty makes
the following
remark
.

10

It is customary to define incorrigibility
in' terms of the
notions of entailment or logical possibility....!
wish,
however, to eschew reference to logical modalities,
both
because of general Quinean doubts about the
existence of
necessities other than "natural" ones and because of
a
particular difficulty that arises when we try to spell
out
'logically possible' in this context.

This particular difficulty involves his interpretation
of

attributes to Sellars.

a

myth he

According to this myth, thoughts and

sensations were originally theoretical entities, postulated as
inner
states that explained certain sorts of behavior.

originally proposed as theoretical entities by
who,

in this myth,

They were

a

man named Jones

invented the concept of mind.

However, Jones

proposed these sensations and thoughts not as objects of immediate

experience but as inferred entities; entities inferred from the
behavior they caused.

Only after

a long

training process can others

make noninf erential reports of their own inner states.

Rorty comments on this myth that the sensations and thoughts
have "no common intrinsic features save 'innerness'"

1

2

all the term 'inner' can mean is "beneath the skin".^^

and that
He then

says that not until reports of the existence or occurrence of these

thoughts and sensations are incorrigible are these entities mental.
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He relates his interpretation of
Sellars' myth to defining

incorrigibility in terms of logical
possibility as follows:^'^
Suppose that, in the familiar manner,
we try to spell
out the force of this term in such
sentences as "It is
logically impossible that I believe that
I am thinking
that £, and not be" by the notion
"impossible by virtue of
the meaning of terms."
We shall then arrive at the
conclusion that the meaning of the terms
'thinking' and
thought' is such that it is impossible to
have incorrect
contemporaneous beliefs about what one is thinking.
But
now let us recur to Jones, who uses the
word 'thought'
before people have learned to make introspective
reports
of their thoughts, much less come to view
such reports as
incorrigible.
Must we say that when Jones first invented
the notion of "thought," meaning by it "inner
state that
can be about X, be true or false..., etc.," he
did not
mean by the word what we do? Did the meaning of
'thought'
change when people came to make noninf erential reports
of
their own thoughts? Did it change when these reports
came
to be regarded as the last word? Would it change
if
cerebroscopes came to be regarded as offering better
evidence for what someone was thinking than his own
introspective reports?
I regard these questions as unanswerable.

The preceding statement by Rorty not only explains why he chose
a

definition of incorrigibility that does not invoke logical

possibility, it also explains his attachment to incorrigibility as

criterion of the mental.

a

Rorty argues in his later book Philosophy

and the Mirror of Nature that if

a

society existed in which

neurology is so advanced that the members of the society report
their "mental" states by making reports of their neurological states
that no descriptive or explanatory power would be lost.

In this

society, instruments such as cerebroscopes have come to be regarded
as offering better evidence for what someone is thinking than his

own introspective reports.

It is Rorty's view that if these

neurological statements are not incorrigible, they are not mental.
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Hence, incorrigibility as a mark of the mental
is Rorty's ticket to

eliminative materialism, a view he has defended
elsewhere.
Ph ilosophy a nd the Mirror of Nature

,

In

his statement of eliminative

materialism may appear to be more sophisticated, in that
it is more
cautiously stated and is materialism without identity of
mental and
physical events.

Nevertheless, eliminative materialism is the view

Rorty defends.
will defer commenting on Rorty's discussion in Philosophy and

I

_the

Mirror o f Nature until later in this section.

return to his definition of incorrigibility, which

For the moment,
I

I

repeat here:^^

believes incorrigibly that £ at _t if and only if
S believes that £ at _t
There are no accepted procedures by applying which
it would be rational to come to believe that not-£,
given S's belief that £ at _t

S

(i)
(ii)

Since Rorty's definition is intended mainly for thoughts and
sensation, he must intend that

form of

a

statement that

thoughts or sensations.

(i)'

(ii)'

S

S

'p'

be replaced by a third-person

makes or at least believes about his

Thus,

(i)

might read:

believes that he is in pain at £.

There are no accepted procedures by applying which
it would be rational to come to believe that S is
not in pain at _t, given S's belief that he is in
pain at _t.

It does seem that if someone believes that he is in pain,

that

there are no accepted procedures to show that he is not in pain.
is of course important that he understand what pain is and be

sincere in his report, if he has made

a

report of his feeling of

It
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pain.

However, some sensation reports that
include more than

report on a felt quality are not incorrigible.

example, "Then

I

a

Even Rorty's

had a painful sensation in my leg", is
shown not to

be incorrigible by Descartes'

example of the person who had an

amputated arm but still felt pain where the arm
would be.

person might say "Then

I

Such a

felt pain in my arm" before being aware

that his arm had been amputated, or if he had
forgotten this fact.

Here, his report that he feels pain is incorrigible,
but he has

located that pain in the wrong place.

The preceding example shows that even if we are
incorrigible
about whether we have a sensation, there are other features
of

sensations such as their location that we are not incorrigible
about.

Where a sensation is located in a person's body is something

he has to learn from experience, just as an infant has to learn that

the object in front of him is his hand.

And like many other things

in life that we must learn, no one gets it right all the time.

recently tried touching another person's toes one

a

time with

I

a

pencil tip to see if she could tell me which toe the sensation was
in.

When she identified the wrong toe, she was easily convinced of

her mistake by the location of my pencil.

She could correctly

identify the toe the sensation was in only 50% of the time.

Hence

the statement "I have a pain in my middle toe" is not incorrigible
for the person uttering it.

Other similar examples are having

a

feeling that seems like hunger but is really a result of being sick

180

(as is discovered several minutes later) and having a
feeling that

seems on the borderline between being

a

pain and being an itch.

If Rorty wants to provide a criterion that shows that a

person's beliefs about his own sensations are incorrigible, he must

write

a

more restrictive criterion that only allows beliefs about

felt qualities of the sensation.

Beliefs about the location or

cause of a sensation or about what the sensation is
not incorrigible.

a

Such beliefs go beyond a report of

and involve making an inference.

sign of are
a

felt quality

And inferences are often mistaken.

To summarize my first criticism of Rorty's criterion,

saying that he may be right that

a

I

am

belief by a person about whether

or not he has a particular sensation or that this sensation has a

particular felt quality is incorrigible, but that beliefs which
require an inference to the cause, location, or significance of the

sensation are not incorrigible.

I

also stated that Rorty must add

the conditions that the person is sincere and understands the

language in which his belief is formulated.

Rorty must, then, add

these three conditions to his definition:

£

understands the language in which his belief that
is formulated.

(iv)

S

is sincere in his belief or statement that

(v)

p

(iii)

S

is a non-inf erential first-person belief about
whether or not S is having a particular occurrent
thought or sensation or that the thought or

sensation has

a

particular felt quality.

Rorty acknowledges that two classes of non-mental statements

may be believed incorrigibly in the sense he defines:
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a)

Statements knowable

b)

Statements about how something looks, seems,
or appears
to someone

Rorty dismisses
reports
.

affairs.

—

a

a

priori

priori statements on the ground that they
are not

they are not descriptions of particular states
of

19

„

Even if one grants this way of dealing with

statements, there are non-mental beliefs that

£

a

priori

which are

descriptions of particular states of affairs such that
there are no
accepted procedures by applying which it would be rational
to
believe that not-£.

My belief that

I

have a hand, that the earth is

round, and that the earth has existed for at least 100 years
are

examples of such beliefs.

In On Certainty , Wittgenstein says that

"about certain empirical propositions no doubt can exist if making

judgments is to be possible at all".

Wittgenstein believes that

the truth of some empirical propositions such as the ones

I

have

just listed is so fundamental to our system of beliefs that no doubt

about them is conceivable.

And while Rorty is talking about

incorrigibility rather than indubitability , if no doubt is possible
about an empirical proposition

£

then there is no accepted procedure

by applying which it would be rational to believe that not-£.

Perhaps Rorty would dismiss these examples on the ground that
if S asserts "The world is round", his asserting this fact is not

part of the evidence for the truth of this proposition.

mean that the phrase "given S's belief that p at

_t"

This would

in Rorty 's

definition asserts that S's belief is part of the evidence for the
proposition.

However, Rorty says this phrase "can be ignored" for
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statements knowable

a

priori, choosing to rule out these
statements

on the ground that they are not reports.

Yet for statements

reporting mental events it is essential, since
"It serves, roughly,
to summarize the fact that present procedures
for adjudicating

belief claims are such that the fact of S's belief
at
least as strong evidence for

could be for not-£".^^

£

_t

that

£

is at

as any imaginable state of affairs

Apparently Rorty believes he does not need

to appeal to the condition that someone believes
that

the evidence for the truth of

£

£

be part of

to rule out a priori statements

since he believes these statements can be ruled out on the
ground
that they are not reports.

Rorty also discusses statements about how something appears,
looks, or seems to someone.

He says of these statements that:^^

in their primary meaning ... they simply mark refusals to
commit oneself to making a report of a certain sort. To
say that "X looks brown" is, at the least, to express
hesitation about saying that X is brown.

Rorty is certainly correct that "seems" and "appears" statements
sometimes function as expressions of hesitation.

He says they also

can be descriptions of particular states of affairs, in which case

they are mental.

Rorty rules out "seems", "appears", and "looks"

statements that are expressions of hesitation on the ground that
they are expressions and not reports

.

While this may deal

effectively with one type of "appearance" statement, it has the
consequence that certain mental statements are ruled out as well.
There are many uses of mental statements which are expressions
rather than descriptions.

It hurts",

"I

love you", and "I feel
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angry- are all sometimes used as
expressions of feeling, rather than
as descriptions.
if Rorty rules out expressions
and allows only

reports, his criterion will not capture
mental events which the

subject expresses but does not report.
To see more clearly why Rorty's criterion
does not capture

mental events for which the subject does not
make

a report,

consider

his revised statement of his criterion:^^

We can sum up the results of this strategy by
noting that
we now have a set of necessary and sufficient
conditions
for something being a mental event namely
,

If there is some person who can have an
incorrigible
belief in some statement P which is a report on X,
then
X is a mental event.

According to this criterion,

a

necessary condition for X to be

mental event is that some person make statement
on X.

P

a

which is a report

It follows that if a person who has pain does not make
a

report on his pain, but rather suffers in silence, the condition
is
not met and the event is not a mental event.

Perhaps Rorty would respond by requiring that some person have
an incorrigible belief in a possible statement, not an actual
statement.
B.

He might then phrase his condition as follows:

If there is some person who can have an incorrigible
belief in some actual or possible statement P which is
a report on X, then X is a mental event.

One problem with this reformulated condition involves the

phrase "can have an incorrigible belief".
car and

I

Suppose

I

am driving my

feel a momentary twinge of pain in my finger.

am driving in downtown Boston in rush hour,

I

Because

I

do not think about the
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pain but continue to concentrate on driving.
incorrigible belief that
If

I

I

Can

I

have an

have a pain in my finger?

stop to think about it.

Perhaps

Since B is a conditional, the correct

phrasing would be "I can have an incorrigible
belief about

momentary twinge of pain if
the time

I

stop to think about it".

a

But then by

stopped to think about the pain, the pain is over
and

I

must rely on my memory.

We are often mistaken

in our memories of what we have thought and felt in
the past.
a

I

And Rorty does not claim that memories of

mental events and thoughts are incorrigible.

memory of

can

I

A

very recent event can be inaccurate just as can a memory

of a less recent event.

Hence in cases of momentary twinges of

pain, we must rely on memory to generate an incorrigible belief.

And the reliance on memory denies the status of incorrigibility to
the actual or possible belief.

Perhaps Rorty would reply that

a

person's belief that he feels

pain is contemporaneous with his experience of pain.

If we asked

this person whether he believed that he was in pain at the time he
felt the twinge of pain, he would probably reply that he did.

At

issue here is what it is for a person to believe he is in pain; is

mere awareness of the pain sufficient or must
pain occur to him?

a

statement about his

Perhaps he has an implicit belief that he is in

pain even if no statement about the pain occurs to him.
Even if Rorty could make out

a

conception of belief that meets

the objection advanced in the preceding paragraph, his criterion.

even if modified to allow possible statements (statement B), will
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not account for all instances of pain,

it does not, for example,

account for the pains of infants who are
incapable of making reports
on their feelings and can only express
them.

A new-born infant is

not capable of understanding language
and hence cannot make a report

on his pain or believe a report about it.

believes that only the person having

a

Since Rorty apparently

mental event can have

incorrigible beliefs about the event, no one can have
incorrigible
beliefs about an infant's pain.

Yet surely the pain an infant has

is a mental event.

Rorty's criterion also does not capture the pains that
animals
have.

Like infants animals cannot either report on their pain or

believe reports on their pain.

Yet it is believed by almost

everyone that animals have feelings and can experience pain.

Hence

there appears to be no reason to deny that animals have mental
events.

If Rorty wants to deny this, he should certainly give an

explanation.

Since animals cannot give reports of of their mental

events, the ability to give and believe such reports as a criterion
for mental events does not make the pain of animals a mental event.

5.2.3

Mental Features

Rorty concedes that we are not incorrigible about what he calls
"mental features": beliefs, moods, emotions, desires, purposes,
intentions, motives, etc.

incorrigible:

24

However, he says we are almost
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ut the fact that we are not
incorrigible in our reports
features as we are about mental events
should
not blind us to the fact that we
are almost incorrigible.
The possibility of overriding reports
about such features
IS real, but it is actualized only
rarely and

with
trepidation. We are far less likely to
have a report
about a mental state, even one that is
not an event,
overridden than to have a report about
something physical
overridden.
Further, as such mental features as
beliefs
and desires become more particular and
limited and, thus,
approach the status of episodes rather than
dispositions,
they become more incorrigible.
He goes on to defend his criterion of
incorrigibility:

—

The two factors we have just mentioned the
near-incorrigibility of reports of mental features, and
their tendency to become strictly incorrigible
as they
become more particular and limited account, I
believe,
for the term 'mental' having been stretched from
the
paradigm cases of the nonphysical thoughts and
sensat ions--to such things as beliefs, desires, emotions,
and intentions.
If i am right in saying that strict
incorrigibility is the mark of mental events and if I was
right in saying above that it was mental events, as
opposed to mental features, which engendered the Cartesian
notion of the mental and the physical as separate realms,
then it is appropriate that near-incorrigibility should be
the basis for widening the realm of the mental.
The
likeness of near-incorrigibility to strict incorrigibility
is the family resemblance that ties the various things
called "mental" together and makes it possible to contrast
them all with the physical.
But the distinctness of nearfrom strict incorrigibility is what makes it impossible to
find any interesting set of necessary and sufficient
conditions for mentality.

—
—

Here Rorty makes the general statement that we are far less

likely to have

a

report about a mental state than a physical

statement overridden.

It

is true that some physical statements are

more easily overridden than some mental statements.

However, not

all mental statements are less easily overridden than some physical

statements.

When

I

stand in my office,

I

almost always feel more

confident that there is a chair in my office than

I

do about what

I
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want to do that evening.

i

often feel uncertain about how

towards another person, particularly
when
feelings.

feel

have conflicting

Many people are uncertain of their
religious beliefs, or

are even uncertain if they have any.
deed,

I

I

Sometimes when

I

do a good

am unsure whether my motive was
generosity or simply a

I

desire to improve my image.

mental features
person.

a

All these examples show that what

person has is often far from clear to that

Often physical statements are more incorrigible
than

first-person reports of these mental features.
The advent of Freudian psychology and the
accompanying

acceptance into common vocabulary of terms such as
"unconscious
belief

unconscious motive", and "unconscious feeling" provides
an

,

additional reason to doubt the correctness of incorrigibility
as

criterion for mental features.
giving someone

a

in my belief that

motive.

gift,
I

I

If

I

a

have an unconscious motive for

am not incorrigible or nearly incorrigible

have it;

I

do not even believe that

I

have this

Rorty does not say how he would account for unconscious

mental features, but near-incorrigibility does not explain their
mental status.

Another example of mental events that persons do not have
either corrigible or near-corrigible beliefs about is dreams.
a

While

dream is occurring, the events in the dream usually seem real to

the person having the dream.

during

a

If

I

can be said to have beliefs

dream, my beliefs are that the dream events are actually

occurring.

Yet when a person wakes up he realizes that "It's only

a
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dream- and that his beliefs were in
error.

The beliefs we have

about the events that occur in our
dreams are among the most

corrigible beliefs we have since they are
usually recognized to be
false when we awaken.

Perhaps Rorty would reply that even if beliefs

during a dream are corrigible, beliefs

when he awakens are incorrigible.
reasons.

have

a

a

person has about his dreams

This reply will not work for two

It is possible to remember a dream incorrectly.

dream in which

I

more detail about my dream,

correct myself.

dreams.

I

As

I

I

I

recollect

realize that it was really Smith, and

Secondly, most people do not remember all their

Most people remember only a few dreams.

with the clear impression that
it.

Suppose

am playing cards with three other people.

initially identify one of my opponents as Jones.

I

person has

a

I

had a dream, but

I

sometimes awaken

I

cannot remember

On Rorty's criterion, unremembered dreams are not mental events

since no one has incorrigible beliefs about them.

It will not work

to say "If the person remembered his dream, the resulting beliefs

would be incorrigible", since we have already seen that it is

possible to remember

5.2.4

a

dream incorrectly.

Conclusion about Rorty's Defense of Incorrigibility
In conclusion, Rorty's attempt to establish incorrigibility as

a

criterion for mental events and to extend his criterion for mental

events to cover all mental entities by using near-incorrigibility as
a

criterion for mental features fails for these five reasons:
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1

.

It may be that the statement
"I am in pain" uttered
sincerely by someone who understands
English
is

f the total number of
statements about mental entities
IS incorrigible.
Many other statements about mental
entities are not even nearly incorrigible
since many

persons are often uncertain about
their feelings and
emotions.
Dreams also provide an example of
mental
events about which our beliefs are not
nearly
incorrigible.

^•2.5

2.

Rorty's criterion fails to capture the
pains of
infants, any pains or other mental
entities animals may
have, or unconscious mental entities
such as
unconscious motives and unconscious feelings.

3.

At best, only some very cautious
non-inf erential
fi^st-person statements about mental events are
incorrigible.
For example, a first-person statement
that locates pain at some place in the body
can be
mistaken.

4.

Rorty's criterion fails to provide us with a clear
contrast with physical entities. Some physical
statements are more incorrigible than some mental
statements.

5.

Rorty s criterion is vague and difficult to spply,
since Rorty does not explain how near to being
incorrigible a statement must be to qualify as nearly
incorrigible.

Rorty's Argument for Materialism
Rorty's primary interest in his article "Incorrigibility as the

Mark of the Mental" apparently is to use his conception of

incorrigibility as
materialism.

a

mark of the mental to state an argument for

He makes the following statement:

25

It might turn out that there are no entities about which
we are incorrigible, nearly or strictly.
This discovery
would be made if the use of cerebroscopes (or some similar

mechanism) led to a practice of overriding reports about
mental entities on the basis of knowledge of brain
states.
If we should, as a result of correlations between
neurological and mental states, begin taking a discovery
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of a neurological state as better
evidence about a

subject's mental state than his own report,
mental states
would lose their incorrigible status and,
thus, their
status as me ntal . This possibility is
a result of the way
in which we defined 'incorrigible
belief. By phrasing
our definition in terms of accepted
procedures, rather
than in terms of the logical impossibility
of error, we
leave room for the sort of change that
would confirm
"eliminative" materialism.

Rorty's claim here is that if some mechanism
such as

a

cerebroscope

came to be regarded as better evidence for the
existence of mental
states than a subject's own reports, mental states
would lose their

incorrigible status and hence their mental status.

Clearly the

correctness of this argument depends on whether Rorty has
succeeded
in establishing that incorrigibility is the mark of the
mental.

have argued that Rorty has not established this claim.

I

Hence, his

argument for materialism, which depends on the claim that
incorrigibility is the mark of the mental, fails.
In a recent book,

26

Rorty advances

a

similar argument.

Here

he imagines that explorers from earth discover on the other side of

the galaxy a group of people who do not have a conception of mental

events.

While they are physiologically very similar to us, they

report brain states instead of mental events such as pain.

Instead

of reporting pain, for example, the members of this group say "My

C-fibers are firing".

The explorers call the members of this group

the Antipodeans, making a reference to a group of Australian

materialists.

Rorty's argument in this example is more difficult to determine
than in the earlier article

I

just discussed since he states his
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argument less directly.

However, he does say that "incorr
igibility

IS all that is at issue in puzzles
about the Antipodeans" 27

Hence, he appears to be giving a more
elaborate version of the

argument for materialism than he gives
in his first articl e: the
argument

I

just discussed.

interpretation

Robert Schwartz also advances this

28

[Rorty's] position is that none of our
mental-state
reports are intrinsically incorrigible,
although, at a
given time, there may not be settled community
standards
for challenging such first-person claims.
Were
neurophysiology to develop sufficiently, no state
would be
incorrigibly reportable; hence, no state would be
on the
nonphysical side of the divide. Materialism wins
out, but
it is materialism without mind/body identity.
The realm
of the mental is eliminated or ontologically
mental.
If Rorty's argument in this book is as Schwartz
presents it,

it is

no better than his defense of incorrigibility as a
mark of the

mental.

have just shown that Rorty does not succeed in

I

establishing incorrigibility as
article.

I

a

mark of the mental in his earlier

have also given reasons for believing that this claim

cannot be established.

Furthermore, Rorty's defense of

incorrigibility as the mark of the mental in Philosophy and the
Mirror of Nature is mainly historical and is not as systematic or

explicit as his defense of this criterion in the earlier article.
His discussion in the book does not add additional substantive

arguments for this criterion that go beyond those advanced in the
earlier article.

Hence, to the extent that Schwart z'

interpretation is correct, Rorty's argument involving the

Antipodeans is susceptible to the same objection as his argument for
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materialism in the article.

This objection is that Eorty's
argument

depends on a claim he has not established:

the claim that

incorrigibility is the mark of the mental.
Rorty does draw a more cautious conclusion
in his book:^^
The materialist should stop reacting
to stories such as
that about the Antipodeans by saying
metaphysical things,
and confine himself to such claims as
"No predictive or
explanatory or descriptive power would be
lost if we had
spoken Antipodean all our lives."
This claim is reminiscent of claims Rorty
makes more explicitly in

another article in which he defends the
"disappearance" version of
the identity theory.

In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature

Rorty does not want to describe his view as being
identity theory
materialism.

,

a

.

version of the

though he regards his position as a form of

In spite of Rorty's attempt to divorce himself from

the identity theory, his claim in the above quotation which
involves
his interpretation of the Antipodean example is susceptible to
the

same objections as his earlier "disappearance" version of the

identity theory.
The main objection to Rorty's claim that no predictive or

explanatory power would be lost if we had spoken Antipodean all our
lives is that in Antipodean there is no way to describe the

subjective qualities of our experiences.

Even if one conceded that

Antipodeans succeed in reporting the existence of pain they cannot
report the subjective qualities of pain.

To see why this is so,

suppose that we place ourselves in the position of the Antipodean.
We can even suppose that science has discovered neural correlates
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for qualities of pain such as its
burning and intense qualities.

Let us call these neural correlates
B and

I.

imagine a person, call

him Matt, connected to a machine which
gives him reliable readings
of his brain processes.

from the machine.

Matt can thus "read off" his state
of mind

Now, let us suppose that such a
person makes a

report based on the sensation.

If he reports "My C-fibers are

firing in ways B and I", what is he reporting?

He is reporting a

brain process which has been empirically discovered
to be
"correlated" with what we (on earth) call "a
painful, intense,

burning sensation".
he is reporting.

intense',

But let us suppose we ask him to describe what

What can he say?

He cannot use terms like

'painful', and 'burning' since these are terms used to

report mental events.

All he can do is to give further details

about his brain process, such as its cause, location, etc.

In other

words. Matt will have no way of describing his experience--he can

only report its cause.

Rorty's Antipodean example is an attempt to show that the

objective point of view from which we view another person's
feelings, thoughts, desires, etc., could replace the subjective

point of view from which each person experiences his own feelings,
thoughts, desires etc. with no loss of explanatory or descriptive
power.

Such an attempt is inherently confused since the objective

point of view depends for its definition on the subjective point of
view.

It is also confused in that objective criteria such as

C-fibers firing" are supposed to be criteria for something, and
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this something is not another brain
state but a subjective

experience such as pain.

Antipodean is in fact

a

very impoverished

language in which people are unable to
describe what their

experiences are like.

The suggestion that Antipodean is
just as

descriptive and explanatory as our current
language has no more
merit than the suggestion that we abandon
all talk of our bodies and
brains in favor of strictly mentalistic
language.
one cannot say "I have

a

pain in my finger".

In such language,

Likewise, in

Antipodean, one cannot say "I have an intense,
throbbing pain."

5. 3

Intentionality

Contemporary discussion of intentionality as

a

criterion of the

mental begins with Franz Brentano.^^
Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the
scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (and
also mental) inexistence Inexistenz of an object
Gegenstand
and what we could call, although in not
entirely unambiguous terms, the reference to a content, a
direction upon an object (by which we are not to
understand a reality in this case) , or an immanent
objectivity.
Each one includes something as object within
itself, although not always in the same way.
In
presentation something is presented, in judgment something
is affirmed or denied, in love [something is] loved, in
hate [something] hated, in desire [something] desired, etc.
(

(

)

)

,

This passage on intentionality is sometimes cited by commentators on

intentionality as the classic statement of the thesis of
intentionality, although Brentano uses the phrase 'intentional
inexistence' rather than 'intentionality'.

32
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Brentano states his thesis as an
ontological claim about mental
phenomena.
Brentano is not making a conceptual
or linguistic claim
about the language for describing
mental phenomena: he is saying
that mental phenomena such as thoughts
and desires have the property
of being directed upon an object.

Recent discussion, by contrast,

centers on criteria by which intentional
sentences or intentional
terms within language can be identified.
Much recent discussion of intentionality
centers around

articles by Roderick Chisholm, responses to his
articles, and
replies to these responses.

In particular,

proposed three criteria of intentionality.

Chisholm has

In Section 5.3.1,

state a recent formulation of these criteria.

I

In Section 5.3.2

I

examine recent discussion of these criteria by Albert Flores^^
and

Ausonio Marras.

In Section 5.3.3,

I

discuss a reformulation by

Chisholm of his criteria in response to criticisms by Flores and
others.

In Section 5.3.4

I

criteria by Ansonio Marras.

examine

reformulation of Chisholm's

In Section 5.3.5

criticisms of intentionality as

5.3.1

a

a

I

state three

criterion of mental phenomena.

Chisholm's Criteria for Intentional Sentences

Chisholm originally states his three criteria for

intentionality in Sentences About Believing ^^ and in Perceiving: A
Philosophical Study
recent discussion:
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38

.

He restates these three criteria in a
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I had suggested a kind
of criterion of the psychological.
A phenomenon is psychological,
I said, if we cannot
adequately describe it in our ordinary
language without

using sentences that are intentional.
And then I
formulated three criteria of intentionality
(i) a
sentence is intentional if it uses a
substantival
expression in such a way that neither the
sentence nor its
negation imply that there is, or that
there isn't
anything, to which that expression truly
applies. (2) A
sentence is intentional if it has a subordinate
clause
such that neither the sentence nor its
negation imply that
the subordinate clause is true or that
it is false.
And
(3) a sentence is intentional if it has
a context that is
referentially opaque. Then I added that a compound
sentence is intentional provided one of its
components is
intentional.
.

Here Chisholm restates his three original
criteria for

sentence's being intentional.

a

These three criteria can be

formulated as follows, together with

a

criterion for compound

sentences.
A sentence is intentional if:
1.

It uses a substantival expression in such a way that

neither the sentence nor its negation implies that this
expression does or does not apply to any thing.
2.

It has a subordinate clause such that neither the
sentence nor its negation imply that the subordinate
clause is true or false.

3.

It has a referentially opaque context.

4.

It is a compound sentence and one of its components is
intentional.

According to Chisholm, "a phenomena is psychological.

.. if

we

cannot adequately describe it without using sentences that are
intentional".
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Apparently Chisholm's view is that if we must use

an intentional sentence to describe
are describing is psychological.

a

phenomenon, the phenomenon we

For example, suppose

I

say:
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5.

Here

I

I

believe that Reagan is from California.

am stating a belief that

I

have.

In this example, my belief

that Reagan Is from California is
the psychological phenomenon.
is the presence of the verb 'believe'

in sentence

5

It

that accounts

for the intentionality of this sentence,
not the presence of the

sentence "Reagan is from California'.

However this sentence

expresses the content of my belief, so its
presence is essential to
the intentionality of the sentence.

phenomenon

I

am describing when

I

Yet the psychological

use this sentence is my belief,

not the fact that Reagan is from California.

Because the intentionality of
on the presence of

a

a

sentence depends in many cases

verb that expresses a propositional attitude,

some philosophers such as Davidson prefer to talk about
mental
u
verbs
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We may call those verbs mental that express propositional
attitudes like believing, intending, desiring, hoping,
knowing, perceiving, noticing, remembering, and so on.
Such verbs are characterized by the fact that they
sometimes feature in sentences with subjects that refer to
persons, and are completed by embedded sentences in which
the usual rules of substitution appear to break down.
This criterion is not precise, since I do not want to
include these verbs when they occur in contexts that are
fully extensional
'He knows Paris,
'He perceives the
moon' may be cases) , nor exclude them whenever they are
not followed by embedded sentences.
An alternative
characterization of the desired class of mental verbs
might be that they are psychological verbs as used when
they create apparently nonextensional contexts. .. .On the
proposed test of the mental, the distinguishing feature of
the mental is not that it is private, subjective, or
immaterial, but that it exhibits what Brentano called
intentionality. Thus intentional actions are clearly
included in the realm of the mental along with thoughts,
hopes, and regrets (or the events tied to these)
(

'
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Davidson talks here about .ental
verbs, e.g., believing,
intending,
hoping, desiring, knowing, etc.
whether a verb is mental depends
on
its use, these verbs may not
always be mental. According
to
Davidson, a verb is mental when
it occurs in an intentional
context.

Chisholm's criteria for intentional
sentences should

enable us to identify intentional
contexts.

Apparently Chisholm intends each
criterion to be
criterion for identifying psychological
phenomena.

a

sufficient

The criteria

cannot be individually necessary since
they apply to different types
of sentences.

Albert Flores cites these three
sentences as examples

of intentional sentences by each of
Chisholm's three criteria:^^

Criterion

1:

6.

Quine looked for the proper
characterization of analyticity.

Criterion

2:

7.

Othello believes that Desdemona loves
Casio.

Sentence

is also intentional by Criterion

7

3

in virtue of the truth

of the following identity statement:

Desdemona is the woman framed by lago.

8.

Sentences

6

and

7

are each intentional according to the first two of

Chisholm's criteria respectively.

according to Chisholm's Criterion
only by Criterion

1.

Sentence

is also intentional

But sentence

3.

6

is intentional

We can add a fourth example of a compound

sentence as an example of Criterion
9.

7

4

Othello believes that Desdemona loves Casio or snow is
white.

The most correct interpretation of Chisholm's criteria, then, is
that the disjunction of the four criteria is a necessary condition
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for Identifying psychological
phenomena, while each condition
is
individually sufficient. This allows
tor the possibility that a
sentence can be intentional by more
than one criterion, but need
not
be intentional by more than
one.

^•3.2

Criticisms of Chisholm's Criteria
One criticism that has been raised
against Chisholm's

intentional criteria for psychological
phenomena is that sentences
that contain modal terms such as
'possible' and 'necessary' satisfy
one or more of Chisholm's criteria yet
are not used to describe

psychological phenomena.
example:
1

10.

Albert Flores cites the following

42

It

is necessary that Alaska is Alaska.

We can assume the truth of the following identity
statement:
11.

Alaska is the 49th state of the union.

Substitution in sentence 10 results in the following
statement:
12.

It is necessary that Alaska is the 49th state
in the union

Sentence 10 is intentional by Criterion
15.

3,

yet it is not used to

describe a psychological phenomenon.
Flores cites other sentences which have been cited as counter

examples to Chisholm's first two criteria:"^^
13.

The fire needs some coal.

14.

The frost may bring it about that the cliff will fall.

Sentence 13 is is intentional by Criterion
The fire does not need some coal.

1

since neither 13 nor
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implies that any coal is available,
or even exists.
16.

intentional by Criterion

2

Sentence 14 is

since neither 14 nor its
negation:

The frost may not bring it
about that the cliff

„iu fan.

implies that the truth or falsity
of the subordinate clause.

Chisholm's response to examples
like these and others is to
claim that the alleged counterexamples
can be transformed into
equivalent non-intentional sentences
These sentences are not examples
counter to our thesis
Anyone who understands the language
can readily transform
hem into conditionals which are not
intentional ... Instead
of using intentional sentences, we
could have said, 'If
there should be any new epidemics,
the patient would not
be affected by them'... I believe that
any other ostensibly
non-psychological sentence which is intentional
can be
transformed, in an equally obvious way,
into a sentence
conforming to our version of Brentano's
thesis.
That is
to say, it will become a sentence of
one of two possible
types: either (a) it will no longer be
intentional or (b)
It will be explicitly psychological.
Sentences about
probability may be intentional, but,
depending upon one's
conception of probability, they may be
transformed either
into the first or into the second type.

Following Chisholm's proposal, D.H. Sanford
proposes these

transformations for sentences 10 and 14: 45
17.

It

18.

It is possible that the frost will bring
it about
that the cliff will fall.

is necessary that Alaska is self-identical.

Sentence 17 has the same truth value as 10, while the
negation of 18
implies the falsity of the subordinate clause.

Hence sentences 10

and 14 are not intentional after all.

Flores correctly attributes to Chisholm the following

principle

46
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A.

All non-transformable intentional
sentences are

psychological

Sentences containing modal terms and
other apparently

non-psychological yet intentional sentences
do not count as
intentional if they can be transformed
into non-intentional
sentences.

Or,

if they can be transformed into
explicitly

intentional sentences, they count as intentional.

For example, one

might transform:
19.

It

is probable that there is life on Venus.

20.

It

is reasonable for us to believe that
there is life

into

on Venus.

Flores takes 'transforms' to mean "transform into

equivalent sentence".

a

logically

He counters that if one sentence is

intentional and the other is not, these two sentences have different

implicatory relations and hence are not logically equivalent

5.3.3.

.

^

Chisholm's Reformulated Criterion

In his response to Flores, Chisholm concedes that his original

criteria need to be reformulated.

He gives the following

definitions which are intended to provide this reformulation:^^
(D14)

T contains S autonymously in L = Df (i) s is a
proper part of T; and (ii) for every U, if U
results from replacing S in T by some sentence in
L, then there is a P such that P is a proper part
of U and the result of replacing S by P in T is a
sentence in L.
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(D15)

T contains S in a propositional
context in L = of
(i) S is a proper part of T;
(ii) t does not
contain S autonymously in L; and (iii)
for every U,
if U is a sentence in L, the
result of replacing s"
by U in T is a sentence in L.

(D16)

T contains s in an intentional
context in L = Df
(i) T contains S in a propositional
context in L;
(ii) there is an S' which is inconsistent
with S in
L but which is such that the result
of replacing S
by S' is consistent with T in L.

(D17)

T

contains S in an exclusively intentional context
in L - Df (i) T contains S in an intentional
context in L; and (ii) there is a U such that (a) U
is logically equivalent to S in L and (b) the
result of replacing S by U in T is not logically
implied by T in L.

discussion of Chisholm's reply, Ausonio Marras correct

attributes to Chisholm the following criterion:^^
(P)

A sentence containing a propositional clause S is
psychological if and only if it contains S in an

exclusively intentional context.
Marras goes on to discuss the problem of modal contexts:^^

According to (P), 'John believes that Socrates is
mortal' is psychological, whereas 'It is possible
that Socrates is mortal' is not; the latter
contains S in an intentional but not in an
exclusively intentional context. And 'It is
necessary that Socrates is mortal' is also
non-psychological since S does not even occur in an
intentional context.
As Marras says, then, Chisholm's revised criterion appears to answer

objections to Chisholm's earlier criteria based on sentences
containing modal terms.

Marras points out

however, that some sentences used to

describe psychological phenomena are not intentional on Chisholm's
revised criterion:

51

obviously psychological sentence
-John knows

c

^
'Socrates is
^ P-^°P°=itional context but not

®

1^00

oontext, and thus not in an
exclusively
<S°crates is nL
mrrtrrrwMcr"^""'
^
inconsistent with s but which is such
^
^
S by S' is not consistent
with
ith ^
T.
Hence T (and many other sentence
containing verbs
20,
'len’etbet', •realise’, etc.) turn
out
ut to be
h! non-psychological
n
according to (P).
^ntenr

?

"

Vf

Other sentences that are not intentional
by Chisholm's criteria are
I

see that my desk is brown.

21.

I

remember that you attended the meeting.

22.

I

am aware that she is wearing lipstick.

In sentences 20 ,

21 , and 22,

the result of replacing the embedded

sentence with its negation yields a sentence
which is inconsistent
with the original sentence.

Chisholm's revised criterion, then,

while dealing with the problems of modal contexts,
appears to rule
out sentences which clearly describe psychological
phenomena.

5

•

3

.

4

Marras* Revision of Chisholm's Cri t e r i

.

Marras proposes a different revision of Chisholm's original
criteria
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(i)

Drop Chisholm's third criterion of intentionality
in SAB [Sentences About Believing], which fails to
keep the de dicto modalities out of the
intentional domain.
(

(ii)

(iii)

)

Retain the first two criteria in SAB as (singly)
sufficient conditions of intentionality.
Add to those two criteria the following recursive
condition
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(C) Any (noncontradictory)

sentence which entails
sentence which is intentional by
either the
first or the second criterion
is itself
intentional.

(iv)

a

Let Chisholm's first two criteria
in SAB
supplemented by the recursive condition
(C)
constitute jointly a necessary and
sufficient
condition of intentionalitv .
(it will be noticed
that modal sentences turn out to be
non-intentional
by this condition, whereas 'John
knows that p
which entails 'John believes that
turns out to
,
be intentional by meeting conditions
(C).)
'

(V)

Reformulate Chisholm's thesis about the
psychological as follows:
sentence is psychological if and only if it
is intentional and is not transformable
into a

(D) A

non-intentional sentence.
In a footnote, Marras replies to four
sentences offered by John

Bacon as counterexamples to his proposal.
23.

One sentence is:

It is a contingent matter whether A.

In reply, Marras refers to an article published in
Intentionalitv,
M_i_nd

and Language.

In a footnote in this article, Marras makes

these remarks:

Contingency sentences seem to be intentional by
Chisholm's second criterion. For neither "It is
contingent that
(where 'contingent' means 'neither
necessary nor impossible'
nor its contradictory implies
either that ^ is true or that
is false.
However, since
such contingency sentences are really abbreviations for
compound sentences (i.e., sentences containing two or more
sentences conjoined by means of such sentence connectors
as 'and', 'or', 'because,' etc.), they are as such beyond
the scope of Chisholm's second criterion, which applies
only to noncompound sentences.
Chisholm also provides a
criterion of intentionality for compound sentences,
according to which a compound (declarative) sentence is
intentional if and only if at least one of its component
sentences is intentional Perceiving . p. 172). By this
criterion, the compound sentence "It is neither necessary
)

(

£

“possible that
(which Is the unabbreviated
form of It IS contingent that £is not intentional
since neither of its component sentences
is intentional.
Similar considerations apply to sentences
about
probability dispositions, tendencies,
abilities, etc.
which may be analyzed into nonintentional
sentences about
frequencies and/or nonintentional counterf
actual sentences.
)

In the above quotation, Marras
deals deftly with many modal

sentences.

Included in his list of statements he believes
he can

show to be non-intentional are sentences
of probability.

Marras

apparently believes that probability sentences
can be analyzed intc
sentences about frequencies or into nonintentional
counterf actual
sentences.

The frequency interpretation is one of several
accepted

interpretations of probability.

However, this interpretation of

probability has difficulty accounting for the probability of
unique
events.

Consider this sentence:

24.

It is probable that the sun will burn out in 23
billion years.

Sentence 24 is intentional by Chisholm's criterion

2.

Perhaps

Marras would analyze 24 as:
25.

26.

The frequency with which suns burn out in 23 billion
years is high.

However, 25 will not do as an analysis of sentence 24 since 24

refers to a particular sun and since this claim is based on evidenc

about the sun; not on

a

statistical or frequency analysis of

probabilities.

Chisholm addresses this issue in Sentences about Believing: 55
•

Here Chisholm says that the following sentence
It is probable that there is life on Venus.
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can be

t ransformed

into sentences abont frequencies.

But unique

events occur only once so that it
is a mistake to suppose that
their
probability is a matter of the frequency
with which they occur.

Chisholm also appears to be confusing
giving an analysis or
equivalent reading of a sentence with
citing the evidence for it.
The evidence for sentence 26, even
if it is a matter of the
frequency with which life is found on
certain places, is not part of
the meaning of 26.

Hence, even if the evidential sentences
for

sentence 26 are non-intentional, this does
not make 26
non- intentional.

Probably Chisholm and Marras would prefer an
intentional
reading of sentences 25 and 26.

Chisholm's other interpretation is

as follows:^^
27.

It is reasonable for us to believe that there
is life
on Venus.

Sentence 27 is intentional by Criterion

2.

However, what is

reasonable to believe is determined by weighing the reasons for and
against

a

proposition, while probability is

likelihood of an event's occurring.

a

matter of judging the

Hence it can be reasonable to

believe something to which the concept of probability does not
apply, as it is reasonable for me to believe that
is not merely probable but certain that

2+2=4.

2+2=4.

Yet it

Furthermore,

what is reasonable for a person to believe is relative to the

background of his beliefs and purposes, so it can be reasonable to

believe something improbable.

For example, it is reasonable for me
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to believe that

I

can leap over a chasm if this will
help me

accomplish this task even if it is improbable
that

I

will succeed.

Perhaps Chisholm or Marras could offer
another "analysis" or

"transformation" that would not be susceptible
to the objections
just advanced.

Unless this is done, Marras' revised criterion
does

not fare better than either Chisholm's original
criteria or

Chisholm's revised criteria.
Marras

criterion is also notable for the psychological

sentences that are not intentional according to his
criterion.

Consider once again Marras' criterion, this time with
Chisholm's
first two criteria spelled out:
1.

It uses a substantival expression in such a way that
neither the sentence nor its negation implies that this
expression does or does not apply to any thing.

2.

It has a subordinate clause such that neither the

sentence nor its negation imply that the subordinate
clause is true or false.

Any (noncontradictory) sentence which entails a
sentence which is intentional by either the first or
the second criterion is itself intentional.

3.

Condition

2

applies only to sentences that contain

subordinate clause, so any sentence without such

a

clause, if it is

intentional, has to be intentional by either Condition

Condition

3.

The sentences which Condition

1

a

1

or

are intended to meet

are sentences such as:
(6)

Quine looked for the proper characterization of
analyticity

These sentences contain
such

a

a

"substantival expression" which is used in

way that neither the sentence nor its negation implies that
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there is or is not anything to which
the substantival expression
applies.

By 'substantival expression',
Chisholm apparently means

-name 28.
or definite or indefinite description"
to allow for examples
such as:

Diogenes looked for an honest man.
In P erceiving Chisholm cites sentence
28, which originates with

Brentano, as an example of an intentional
sentence according to his

first criterion. 57

either

a

Hence the substantival expression can be

definite or indefinite description, as well as

a name.

In the examples Chisholm gives of sentences
that are

intentional by Condition
object of

a verb.

1,

the substantival expression is the

Chisholm does not to my knowledge address the

possibility that the substantival expression referred to in
Condition

1

might be the subject of the sentence.

Hence, sentences

which neither contain a subordinate clause nor contain
substantival expression which is the object of
not covered by either Condition

1

a

or Condition 2.

a

verb are apparently
Examples of such

sentences are:
29.

I

30.

He is dreaming.

31.

I

am in pain.

32.

I

am angry.

33.

She is depressed.

am thinking.

Sentences 29 to 33 are all mental or psychological sentences.
None of these sentences contains a subordinate clause, and the only
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substantival expression In any of these
sentences is the subject of
the sentence.
I do not believe that
Chisholm Intended the

substantival expression mentioned in
Condition
Of the sentence.

1

to be the subject

However, to the extent that any of
these sentences

implies anything about their subjects,
the implication is that the
subject exists, viz. that there is something
to which the

substantival expression truly applies.

This is especially true of

the first-person sentences, but it applies
to the third person

sentences as well.

But if Chisholm or Marras were to deny
that

there is such an implication, and hence that
these sentences are

intentional, it is difficult to see why these
sentences would not be

intentional as well:
34.

I

35.

He is rich.

36.

She is tanned.

am tall.

These three sentences have subjects that function like the subjects
of sentences 29 to 33.

The difference is that they do not contain

37.

intentional terms.

Hence Chisholm and Marras cannot account for the

intentionality of sentences 29 to 33 by appealing to Condition
Perhaps Marras' Condition
of sentences 29 to 33.
31.

I

3

entails
I

believe

I

will account for the intentionality

Marras may wish to argue that:

am in pain.

am in pain.

1.
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iPcyclopedia

of Philosophy article on

"

Intentionality"

Chisholm gives this very argument in an attempt
to account for the
intentionality of pain.

Chisholm does not incorporate this

consideration into his criteria as Marras has.

However, it is not

clear that sentence 37 is intentional by Marras'
criterion.

Just as

sentence 31 plausibly can be held to imply
sentence 37, so 37

plausibly can be held to imply 31.
according to which neither

a

This violates Condition

2,

sentence nor its contradictory implies

the truth or falsity of the subordinate clause.

Hence even if

sentence 31 does imply 37, sentence 31 is not intentional and
therefore mental by Condition

3.

In the case of sentence 31 implying sentence 37, which
seemed

at first as if it might provide a way to argue that sentence 31
is

intentional, this implication relies on the incorrigibility of
f

i^^st-person pain sentences.

Hence, someone who relies on this

implication to explain the intentionality of pain sentences is
importing

a

different criterion from intentionality, viz.

incorrigibility, and using it to support intentionality as a

criterion of mental phenomena.

However,

I

argued in Section 5.2

that incorrigibility does not extend to all our mental states, and
that in particular it does not extend to dream states and emotional
states.

Hence, even if Marras could find a way to show that

sentence 31 is intentional, or even that sentence 29 is intentional
by Condition 3, his argument would not extend to the other three

sentences listed:
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30.

He is dreaming.

31.

I

32.

She is depressed.

am angry.

In summary, according to Marras'

revised criterion of

intentionality , some sentences which are not mental
such as
sentences of probability are intentional by Marras*
criterion.
Other sentences which are mental, such as sentences 29
to 33, are
not intentional by his criterion.

Whether or not Marras* criterion

is an improvement on Chisholm* s, it is not significantly
more

successful than Chisholm*s in capturing those sentences which are

generally recognized to be psychological or mental.

5.3.5

Conclusion about Intentionality
I

will now make some general comments about intentionality as

criterion of the mental.

First, the Chisholm-Mar ras criteria

attempt to identify certain sentences as being intentional and then

claim that what these sentences describe or refer to is mental.

On

the other hand, it is clear from reading Brentano that he regarded

intentionality as an ontological feature of mental phenomena, not
merely

a

conceptual or linguistic one.

Based on the attempts

examined in this section, it is unlikely that any conceptual or
linguistic criterion of intentionality will capture all and only
those sentences we antecedently call mental.

It may be,

then, that

future research should be directed upon formulating an ontological
criterion.

a

Secondly, it seems unlikely that any
criterion, either

ontological or conceptual, could succeed
in capturing all cases of
mental phenomena.
If the unique feature of intentional
phenomena i
that they are directed towards an object,
it seems clear that not
all mental phenomena share this feature.

Both sensations such as

pain and tiredness and objectless emotions
such as certain cases of

depression and fear do not share this feature of
intentionality
Also, visual images which do not represent
any thing, such as spots

before someone's eyes, are not intentional.

It appears,

then, that

many mental phenomena do not have the feature Brentano
originally
identified, that of being directed towards an object,
and which has

come to be known as intentionality.
Third, it is not clear that intentionality is exclusively

feature of mental phenomena.

a

As Marion Knowles says:^^

It has been suggested that there are physical phenomena
which, in some sense, are intentional.
For instance, Scruton, following Goodman, points out
that one can conceive of a painting as being about its
object in the way that a sentence is about its subject.'
And, clearly, certain paintings are paintings of something
(e.g., portraits, landscape paintings), while others are,
in a sense, 'about' something (e.g. Picasso's 'Guernica'
is, inter alia, about war)
'

Another example is a road sign which points in
direction.

In these cases,

a

particular

the intentionality of the physical

entity is dependent on the intention of a person.

Nevertheless,

sign still points in a particular direction even if one has to

explain this fact by reference to human intentions.

Any complete

a

account of Intentionality will take into
account the intentionality
that attaches to some physical entities.

5

In Section 5.2

incorrigibility as
Section 5.3

I

I

a

.

4

Conclusion

examined Richard Rorty's defense of

criterion for identifying mental phenomena.

I

examined Roderick Chisholm's criterion of

intentionality as

a

criterion for identifying mental phenomena.

I

argued that while a small subset of first-person
statements may be
incorrigible, this criterion fails to capture many other first

person and third person statements about mental phenomena.

In

particular, it fails to capture many statements about what Rorty

calls mental features, including statement about feelings, emotions
and dreams.

animal pains.

It also fails to capture statements about infant and

Furthermore, some physical statements are more

incorrigible than some mental statements.

Hence, incorrigibility

does not succeed in capturing all and only mental phenomena.

With respect to intentionality,

I

argued that the criteria

proposed by Chisholm and Marras make non-mental sentences
intentional and fail to capture sentences which clearly are mental.
It seems unlikely that any linguistic criterion will be successful

in capturing all and only mental phenomena.

Ontologically speaking

it does not seem that all mental phenomena share the feature of

intentionality originally identified by Brentano.

In particular.
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objectless emotions such as certain cases of
depression and fear and
certain sensations such as those of pain and
tiredness do not have
this quality of "aboutness" or intentionality

.

Finally, certain

physical objects appear to have intentionality,
or

much like intentionality.

a

feature very

Hence, the criterion of intentionality

does not succeed in identifying all and only mental
phenomena.

There are other criteria for mental phenomena that

discussed here.

I

have not

It is sometimes claimed that what is unique
to

mental phenomena is that they are subjective, nonspatial,
qualitative, purposive, phenomenal, mnemic, holistic, or emergent.
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss all
these proposed
fot'

identifying mental phenomena.

The most comprehensive

discussion of this subject is still Herbert Feigl's classic article,
"The Mental and the Physical".

Even though this chapter does

not attempt the exhaustive survey that Feigl makes, the fact remains

that incorrigibility and intentionality are two of the strongest

candidates for

a

criterion of mental phenomena.

these two criteria is close to being

a

And neither of

satisfactory criterion for

mental phenomena.
Finally, it may be that the most promising course for someone

who wishes to defend incorrigibility or intentionality as criteria
of the mental is to concede that neither one is a necessary

condition for something's being

a

mental phenomenon and that the

criterion is one but not the only criterion for identifying mental
phenomena.

Just as was the case with incorrigibility.
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intentionality does characterize a subset
of mental phenomena, but
it does not characterize all mental
phenomena.

A logical conclusion

to draw, then, is that there may be no
single criterion of what is

mental and that if there can be a successful
criterion which states
a

necessary condition, it will be

a

disjunction of criteria each of

which applies to some but not all mental phenomena.
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CHAPTER

VI

MIND-BODY INTERACTION AND THREE CONCEPTIONS
OF THE PHYSICAL

6.1

In Chapter 2,

Saul Kripke.

I

l

Introduction

considered

a

form of dualism as presented by

also considered identity theory in this
chapter in

that much of the chapter was devoted to
defending Kripke against the

criticism of an identity theorist, Fred Feldman.

However,

I

noted

that the problem of interaction is a serious problem
for dualism.

devoted Chapter

3

I

to considering anomalous monism, a position

advocated by Donald Davidson.
Spinoza's dual aspect view.^

This position has its roots in
I

argued that Davidson has failed to

establish anomalous monism and that there are good reasons for
doubting that anomalous monism is true.

Chapter

functionalism as presented by Daniel Dennett.
contemporary form of materialism, perhaps
than the identity theory.

I

a

4

considered

This is really a very

more sophisticated form

argued in this chapter that Dennett's

functionalist account deals with the mechanisms of pain and not pain
itself, and that functionalism cannot account for the subjective

qualities of pain and other experiences.

Finally, Chapter

5

considered two criteria for mental phenomena: incorrigibility and
i

ntentionality
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The following statements formulate
the results from the

preceding which are most important for
future discussion:
I.

The dualistic division of the
world into two
ontologically distinct classes makes
the
distinctness of mind from body fairly
easy to
argue for.
However/ dualism will not be a viable
theory until a plausible account of
mind-body
interaction is given which is consistent
with
dualist principles.

II.

In justifying his claim that there
are no
psychophysical lawS/ Davidson utilizes the
claim
that the physical conceptual domain
is homonomic.
The homonomic quality of the physical
conceptual

domain has the result that this domain
includes
only the language(s) of physics and chemistry/
and
not biology or neurology.
III.

Like other forms of materialism/ functionalism
describes the mechanisms and causes of pain and
other mental phenomena/ but does not account for
mental phenomena.
In particular/ functionalism/
like other materialist theories/ is unable to
account for the subjective qualities of experience.

IV.

It is unlikely that any single criterion can
be
found which uniquely identifies all and only
mental phenomena.
It is especially unlikely that
a necessary condition for mental phenomena can be
found.
If such a condition is found/ it is likely
to be a disjunction of properties rather than one
single property.

In this chapter

Statements

I,

interaction as

I

return to issues relating mainly to

II/ and IV.
a

In Section 6,2/

problem for dualism.

I

discuss mind-body

In Section 6.3/

other half of the mental-physical distinction:

I

discuss the

the physical.

I

provide three different definitions of the term 'physical' which

correspond to three distinct conceptions of what is physical.
belief that it is possible to provide

a

The

single definition of

'physical' that covers all physical entities and phenomena is one
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reason the mind-body problem has
proved so intractable,

summarizes the chapter.

I

section 6.4

develop the Implications of the
different

definitions of 'physical' and the
implications for the discussion of
mind-body interaction in Chapter 7.

6.2

Dualism and Mind-Body Interaction

One formulation of dualism is the view that
mental events,
states, and phenomena are distinct from
physical events, states, and

phenomena.

Other formulations hold that mind is distinct
from body,

or that a particular mind is distinct from any
particular body.

These formulations are all versions of ontological
dualism,
according to which dualism is

theory about the relation between

a

phenomena or substances in the world or universe.
dualism, on the other hand, is

a

these phenomena or substances.

Conceptual

theory about terms which refer to

According to conceptual dualism,

terms which refer to mental phenomena or substances cannot be
reduced to or identified with terms that refer to physical phenomena
or substances.

In terms of the philosophers considered in earlier

chapters, Saul Kripke (following Descartes)

is both an ontological

dualist and a conceptual dualist, while Donald Davidson is

a

conceptual dualist but an ontological monist.

Dualism is a view supported by what is sometimes called "common
sense"

2
,

say that

and is suggested by many everyday locutions.
a

person has a mind and

a body,

Thus, we

implying that there is a
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difference, and we say "My mind is
playing tricks on me".

it

certainly seems as if mental phenomena
such as thoughts and feelings
are distinct from brain events,
when I am aware of another person-s
feelings,

I

do not seem to be aware of a state of
his brain.

people also hold that every human being has

a soul,

Many

and some hold

that this soul survives death and passes
into another mode of

existence or being.

Dualism, then, is almost certainly the

predominant view among those who have not reflected
on the mind-body
problem.

This should perhaps not be considered evidence
for

dualism, in and of itself, but it is

a

fact about dualism.

At this same "common sense" level, interaction
between mind and

body, or between mental and physical phenomena,
seems to be an

undeniable fact.

If

I

am stuck with a pin, it certainly seems as if

the pin-prick causes my pain.

Seeing a bear in the road will cause

almost anyone to shiver with fright.

I

commit a social faux pax,

my face might turn red with embarrassment.

Drugs such as marijuana,

If

alcohol, and LSD can cause modified perceptions or entirely new

perceptions.

Voluntary action is often explained as follows:

my

decision to perform an act such as raising my arm is the cause of my
arm's being raised.

The world is also full of artefacts such as

bridges, books, desks, and cars which are products of human minds.

There are also common sense examples of mental events interacting
with other mental events, as when a person's fear of flying causes
him to decide to take alternative transportation.

In all these
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cases, mental and physical phenomena
appear to interact in some way

with each other.
In spite of the prima facie evidence
for mind-body interaction,

interaction has always been difficult to explain
within
framework.

a

dualist

Explaining interaction has, in fact, been the
principal

difficulty for dualism, and this difficulty has
provided
materialists with several distinct arguments against
dualism.
Michael Levin formulates one such argument as follows;^

Armed with this notion [that a given event e has only
one
cause which is the cause of e], the anti-du7list presses
what appears to be the empirical fact that for every
physical event e involving a human body, there is some
preceding physical event which is the cause of e. As far
as anyone knows there are no gaps in the sequence of
bodily events to be bridged by a mental event, or into
which a mental event might slip. There is no physical
event whose cause is mental, in the dualist's intended
sense.

Levin suggests that a dualist might give the following reply:'^
The dualist can. ..reply that the causes of some bodily
events are not purely physical.
His argument here is
reminiscent of a standard defence of epiphenomenalism, the
thesis that some physical events cause mental events but
mental events have no causal efficacy of their own.
Epiphenomenalists reply to the charge that their theory
makes mentality causally superfluous by observing that if
mental event in had not occurred the physical event ^ that
caused in would not have occurred, nor any further physical
events _b was the cause of.
Similarly, replies the
dualist, suppose that when I form the intention (event jn)
to move my leg (event ^)
and thereafter move it, neural
event c^ causes
Assuming that the formation of an
intention is an event, both jc and jn are necessary for e^.
Had I not intended to move my leg, it would not have
moved.
Consequently, c_ does not contain all the necessary
conditions for my leg's moving and is not the cause of my
leg s moving
,

'

225

According to this reply, both neural event

£

and mental event m

are individually necessary for my leg's moving,
and if

without m or m occurs without £, my leg will not move.

£

£

occurs

Thus, m and

are individually necessary and jointly sufficient
for my leg to

move.

This makes the intention to move my leg a partial cause
of my

leg s moving.

neural event

Levin does not say what the relation is between

£

simultaneously.

and my intention,

in,

or whether they occur

If they occur independently of each other such that

either could occur without the other, then it is difficult to see
why the intention is also necessary.

However,

if they are related

in such a way that they either occur together or not at all (c

cannot occur without m or m without £)
plausible.

,

then this reply seems

The only difficulty for a dualist, however, is that

mental events are conceived as being conceptually and ontologically
distinct from physical events, and hence

a

consistent dualist may

not wish to admit a relation between mental and physical events

which seems to imply that they together form

mental-physical unity.

However,

a

kind of

it may be that this type of

relation must be admitted if the problem of interaction is to be
solved.
I

discuss in more detail

physical events form

a kind of

a

view according to which mental and

unity in Chapter

7.

For the moment,

consider another argument which Levin advances against

interaction

5
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nother traditional argument, however,
does seem to show
decisively that the causal relations
between the mind as
the dualist conceives it and the body
are impossible.
Originally my leg, which has mass w, is
motionless. Then
It moves distance d.
Where did the energy come from? It
IS an empirical fact, the law of the
conservation of
energy, that the energy had to come from
somewhere, and
not only does it come from some preceding
physical event,
no immaterial substance could possibly
supply mechanical
energy. The mind can apply no physical
force to the leg,
while the contraction of the hamstring muscle
supplies
just the right amount - and the bodily event
just is the
motion of an object of mass w through distance
d. ~hus
the contraction of the muscle is the cause
of e.
If there
were non-physical causes of physical events,
th”e energy in
the universe would increase.
[C.D.] Broad cites, on the dualist's behalf,
systems whose
parts are causally related but which, allegedly,
exchange
no energy.
The state of the bob of a pendulum is
constantly changing, yet the shaft applies no force to
the
bob.
This analogy is misguided in several ways. When
my
leg moves a force
being applied to a physical object;
energy is being transferred. Since all the requisite
force is supplied by a change in another physical object,
any change in any other (especially immaterial) object is
superfluous. The pendulum case is at best a precedent for
a very limited number of mind-body interactions.
More
damaging is the fact that energy is actually being
exchanged in the pendulum case. The shaft is exerting
centripetal force on the bob, and the bob is exerting
centrifugal force on the shaft; and at different positions
the bob is exerting and bearing different amounts of
both.
The potential and kinetic energy of the bob are
constantly changing.

Levin is right that energy is being exchanged in the pendulum case
cited by Broad.

6

He goes on to say:

V

The dualist may complain that this appeal to the
conservation of energy reifies energy as a kind of stuff
passed from object to object, whereas legitimate talk of
energy (and mass) is shorthand for facts about
acceleration.
The conservation of energy in particular is
shorthand for an empirical fact about constancies in such
ratios.
But even if energy is analytically eliminable,
the present objection stands.
Suppose we 'operationalize'
energy and mass, explaining the mass of a body as its
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constant, additive) tendency to induce
acceleration.
My
which has a constant additive tendency
to induce
acceleration w, moves with average velocity
v during
time interval At.
it is a hard empirical fact
that some
o ject with a constant additive
tendency w' to induce
acceleration must ha^e moved with such an
average velocity
V
during At that ri/2wv2dt =- 5''^/2w' v 2dt
Since. .. immaterial objects have no tendency
to induce
acceleration, it cannot have been an immaterial
object
that slowed down.
But the cause of my leg's moving was
the slowing down of the object with mass
w'
leg,

'

Levin has formulated quite forcefully an
argument which is
often taken to be fatal to dualism:
of energy.

In doing so,

the argument from conservation

he cites one formulation of Newton's Third

Law
(At:

2

)

l/2wv dt

follows:

2

J l/2w'v' dt.

This law can also be formulated as

"The force that one object exerts on

a

second object is

equal and opposite to the force' that the second exerts on the
first

.

In this example,

object with mass
leg's moving.

w'

"

the leg is one object, while the

is the other object which is the cause of
my

Here this object with mass

hamstring muscle.

cannot be

is presumably my

Since immaterial objects cannot induce

acceleration or exert force on
mass

w'

a

a

physical object, the object with

mental object or

mental phenomenon.

a

Let us examine this argument to see what,

shows.

if anything,

it

Levin says that the cause of his leg's moving was the

slowing down of an object with mass

w'

.

Let us look at the

physiology of the movement of limbs, to identify this object and see
how the causation occurs:

9

228

Prop your elbow up on a table with
your fingers pointing
toward the ceiling. Turn your hand so
that you are
looking at the palm. Now make a fist
and alternately bend
your fist first toward you and then away
from you. When
you bend your fist toward you, the muscles
running from
the inner surface of your wrist to the
inner surface of
your elbow are contracting,
when you bend your fist away
from you, the same muscles are being stretched
.. .when the
muscles contract, they pull on the tendons.
Because the
tendons are attached to the bones, those bones
that are
free to move (in this case, the bones of your
hand) will
be pulled into a new position.
In those places where the
bones cannot be moved (in this case, the bones
of your
elbow) , there will simply be increased tension
on the
tendons.

When the muscles are stretched (in our example, the
muscles are stretched when the muscles on the other
side
of the forearm contract) , movable bones are pulled
into a
new position.
Because of that new position, they, in
turn, pull on the tendons and muscles.
When the muscles contract, they pull on the tendons which are

attached to bones.
hand moves.

Because the bones are in the hand, the entire

Even here we have a chain (series) of causal events,

not a single cause.

But the term 'cause'

is often used to designate

some event which occurs and which, together with certain preexisting
or standing conditions,

is sufficient for the event to occur.

Thus

the cause of the collapse of a weak bridge might be the passing over
it of an especially heavy truck even though the bridge would not

have collapsed if it had not already been weak.

In our example,

it

is the contraction of the muscle that causes the hand movements, and
it is muscle contractions that cause Levin's leg to move as well.
If Levin's point is simply that muscle contractions and not

thoughts or volitions cause leg movements, then his argument does
not cast doubt on dualism in relation to interaction.

For no
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responsible dualist would deny
this; he would maintain that
there is
a series of events which
originate in a thought or act
of will, and
the final event in this series
is the movement of the
leg.

The

muscle contracts in response to
commands from the nervous system,
so
that it is in the brain and/or
mind that we should look tor
the

origin of the series of events which
culminate with leg movement.
Insisting that there must be only
one cause and that it must be
the
immediate physical cause of the leg's
moving ignores the role of the
nervous system in voluntary motion.

Levin's argument is also oversimplified
in that he requires
that there be a single object with
constant additive tendency w' to

induce acceleration that must have moved
with an average velocity

during

t.

v'

The movement of a leg in most cases
is the result of the

contractions of
would say that

a
v'

number of muscles, not just one.

Perhaps Levin

represents the average velocity of the relevant

muscle contractions, taking into account the fact
that some muscular
action is inhibitory.
To provide an argument against dualism. Levin's
argument must

apply to the nervous system as well, since muscles contract
or
stretch in response to neural commands.

Neural commands which

originate in the higher portions of the brain and pass through the
spinal cord give the muscles the signal to contract.

A neuron

consists of many dendrites, which carry information in to the soma,
or cell body, and an axon, which carries information away from
the

soma.

Figure 6-1 contains an illustration of the neuron.

An action

potential is formed at the axon hillock,
where th e axon protrudes
from the soma.

Figure 6-1.

An Illustration of a Neuron

It is a well-known fact that the action potential
produced by

neuron is not always equal to the sum total of incoming potentials.
An axon has a threshold and it either produces

potential or it does nothing.

a

full-sized

This principle, known as the

All-or-None Law , is explained as follows:^^
If an extremely mild electric shock is delivered to the
dendrites or soma, the axon does not produce any action

potential.
It does nothing.
If the intensity of the
shock is gradually increased, a point will be reached when
the axon does produce an action potential.
Therefore, we
can say that the axon has a t hreshold that is, the axon
requires a certain level of disturbance before it
reacts.
And an axon either reacts completely by producing
;

231
a full-sized action
potential, or else it does nothing.
An axon cannot produce a half-sized
or quarter-sized

stays on; either an action potential
is produced or the
maintained. This characteristic
is
ctllid^r
the All-°r-None Principle: either
the axon reacts
y doing all it can (producing an action
potential) or it
does nothing. If the axon is to
react, the disturbance
must reach or exceed the
axon s threshold. Anything less
intense will not cause an
action potential.

William Uttal also comments on the All-or-None
Law in the context of
discussing sensory coding
The discovery of the all-or-none law
effectively removed
the amplitude of the response of a single
axonal spike
potential from the list of candidate coding
dimensions.
It now seems certain that the all-or-none
law is valid for
axonal spikes and that the amplitude of the
individual
nerve impulse is related only to the metabolic
state of
the axon and not to any characteristic of the
stimulus
once the spike threshold is exceeded. However, it
should
be remembered that in other parts of the neuron,
it has
been equally clearly established that slow potentials
of
graded amplitude and prolonged duration are the
significant information symbols.
In the last sentence, Uttal is referring to graded
potentials which

also exist and whose amplitude does vary with incoming impulses.
But the important point here is that action potentials do obey
the

All-or-None Law , and that the amplitude of an action potential is
not a function of incoming impulses.

One reason for the All— or— None Law is the existence of synapses
in the brain.

A synapse is a gap which serves as a point of

communication between neurons, between neurons and effector organs,
and between two muscle fibers.

A single neuron may have many single

synaptic connections, as we see from the following account: 12
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The axon of a neuron may terminate
in only a few synapses
or in up to 200,000 synapses
(Purkinje cells of
cerebellum). On the other hand,
the dendrites and cell
body of a single neuron may
receive synaptic contacts from
several hundred to as many as
200,000
separate axon contacts.
in some neurons, as much
as 40
percent of the surface of the cell
body is covered with
An average neuron is said to
make from 1000 to
10,000 synaptic contacts with other
neurons and may
receive synaptic input from about 1000
other neurons.

Transmission of information across synapses
occurs by both
electrical and chemical means.

in the chemical synapse,

the arrival

of an action potential generates the
release of chemical substances

known as neurotransmitters.

These are released in packets or quanta

which are the minimal unit of release.

These neurotransmitters can

evoke a response in the postsynaptic cell,

in the electrical

synapse, the currents generated by the action
potential spread

directly into the postsynaptic neuron across the synapse.

Neurotransmitters are not always released; it is the
neurotransmitters which determine whether the action potential
is
continued
Of course, a neuron has many inputs at once.

We learn more

about how it "decides" what to do from the following description:^^
Each neuron may be influenced by hundreds or thousands of
stimuli on its excitatory and inhibitory receptive sites.
The complex interplay of the subliminal excitatory
postsynaptic potentials (EXSP) and subliminal inhibitory
postsynaptic potentials (IPSP) on each neuron endows the
neuron with a variety of inputs; this provides the basis
for the great plasticity of activity. Neurons are under
continual synaptic bombardment.
In this battleground of
activity, the neuron reacts and responds.
If the
algebraic summation of the polarizing EPSPs and
hyper-polarizing IPSPs results in a depolarizing event at
the low-resistance, low threshold axon hillock, an action
potential is generated and conducted along the axon. On

e other hand, if the algebraic
summation of the graded
subliminal potentials is not enough to
stimulate the
i nitial segment sufficiently,
an action potential is not
generated in the axon.

In summary, each neuron is a
miniature "integration"
center where the confluences and algebraic
summation of
all the decremental spreads of EPSPs
and IPSPs take place
on the dendrites and cell body in relation
to their
geometric distribution and locations on the
neuron. ..We
are dealing, in these central nervous
system cells, with a
brain in miniature. The resulting action
potential is, in
effect, a code message conveying information
about graded
events in the dendrites and cell body of one
neuron to a
distant location where a graded event can be
initiated on
another neuron.

Obviously, then, whether
a

a

neuron does fire on any given occasion

i

complex matter; perhaps there is an internal rule built
in to the

neuron which it operates by.

in any case, whether it does fire and

the amplitude of the impulse is not simply a function of
the sum

total of the inputs.

Due to the All-or-None Law

,

it is ’not the case that when an

action potential is generated, some body with mass

w'

must have

slowed down by the amplitude or speed of the action potential.

In

fact, Newton's third law does not even apply here since it applies

to bodies with mass and an action potential is not
mass.

a

body with

An action potential is an electrical signal which passes

through an axon,

a

body which does have mass.

Neither graded

potentials nor action potentials are bodies with mass, and both can
occur in the chain of events beginning usually in the cerebral
cortex and ending with the movement of a leg.

What Levin needs to

show is that mental events such as thoughts and volitions cannot
trigger neural activity, not that mental events cannot move legs.
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Levin has taken a mechanical principle
of motion applying to

bodies with mass and applied it to the
human body which contains

structures whose motion is not just governed
by force and
acceleration, but by codes, rules, and
signals.

I

am not saying

that neural structures violate the
Conservation of Energy Principle;
I

am saying that it doesn't apply to neural
impulses since they are

not bodies with mass.

Neural impulses are somewhat like magnetic

fields and light waves in that they don't fit
standard conceptions
of what a body with mass is.

An action potential is a kind of wave

that travels through an axon; it is not

Levin

s

a

body with mass.

argument from the conservation of energy does not show

that a thought cannot initiate neural activity since
initiating

neural activity does not require that some body with mass
provide
the acceleration.

However, perhaps we can give a similar argument.

In general, neural impulses are generated either by other neural

impulses or spontaneously, probably by factors within the neuron
itself.

In the former case, a neuron receives a large number of

graded potentials or action potentials and either generates

a

potential or does not, depending on its threshold and other
factors.

In the case of spontaneous activity,

believe that an immaterial object is the cause.

there is no reason to

Hence in neither

case does there appear to be any explanatory power added by

postulating an immaterial object as the initiator of neural activity.
Perhaps

a

more sophisticated form of dualism which recognizes

the distinction between the action of one body with mass on another
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as It occurs in physics and the
way in which neural activity
occurs
in the brain could explain
interaction from a dualist viewpoint.

However, any successful explanation
will have to take into account

the intentional and biological nature
of the brain.

The brain

operates according to signals and rules,
and it is part of
biological system.

a

living

Hence mechanical models of explanation
imported

from physics will not explain neurological
processes.

On the other

hand, a thought has a neurological
component in that it originates
in the brain.

Most forms of dualism have too simple a
conception of

mental" and "physical" to accurately describe
or explain these
facts.

The real problem with dualism is that it divides
the universe
into two mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories.

According to

dualism, one conception of what is physical can apply to all
cases
in which the term 'physical' applies, while 'mental'

distinct type of phenomenon.

refers to a

The motivation for this way of

conceiving physical things may lie in Descartes' desire to bring
human bodies and animals under the same laws as the entities of
physics.

Whatever the motivation, this view obscures important

distinctions and creates unresolvable dichotomies.

On the other

hand, conceiving of a mental event such as a thought as an

immaterial entity distinct from neurological (read "physical")

events places

a

metaphysical synapse between them that no

transmitter will ever cross.

Only by revising its conception of
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interaction.
A conceptual revision of
the dualist conceptions of
what is

mental and what is physical which
would possibly enable dualism to
account for the interaction of mental
and physical phenomena would
have to take into account several
factors.
First, it would have to
take into account the intentional
and biological nature of the brain
as well as the neurological aspects
of mental events.

Secondly, it

would have to take into account the
distinctions between the types
of explanation and description in
physics as opposed to neurology

and biology.

Third, it would have to give a consistent
account of

phenomena which appear to be non-physical and
non-mental, or at
least not purely physical or mental, such as
persons, social

conventions, and moral rules.

As

I

will argue later,

I

do not see

how such a conceptual revision can be made
without abandoning

dualism for some form of pluralism.
In conclusion,

it seems that some materialist arguments against

interaction are oversimplified in that they try to import
laws and

principles from physics which govern matter in motion into
neurological context.
a manner,

it.

a

On the other hand, in just as oversimplified

dualists accept this framework and try to reply within

Because the problem of interaction is based on the false

conceptions that the brain and matter as it occurs in physics are of
the same type and obey the same laws, and that mental phenomena have

no physical properties and physical phenomena have no mental
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properties, neither argument can be
conclusive.

Both sides need to

recognize that the universe is more
complex than their theories
allow.
I

conclude, then, that the problem o£
interaction will remain

unresolvable for dualistic theories unless
and until

a

conceptual

revision in the notions of "mental- and
"physical" is made.

Unless

this can be done, or unless new arguments
are presented, the problem
Of interaction may be fatal to dualism.

Three Conceptions of the Physical

6.3.

What sort of conceptual revision is needed in the notions
of
mental" and "physical" if the problem of interaction is to be
resolved?

I

argued in Chapter

5

that it is unlikely that there is a

single criterion for identifying all and only mental phenomena.
there such a criterion for physical phenomena?

Is

Is

it possible to

give a single definition of 'physical' that identifies all and only

physical phenomena?

6.3.1

I

will now discuss these questions.

The Scientific Conception
In Chapter 3,

I

argued that Davidson's requirement that

scientific laws draw on

a

homonomic conceptual domain has the result

that the physical conceptual domain is restricted to the languages
of chemistry and physics.

Yet Davidson also cites a person's bodily

movement as an example of a physical event.

However, the conceptual
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domains of biology, neurology, and human
bodily movement are not
homonomic since they include references
to mental terms and to terms

which are functionally defined such as
'life'.^^

Hence terms that

describe human bodily movement belong to a
different conceptual
domain than the scientific one.
The attempt to interpret 'physical* as
meaning "belonging to
the conceptual domain of physics and chemistry"
is not novel.
is a common conception of "physical".

This

Hilary Putnam implicitly

appeals to this in these remarks
Now, what do

I mean by saying that the brain
has
non-ph ysical properties? I mean properties which are
definable i n terms that do not mention the brain's physics
or chemistry .

According to this conception, an object has physical properties
just
in case it has properties which are definable in terms which
mention

the physics or chemistry of the object.

Although this conception of what is physical as being that
which is definable in terms from physics or chemistry is one that is

often appealed to or implicitly assumed in mind-body discussions, it
is too restricted to cover a number of central cases in which the

term 'physical' is used.

Herbert Feigl also saw the need of

identifying this conception of "physical" as one to be distinguished
from others.

In his article "The 'Mental'

and the 'Physical'" he

distinguishes two concepts, which he calls "physical^^" and
physical^

:

By "physical" I mean the type of concepts and laws which
suffice in principle for the explanation and prediction of
inorganic processes.
If emergentism is not required for
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the phenomena of organic life,
-physical' would mean those
concepts and laws sufficient for the
explanation of
inorganic as well as of biological
phenomena.
In
accordance with the terminology of Meehl
and Sellars, I
shall henceforth designate this concept
by "physicalo"
in contradistinction to "physicalj^"
which
is
,
practically synonymous with "scientific",
i.e. with being
an essential part of the coherent and
adequate descriptive
and explanatory account of the
spatio-temporal-causal
world

Feigl sees the need for distinguishing

a

scientific from a

biological conception of "physical" due to the
possibility of
emergent phenomena.

While it is true that emergent properties are

a

feature of biological and organic phenomena, they occur
at the
chemical level and the physical object level as well.

Hence,

emergence may not be the best choice to distinguish the two

conceptions of

physical".

As we shall soon see, however, there are

good reasons for distinguishing two conceptions of "physical".
Davidson, Putnam, and Feigl all agree that there is

a

conception of "physical" according to which the term 'physical' is

closely related to physics and chemistry or, more broadly, to the
natural sciences.

This is the conception of 'physical' which occurs

in the phrases "the physical sciences".

Here 'physical' contrasts

with "non-physical sciences" such as biology and neuroscience and
other life sciences, sociology, economics, and psychology.

The

reason Davidson uses this conception of "physical" is due to his

views about scientific laws, and certainly laws, explanations, and

theories are different in the natural sciences than in psychology
and sociology.

If

Davidson is right that the physical forms

closed homonomic domain, then to say of something that it is

a
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physical in this scientific sense has

a

very different meaning from

saying that a bodily movement is
physical.
I

will now give a definition of the
meaning of 'physical' which

involves physics and chemistry.

Because it is far from obvious what

IS meant by phrases such as "physical
state" and "physical event",

i

state the definition in terms of the notions
of physical property
and physical entity.

I

choose 'entity' rather than 'object'
because

•object' contrasts with 'subject' and so
is more restricted.

I

call

this the "scientific" conception of what is
physical and denote it
as follows:

(s)physical.

This conception can be defined in the

following way:
P(s).

^

is a purely (s)physical property = df. _x is a
property and
is uniquely specifiable in terms
from only the languages of physics and chemistry.

P(s)'.

2^

E(s).

2^

is a uniquely (s)physical property = df.
x is
property and
is partially but not completely
specifiable in terms from only the languages of
physics and chemistry.

a

is a purely (s)physical entity = df.
2L is an
entity and all of
s essential properties are

purely (s)physical properties.
E(s)'.

X is an impurely (s)physical entity = df.
x is an
entity and at least one but not all of 2L's
essential properties are (s)physical properties.

The above four definitions are all ontological versions of
(s)physical.
T(s).

A conceptual version can be created as follows:
't' is an (s)physical term just in case 't' refers
to some (s)physical property or (s)physical entity.

Using T(s), it is also possible to say what the (s)physical

conceptual domain looks like, based on earlier work in Chapter
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3.

The

(s)

physical conceptual domain will
contain at least the

following elements:
1.

Logical terms ('and', 'or', 'if,
etc.)

2.

Mathematical terms ('number', 'line',
'point'
etc
The mathematics chosen can be
governed by pragmatic
considerations.

3.

Syntactic rules.

4.

(s)physical terms which are descriptive.
nouns, verbs, adjectives, or adverbs.

)

These can be

What terms qualify as "the terms of
physics and chemistry"?
Some terms of physics or chemistry such
as the term 'neutron' are

originally introduced into the language of these
sciences as part of
an (s)physical or chemical theory.

Other terms such as 'force' and

acceleration' are terms taken from ordinary language
and given a

special meaning in an

(s)

physical or chemical theory.

single rule for determining whether

a

There is no

term is a term of physics or

chemistry; one must consult the work of physicists and
chemists and

determine what language they use in formulating their theories.
Even the term "the language of physics" is misleading since
this

language is composed of many subsets of smaller languages.
in many examples such as 'neutron',

'force',

However,

'mass', and 'gravity',

there is no dispute that these terms are (s)physical terms.
What properties are (s)physical properties?

The following

equation, which is a formulation of Newton's Second Law, states a

mathematical relationship using only (s)physical terms:
Force

Mass

X

Acceleration

1

Q
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Another example involves the gravitational
attraction of

a

planet:

Force due to gravity =

Here G is the gravitation constant, M
is the mass of the sun,
the mass of the planet, and

_r

is the radius of the orbit.

n is

The

properties of force, mass, acceleration, and gravity
are all
(s)physical properties, uniquely specifiable in the
languages of

physics or chemistry.
What entities are (s)physical entities?

Entities whose

essential properties are all (s)physical are purely
(s)physical
entities.

Atoms, along with protons, neutrons, and electrons are

(s)physical entities under this criterion.

However, a cup is not

purely (s)physical since it is essential to an object's being

a

cup

that someone has intended to use it for drinking or has intended

that it be used for drinking.

The term 'intention*

is a mental term

and not a term of physics or chemistry, so a cup is not purely
(s)physical.

However,

it may be essential to a cup's being the cup

it is that it have a certain chemical makeup.

cup is an impurely

(s)

If this is true,

physical entity.

Other terms mix an (s)physical term with non-(
terms.

a

s)

physical

The phrase 'apparent shape' refers to the shape something

appears to have.

The property of apparent shape is a complex

property involving the
property of appearance.

(s)

physical property of shape and

a

mental

Such a property is impurely (s)physical
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since complete specification of it makes
reference to

a

non- s) physical (in this case mental)
property.
(

^•3.2

The Personal Conception

.

Much discussion relating to the mind-body
problem centers

around the body of a person or human being.
around particular elements of

Or,

it might center

person's body such as his brain,

a

neural state, or his arm or leg.

a

If we describe a human body in

terms of the languages of physics and chemistry, we
only describe
chemicals, molecules, and certain other properties
such as weight,
mass, and heat.

We can agree with Davidson that terms referring to

these entities are part of a closed homonomic domain which
forms the

languages of these two physical* sciences ((s)physical terms),

when

we give a physical description of a person or a human body in
terms

relating to a person we use terms such as 'beautiful'
'well-proportioned',

'tanned',

'muscular', and 'brunette' which come

from a different conceptual domain:
discourse.

We also speak of

a

the domain of personal

person's body as the physical aspect

of a person and describe it as living, as being composed of organs

such as the heart, and as having perceptual organs such as the eye,
the ear, and the nose.

These are not terms or entities of physics

or chemistry ((s)physical terms or (s)physical entities).

This does not mean that one cannot make

about human bodies.

(s)

physical statements

This is possible, but only within the limited
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(s)

physical vocabulary,

one recent text defines physical
sc
science as

follows

cosmology.

The difference between the

(s)

physical vocabulary and the vocabulary

of personal discourse is one in points
of view.

of physics,

From the viewpoint

the human body is a mass of matter which
differs only

incidentally from other solid objects such as
rocks and tables.

As

Russell says:

21

There is. ..some conflict between what common sense
regards
as one thing, and what physics regards as an
unchanging
collection of particles.
To common sense, a human body is
one thing, but to science the matter composing it is
continually changing.
Thus,

it is possible to make (s)physical statements about the
human

body, but only about the physics or chemistry of the body.

Other examples show that there is
physical" from
bodies.

"( s)

a

distinct conception of

physical" which relates to human (and animal)

A person's physical needs are ones which relate to his

body's proper functioning.

Physical desires are desires relating to

sexual desires and to other desires relating to fulfillment of

bodily needs.

If

I

am physically tired, my body is tired.

Physical

education involves instruction in the development and care of the
human body.

Physicality is an intensely physical orientation at the

expense of the mental, spiritual, or social.
football) is one involving much body contact.

A physical game (e.g.

The refrain "Let's
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Get Physical- from a recent
song exhorts intense body
movements

m

(viz. dancing).

none of these cases is

a

statement being made

about a person's physics or chemistry,
although in all cases an
implicit or explicit reference is made
to a person's body.
It might seem that

I

should call this the biological
rather

than the personal conception of
"physical".

inappropriate since
However, as

I

a

This would not be

person's body is his biological aspect.

have already noted, many words and
concepts become

entrenched in ordinary language long before
scientists acquire an
interest in studying the entities they denote.

This is certainly

the case with 'solid object' and with
'physical',

'thought'.

'mind', and

Scientists are interested in explaining and
predicting

phenomena and events, and in giving descriptions
of events which
cohere with the theories necessary to explain and predict.
words acquire new meanings in

a

Thus,

scientific context and some

well-entrenched descriptions are found not to apply at all.
Philosophical discussion of the mind-body issue often employs
terms from science such as 'neuron' or 'brain state' but it also

discusses everyday life examples such as

drinking coffee.

a

person raising his arm or

Thus there are terms used in this discussion which

refer to an everyday point of view of the body, and also terms which
are taken out of

a

highly specialized neurological or scientific

context and whose meaning is seldom understood by anyone in the
discussion.

Probably the most correct view is that each science

forms a conceptual domain to itself and that ordinary language has

246

its own conceptual domains which are
distinct from the scientific

domains.

Because

I

cannot argue for this view here,

will simply

I

define the personal physical domain in
terms of properties which are
uniquely specifiable in terms which make
reference to

a

human or

animal body or to elements of those bodies
without specifying

whether it has to be in

a

scientific (e.g. biological or

neurological) context or an everyday life (personal)
context.
Hence, the personal conception of the physical
will include

biological, neurological, and ordinary language terms
which refer to
the body of a person or animal.

Some terms are used both in

ordinary language context.

a

scientific context and in an

An example is ’life'

study of living things, but we also speak of
the life of the body.
of the body such as

;

biology is the

living organ and of

a

Other examples are terms that refer to parts
hand',

'heart', and 'brain'.

event such as a heart attack, the breaking of

a

If we

describe an

leg, or a case in

which someone suffers brain damage or brain-stem death as

a

physical

event, whether in a scientific or an every day context, we don't

mean that the properties of this event can be described in physics.
Terms such as 'life',

'death',

denote (s)physical properties.

'health', and 'brain damage' do not
It

is to account for the use of

'physical' in biological, neurological, and every day contexts in

which human and animal bodies are discussed that we need

conception of what is physical.

a

second

247

In order to understand this conception
of "physical",

helpful to notice that the term 'physical*

elements or aspects of

a

it is

refers to one of several

person; others are social, intellectual,

spiritual, mental, and moral.

Because of the close connection

between this notion of "physical" and the
notion of person,

I

refer

to this conception as the personal conception
of what is physical,

and denote it as follows:

(p)physical.

However, it does apply to

animal bodies and to the bodies of human beings which
are not
persons, if there are any.

it also applies in biological and

neurological contexts in which human or animal bodies are
discussed.
I

define the personal meaning of 'physical'

(

(p)physical) as

follows
P(p).

is a purely (p)physical property just in case
is a property and x is uniquely specifiable in

2^

terms which only make reference to the body or to
elements of the body of a person, human being, or
animal.
P(p)'.

_x

2^

is an impurely (p)physical property just in case
is a property and 2i is partially but not

completely specifiable in terms which only make
reference to the body or to elements of the body
of a person, human being, or animal.
E(p).

E(p)'.

is a purely (p)physical entity = df
2L is an
entity and all of 2i's essential properties are
(p)physical properties.

2L

.

is an impurely (p)physical entity = df. 21 is an
entity and at least one but not all of 2l's
essential properties are (p)physical properties.

21

We can create

a

conceptual version in the following way:
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T(p).

't' is a (p)physical term
just in case 'f refers
to a (p)physical property or a
(p)physical entity.

using T(p), we can also give a reading
of the (p)physical conceptual
domain.

The (p)physical conceptual domain will
include at least the

following elements:
1.

Logical terms ('and', 'or', 'if, etc.)

2.

Mathematical terms ('number', 'line', 'point', etc.).
The mathematics chosen can be governed by
pragmatic
considerations.

3.

Syntactic rules.

4.

(p)physical terms which are descriptive.
nouns, verbs, adjectives, or adverbs.

These can be

Examples of (p)physical properties according to these

definitions are the property of regeneration of the optic nerve
of
amphibians,

22

the homeostatic properties of the hypothalamus,^^

the (functional) property of the heart to pump the blood, and the

property of every living body to grow.
entities are neurons,
heart, and the brain.

a

Examples of

(p)

physical

human arm, leg, or bodily organ such as the
All these properties and entities are

(p)physical; none is uniquely specifiable in the terms of physics or

chemistry.

6.3.3

The Objective Conception .

There is also

a

third conception of what is physical which has

not been captured by either our scientific or personal conceptions.

This is the term 'physical' as it occurs in statements such as
can touch this thing so it must be physical" and "This table is

"I
a

249

physical object".

This conception might be called a
"common sense"

conception of the physical, since it is the
conception of "physicalmost common in everyday life.

Probably the term closest in meaning

to this conception is 'objective'.

To say something is objective is

to say in part that it can exist independent
of any mind.
for applying the term 'physical'

follows.

in this objective sense are as

If an object can be both seen and touched,

to believe it is physical.

Criteria

this is reason

Alternatively, if it can be seen and

touched by several people at once, this is even more
reason to

believe that it is physical.
In everyday life, we regard physical objects as being
solid,

stable entities that endure through time.
view of the matter.

Physics has a different

Bertrand Russell recognizes

a

gulf between the

world of sense and the world of physics in these remarks:^"^
Among the objections to the reality of objects of sense,
there is one which is derived from the apparent difference
between matter as it appears in physics and things as they
appear in sensation. Men of science, for the most part,
are willing to condemn immediate data as "merely
subjective", while yet maintaining the truth of the
physics inferred from those data. But such an attitude,
though it may be capable of justification, obviously
stands in need of it; and the only justification possible
must be one which exhibits matter as a logical
construction from sense-data unless, indeed, there were
some wholly a priori principle by which unknown entities
could be inferred from such as are known.
It is therefore
necessary to find some way of bridging the gulf between
the world of physics and the world of sense.

—

Russell's concern here is epistemological; his entire lecture is
devoted to discussing "the apparent difference between matter as it
appears in physics and things as they appear in sensation".
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Just as human bodies have properties
which cannot be described
by the languages of physics and
chemistry, so physical objects have

properties not describable in terms of their
physics or chemistry.

According to physics and chemistry, objects are
not solid at all but
are constantly changing masses of particles or
waves.
be described as useful, beautiful,

A table can

round, solid, and made of pine.

According to the view of physics, physical objects are
instances of
matter in motion; the emergent properties physical objects
have in
virtue of being individual things which exist through time
and which
stand in economic, social, aesthetic, and historical relations
to

other objects cannot be uniquely specified in the terms of chemistry
or physics.
a

Other properties such as smoothness, roughness, having

grainy texture, a sensational- color , of weighing more than

a

typewriter, and having a sweet taste are all properties we attribute
to physical objects based on our perceptions of them.

These are

terms of ordinary language, not scientific language.

There are many physical objects which cannot be defined in
terms which make an essential reference only to their physics or
chemistry.

For example, an artefact such as a cup is a physical

object; yet it is essential to a cup that it have been in the past
an object of the intention that it be used for drinking.

term 'intention'

And the

is not a part of the language of physics.

Likewise, it is essential to my copy of Our Knowledge of the

External World that it have the property that it was written by
Bertrand Russell; yet this property is not part of its physics or
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chemistry.

it is essential to a tennis ball
that it is intended to

be used to play tennis.

Artefacts have essential properties not

definable in terms of physics or chemistry;
yet they are physical
objects according to some conception of
"physical".
Physics and chemistry are concerned with
physical objects, but

only with certain of their aspects.

In one physics text,

I

found

the sentence "Blow up a small party balloon
and you will have an

excellent source of negative electric charge".
either 'balloon' or 'party balloon'

a

Does this make

term of physics?

Perhaps not;

but the property of being a source of negative
electric charge is an

(s)physical property.
non-

(

s)

Yet such a balloon will have other

physical properties such as frightening many people when it

blows up and being the center of attention.
(s)

Is the party balloon an

physical object because it has mass and weight?

If we consider

having mass an essential property of a balloon, then

a

party balloon

is an impurely (s)physical entity because it has at least one

essential (s)physical property.

However, having weight should not

be considered an essential property since a balloon in outer space
is weightless but is still the same balloon.
I

call this third conception of what is physical the

"objective" conception, and denote it as follows:

(o)physical.

This conception is defined as follows:
P(o).

is a purely (o)physical property = df.
is a
property and
is uniquely specifiable in terms
which refer only to properties that can exist
independent of any mind and can be seen or touched
by more than one person simultaneously.

2^
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P(o)'.

is an impurely (o)physical
property = df. x is
property and x is partially but not
completely
specifiable in terms which refer only to
properties that can exist independent of
any mind
and can be seen or touched by more
than one person
simultaneously.
X

a

E(o).

E(o)'.

is a purely (o)physical entity =
df.
x is an
entity and all of x^' s essential properties
are
(o)physical properties.

2L

is an impurely (o)physical entity = df.
~x is an
entity and at least one but not all of x's
essential properties are (o)physical
properties.

2^

A conceptual version can be created in the
following way:

T(o).

't' is an (o)physical term just in case
't' refers
to an (o)physical entity or to an (o)physical

property.

The (o)physical conceptual domain will include at
least these

elements
1.

Logical terms ('and',

2.

Mathematical terms ('number', 'line', 'point', etc.).
The choice of mathematics can be governed by pragmatic
considerations.

3.

Syntactic rules.

4.

(o)physical terms which are descriptive.
nouns, verbs, adjectives, or adverbs.

'or',

'if, etc.)

These can be

Examples of purely (o)physical entities are the sun,
mountain, a tree, and other natural objects.

a

rock,

a

Artefacts are impurely

(o)physical since they have an essential property that makes

reference to an intention.

Since light exists independent of the

mind and can be seen simultaneously by two persons, it is purely
(o)physical.

I

have already said that an atom is an (s)physical

entity; however, the properties of an atom can exist independent of
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any mind.

I£ any o£ these mind-independent
properties are essential

and can in principle be seen or
touched by more than one person
at
once, an atom is impurely
(o)physical.
The wind is a difficult

example because while it exists
Independent of any mind, its effects
can be seen but it cannot.
It can be felt simultaneously
by more
than one person.
However, the definition says ’touch'
not ’feel',
and allowing 'feel' would create
even mote problems.

Perhaps the

best solution is to say that the wind
satisfies some but not all the

criteria for (o)physical entities and hence
should not be counted as
(o)

physical.

How do these definitions of 'physical' relate
to each other?

I

will use the phrase '(x)physical property'
to mean "either an

(s)physical or

a

(p)physical or an (o)physical property".

entities have different (x)physical properties.

Some

For example, a rock

has the (o) physical property of hardness but it
also has the
(s)

physical property of being composed of certain chemical

elements.

If

it is essential to a rock that it be composed of

certain chemical elements and it is essential to it that it
exists
independent of the mind, then

impurely (o)physical.
a

a

rock is impurely (s)physical and

Assuming that it is an essential property of

human body that it is the body of

a

person or human being,

body is either purely or impurely (p)physical.

essential property of

a

a

human

If it is either an

human body that it can exist independent of

any mind, or that it can be touched, then the human body is impurely
(p)physical and impurely (o)physical.

If

it is also essential to a
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human body that it be composed of
certain chemical elements such as
carbon or H^O, then a human body is
impurely (s) physical, impurely
(P)physical, and impurely (o)physical.

Hence it is likely that some

single entities are (o)physical,
(s)physical, and (p)physical.
It is likely that whatever
analysis is given of a human body

can also be given of a human brain,
since a human brain is an

element of

a

human body.

Hence it is likely that

(s)physical, (o)physical, and (p)physical.

a

human brain is

If this is so,

then

trying to state the relations between a
mental phenomenon and

human brain is more complex than it may appear.

a

If a human brain is

physical according to all three meanings of 'physical',
then

a

mental event may stand in different relations to each
of these three

elements of

a

human brain.

However,

it is likely that the most

interesting relations from the viewpoint of mind-body
interaction
will obtain between a mental phenomenon and the (p)physical
elements
of the brain.
of

person

For it is this element that presupposes the concept

and thus holds the most hope of

and physical phenomena.

I

a

link between mental

discuss this subject as it relates to

mind-body interaction in Chapter

6.4

7.

Conclusion

Section 6.2 discussed mind-body interaction as
dualism.

a

problem for

The most important conclusion from this discussion is that

the concepts of "mental" and "physical" used in the discussion of
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this issue need to be revised
before an account of mind-body

interaction can be given,
the concept of -physical-,

term -physical',

if

m
i

section 6.3

I

proposed a revision of

distinguished three meanings of the

ontological dualism is the view that
there are

two kinds of entitles in the world,
mental and physical entities,
then accepting the results of Section
6.3 requires abandoning
dualism.

If the

term -physical- has three meanings,
then there are

more than two kinds of entities in the
world, there are at least
four: mental entities, (s)physloal
entitles, (p)physlcal entities,
and (o)physical entities,

since any view according to which there

are more than two fundamentally distinct
kinds of entities in the

world is pluralistic. Section 6.3 is an argument
for

a

form of

pluralism.
In conclusion,

it appears that the problem of mind-body

interaction is fatal to dualism.

Dualism as

a

philosophical view

about mind and body is caught in the following dilemma:
D.

Either dualism can account for mind-body interaction
or it cannot.
If dualism cannot account for mind— body
interaction, then dualism is not a viable theory.
In
order to account for mind-body interaction, a
conceptual revision in the notion of "physical" is
required which involves abandoning dualism for
pluralism.
Hence either dualism is not a viable
theory or dualism must be abandoned for pluralism.

In chapter 7,

I

show how distinguishing three meanings of 'physical'

helps give an account of mind-body interaction.
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CHAPTER

VII

AN ACCOUNT OF MIND-BODY
INTERACTION

^•1

In Section 6.2

Introduction

argued that if dualists are to give
an account

I

of mind-body interaction,

they must accept a conceptual revision
in

the notions of "mental" and "physical".

In Section 6.3

I

provided

such a revision in the notion of
"physical" by distinguishing three

conceptions of the physical: the scientific
conception, the objective
(

(p)physical) conception.

(( o)

(( s)

physical)

physical) conception, and the personal

In Section 6.4

I

argued that accepting

the view that there are three conceptions of
the physical requires

abandoning dualism for
In this chapter

I

mind-body interaction.

form of pluralism.

a

return to the problem of giving an account of
I

return to the argument by Michael Levin

against the possibility of mind-body interaction which

Section 6.2.

I

I

discuss in

concede that Levin's argument may be successful in

showing the impossibility of causal interaction between mental

phenomena and (p)physical entities, and that

a

variation of Levin's

argument may show the impossibility of causal interaction between
mental phenomena and (o)physical entities.

However,

I

deny that

either Levin's argument or a variation of it shows the impossibility
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of causal interaction between
mental phenomena and
(pjphysical

entities.

The main result needed to support
the claim that Levin's

argument against the possibility of
mind-body interaction is

unsuccessful if applied to (p)physical
entities is that some
(P)

physical entities have mental properties
or aspects and some

mental phenomena have (p)physical
properties or aspects.

I

support

this result by citing discussions of
the visual system which show

that some neurons have properties which
are uniquely specifiable by

reference to mental terms.

discussed in Chapter

3,

I

also cite Davidson's contention,

that an event is mental if and only if
it

can be picked out by a mental description
in support of the claim
that (p)physical entities have mental properties.

That mental

phenomena have (p)physical properties follows from
the claim that
(p)physical entities have mental properties.

I

also cite an

independent argument for this claim according to which
mental

phenomena that originate in (p)physical entities have at least
one
(p)

physical property: the property that they originate in

a

(p)physical entity.
In Section 7.3

result that

(p)

I

give an account of interaction by using the

physical entities have mental properties or aspects

and mental phenomena have (p)physical properties or aspects.

According to this account, when

a

mental entity such as

causally acts on the brain or initiates

a

a

thought

neural event, it is the

neural aspect of the thought that acts on some other neural aspect.
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This second neural aspect may or
may not be associated with
some
other mental phenomenon.
I cite a study by
Claude Ghez of voluntary
movement In support of this account.
My account of interaction

applies only to mental phenomena with
(p)physlcal aspects: if there
is any mental phenomenon with
no (p)physlcal aspect, then my
account

of interaction does not apply to
this mental phenomenon.
In section 7.4

I

cite views by Jack Ornstein, G. D.
Wassermann,

and John Searle which are similar in one
or more respects to the

View

I

present.

In Section 7.5

I

sketch a more general position

that links a plural aspect view with Leibniz's
pluralism of

viewpoints.

I

call this position Viewpoint Pluralism.

summarizes the chapter,

section 7.7 briefly summarizes earlier

chapters, as well as Chapter

2

Section 7.6

7.

Levin's Argument Against Mind-Body Interaction

In Chapter 6,

I

discussed an argument stated by Michael Levin

purporting to show that causal relations between mind and body are
impossible.
energy.

This argument appeals to the law of the conservation of

According to Levin:^

Another traditional argument, however, does seem to show
decisively that the causal relations between the mind as
the dualist conceives it and the body are impossible.
Originally my leg, which has mass
is motionless.
Then
it moves distance
Where did the energy come from? It
is an empirical fact, the law of the conservation of
energy, that the energy had to come from somewhere, and
not only does it come from some preceding physical event,
no immaterial substance could possibly supply mechanical
energy.
The mind can apply no physical force to the leg.
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hamstring muscle supplies
]ust the right amount - and the
bodily event just is the
motion of an object of mass w
through distance d. ~hus
the contraction of the muscle is
the cause of p.
Tf

were non-physical causes of
physiol events', the energy in
the universe would increase.
The dualist may complain that
this appeal to the
conservation of energy reifies energy as
a kind of stuff
passed from object to object, whereas
legitimate talk of
energy (and mass) is shorthand for
facts about
acceleration. The conservation of energy
in particular is
shorthand for an empirical fact about
constancies in such
ratios.
But even if energy is analytically
eliminable,
the present objection stands.
Suppose we 'operationalize'
energy and mass, explaining the mass of
a body as its
(constant, additive) tendency to induce
acceleration.
My
leg, which has a constant additive
tendency to induce
acceleration w^, moves with average velocity v
during
time-interval A t.
It is a hard empirical fact that
some
object with a constant additive tendency _w'
to induce
acceleration must have moved with such an average
velocity
during At that J l/2wy2dt =- i^l/ 2w' v' ^dt
Since. .immaterial objects have no tendency to
induce
acceleration, it cannot have been an immaterial object
that slowed down.
But the cause of my leg's moving was
the slowing down of the object with mass w'
.

"7*2.1

Criticisms of Levin's Argument

One criticism of the argument Levin states in the above

quotation is that Levin's insistence that there be one cause
of the
leg

s

moving and that this cause be the immediate physical cause

ignores the role of the nervous system in voluntary motion.

movement of
leg

s

a

The

hamstring muscle may be the immediate cause of my

moving, but this muscle moves in response to neural commands.

These neural commands occur as

a

sequence or series of events which

culminates in an instruction to the hamstring muscle to contract.
The first event of this series or sequence of neural events is as
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important a cause of my leg's moving
as the movement of the
hamstring muscle, even though it is
not the immediate cause.
A second criticism of Levin's
argument is that Levin has taken
a

mechanical principle of motion applying
to bodies with mass and

applied it to the human body which contains
structures whose motion
is not just governed by force and
acceleration,

and signals.

Now that

(p)physical entities,

distinction.

I

I

have distinguished

(s)

but by codes,

rules,

physical from

can state this criticism in relation to
this

The law Levin cites, the law of the
conservation of

energy, is a law of physics that is formulated
in (s)physical
terms.

The laws that govern neuronal interactions are
formulated in

(p)physical terms.

apply to

a

Levin's conservation of energy argument does not

sequence of neural events because whether

and the amplitude of the impulse in not simply

total of the inputs.

Whether

a

a

a

neuron fires

function of the sum

neuron fires depends on the way in

which the neuron integrates and sums its inputs.^

The

conservation of energy argument Levin cites applies to bodies with
mass, and an action potential is not a body with mass.

After stating these criticisms,

which is similar to Levin's.

I

formulated another argument

According to this argument, neural

impulses are generated either by other neural impulses or

spontaneously.

In the former case,

a

neuron receives a large number

of graded potentials or action potentials and either generates a

potential or does not, depending on its threshold and other
factors.

In the case of spontaneous activity,

there is no reason to

263

believe that an Immaterial object
Is the cause.

Hence in neither

case does there appear to be any
explanatory power added by

postulating an immaterial object as its
cause.

Hence, no mental

event plays a causal role in neural
activity.
If this argument appears irrefutable,

it is only because the

conceptions of "mental event" and "physical
event" it employs are
dichotomous and inaccurate.

In Chapter

6

I

distinguished three

conceptions of the physical, and gave three
corresponding
definitions of
entity
(

.

I

is a physical property" and

"x_

”

x

is a physical

called these three conceptions the scientific

(s)physical) conception, the objective

and the personal

(

(( o)

(p)physical) conception.

physical) conception,
I

now discuss how

distinguishing these three conceptions of the physical affects
the

problem of mind-body interaction.

"7*2.2

Levin's Argument Applied to
and (p)physical Entities

(s)

physical, (o)physical.

Levin's original argument purported to show that no immaterial

object could impart mechanical energy to someone's leg.

Levin says

"the energy had to come from somewhere, and not only does it come

from some preceding physical event, no immaterial substance could

possibly supply mechanical energy"."^
(s)

A human leg has impurely

physical properties since it has weight and mass.

A human leg

has impurely (o) physical properties since it can exist independent
of any mind and can be seen or touched by more than one person at
once.

A human leg is impurely (p)physical since it is partially
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specifiable in terms which make reference
to a human being,

it

seems safe to say that it is
essential to a human leg that it
is the
leg of a human being,

some of the (s) physical properties
of

leg are probably essential,

it

a

human

is probably essential to a
human leg

that it have mass and that it contain
certain chemical elements such
as carbon and water.

It is

probably also essential to a human leg

that It can exist independent of a
human mind,

if these (s)physlcal

and (o)physical properties ate essential,
as seems likely, a human
leg IS an impurely (s) physical entity,
an impurely (o) physical

entity, and an impurely (p)physical entity.

Levin's argument against the possibility of
interaction seems

addressed to those properties of
is an (impurely)

energy is

a

a

human leg in virtue of which it

(s)physical entity.

The concept of mechanical

concept of physics, and Levin claims that no immaterial

object can supply mechanical energy to an object with mass.

If we

accept the correctness of the terms Levin uses to phrase his
argument, his argument is correct.

If a mental phenomenon is an

immaterial object, it is difficult to see how

a

supply mechanical energy to at least

(s)

a

purely

mental object could
physical object.

However, a human leg is an impurely (s)physical object, so

consider its non-(

s)

I

will

physical properties in order to determine

whether his argument succeeds.
Levin's argument could be rephrased as an argument purporting
to show that no mental phenomenon can interact causally with an

(o)physical object.

If

we consider an impurely (o)physical object
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as a rock, it seems clear that
only the application of some
kind of physical energy can cause
a rock to be moved.
This energy
si^oh

is (s)physical energy since
it can be uniquely specified
by using

terms of physics.

It takes

(o)physical object.
energy,

(s)physical energy to move an

And no immaterial object can
exert (s)physical

such an argument seems to show the
impossibility of

someone's moving

a chair or a

fork purely by mental concentration.

While such feats have been attempted,^
the correct explanation of
these feats and whether they show anything
is far from clear.

If

the case for mind-body interaction
rests on the ability of some

people to perform these dubious feats, the
case for mind-body

interaction is weak at best.

However, there is one more type of

physical property to consider: (p)physical properties.
Standard examples of mind-body interaction typically
involve
the interaction of

entities.

a

mental phenomenon with one or more (p)physical

A feeling of embarrassment causes my face to
turn red, or

my thought that

I

will move my leg causes my leg to move.

Or, my

feeling of love for someone causes my heart to beat rapidly.

While

my face, my leg, and my heart are all impurely (s)physical and

impurely (o)physical entities, it is the impurely (p)physical

properties of my face, my leg, and my heart that are particularly
relevant to the issue of mind-body interaction.

I

now consider

these (p)physical properties.
I

now repeat my definition of

'(p)physical entity':

'

(p)physical property' and
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P(p).

P(p)'.

E(p).

is a purely (p)physical property
= df. x is a
property and
is uniquely specifiable in“ternis
which only make reference to the
body or to
elements of the body of a person, human
being, or
animal.

ii

is an impurely (p)physical property
= df. x is a
property and ^ is partially but not
completely
specifiable in terms which only make
reference to
the body or to elements of the body
of a person,
human being, or animal.

iL

is a purely (p)physical entity =
df.
x is an
entity and all of x^'s essential propertie’s
are
uniquely specifiable in terms which only
make
reference to the body or to elements of the
body
of a person, human being, or animal.

2^

E(p)'.

is an impurely (p)physical entity = df.
x is an
entity and at least one but not all of x's ~
essential properties are uniquely speciTiable in
terms which only make reference to the body or
to
elements of the body of a person, human being, or
animal.

jc

We can create a conceptual version in the following way:
T(p).

't' is a (p)physical term just in case 't'
refers
to a (p)physical property or a (p)physical entity.

Since both a human brain and a human eye are elements of

human body, both are impurely (p)physical entities.
I

In Chapter 3^

argued that some terms for elements of the human body are defined

by their mental function.

as

a

eye',

Examples are terms for sense organs such

'ear', and 'nose'.

I

also stated that if scientists were

to study these sense organs apart from their mental function they

would be unable to account for many of their interesting
properties.

Viewing sense organs apart from their mental functions

also strips science of much of its explanatory and descriptive
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ability.

I

now support these claims by considering
an account of

how the eye works.

The visual system is a very complex system
that includes many
structures both in the eye and in different
parts of the brain.
Eric R. Kandel presents

a

schematic diagram of the visual system,

shown in Figure 1-lJ

Pulvinar

Figure 7-1.

A Schematic Diagram of the Visual System
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The following selection is taken from
a discussion by Kandel of
the striate cortex, a structure which plays
a key role in human
.

.

Vision:

8

The structure of the striate cortex is more
complex
than that of the lateral geniculate nucleus.
Large
numbers of cells are arranged in several different
ways.
Most of the input from the geniculate comes in
layer IV of
the cortex and then is conveyed to the critical
layers
above and below.
Paralleling the increase in anatomical
complexity, Hubei and Wiesel found an increase in
complexity of the stimulus requirements needed for cells
to respond.
Small spots of light that are effective in
the retina and the lateral geniculate are not as
effective
in the striate cortex.
To be effective, a stimulus must
have linear properties. .. .It must be a line, a bar, or
something that has a clear edge. Hubei and Wiesel
categorized the cortical cells in area 17 into two major
groups, simple and complex.
Both respond to linear
stimuli. .
Some support for the hypothesis that complex cells are
connected to simple ones comes from the finding by Hubei
and Wiesel that the visual' cortex is organized into narrow
columns (much as is the somatic sensory cortex), running
from about the surface to the white matter. Each column
is about 10-30//m wide and 2 mm deep, and in each column
there are many simple cells with almost identical retinal
position and identical axes of orientation.
In any column
there are also complex cells.
The properties of these
complex cells in a column could most easily be explained
by postulating that each complex cell receives direct
connections from the simple cells in the column. This
finding gives us a completely new insight into the
importance of cortical columns.
In the visual system
columns seem to serve as anatomical devices for bringing
cells together so as to interconnect them and to generate,
by means of these interconnections, a new level of
abstraction of visual information. For example, the
columns allow cortical cells to generate linear receptive
field properties from a geniculate input that responds
best to small spots of light.
The discovery of columns in the various sensory systems
is perhaps the most important single advance in cortical
physiology in the past several decades and has led to a
number of related discoveries.
One can ask: given that
cells with the same axis of orientation tend to be grouped
into columns, how are columns of cells with different axes
of orientation organized in relation to one another?
.

Detailed mapping of adjacent columns
by Hubei and Wiesel
usxng tangential n,ictoele=troda
panetrLlons,

hfa "rvJaUd
Every 20-50>/m,
the electrode encounters a new
column and a shift in axis
of orientation of about IQO
^
In addition to columns devoted
to axis of orientation
there are columns devoted to eye
preference or ocular
dominance (properties related to binocular
interaction)
Hubei and Wiesel have designated the
term
hypercolumn to refer to the whole set of
columns for
analyzing lines of all orientations
from a particular
region in space via both eyes . From
these studies it is
apparent that the striate cortex carries
out two major
unctions: (1) it combines the input from
the two eyes, a
step in a sequence of transformations
necessary for depth
perception; and (2) it decomposes the visual
world into
short line segments of various orientations,
an early step
in the process thought to be necessary
for pattern
discrimination.
Hubei and Wiesel suggest that the interaction
between
simple and complex cells may be important for
the
f^*^^Iowing] issue:.,. the perception of patterns
irrespective of where they fall on the retina. Take
a
vertical line or an object with vertical edges
that is
located in front of you. The vertical edge (or the
line)
will excite a population of simple cells and a
population
of complex ones, each with a vertical axis of
orientation,
A slight (saccadic) movement of your eye or
of the object will call into play a new population
of
simple cells (because these cells are very sensitive to
the exact position of the line in the receptive field).
However, for a small movement the stimulus will still
excite the original population of complex cells (because
these cells are less sensitive to movement within the
receptive field) ....
An unresolved question that is now receiving increasing
attention is, how far can this hierarchy go? (Is there a
grandmother cell?
Is there a group of cells that observe
the hyper-hypercomplex cells and make one aware of the
total pattern?
If so, is there a still higher group in
the hierarchy that looks at combinations of complex
patterns as these enter our awareness?
There may indeed be other higher order cells combining
the computational results of the inf erotemporal,
peristriate, and striate cortices to produce even more
elaborate abstractions.
However, to discern the
relatively simple features we have thus far considered has
already required an enormous proportion of visual brain.
It would appear curious to attribute progressively more
important processing to a relatively small group of cells
of axis orientation.

^

—

)

enormously complex abstraction
Iternative to this supposition
would be that at hiaher
levels the mechanism of
transformation changes, so that
single units no longer serve to
represent featirrstatL
but represent only selected
aspects of the percept

4

To
regri^e
plran^r
activity in cells in
"""
inferotemporal, peristriate, and
stritlT cortices, with the cells
striate
in each area coding for a
particular aspect of the stimulus:
for shape, depth^
'

^

leve/c:ils^“'„a„y

parallel visual areas are likely to
raranel'v'""
be involved, and their
imultaneous activity may serve as the
feature detector.
The states of the parts taken
separately may not represent
'=*’® relationship among
them that
mav
ay be important.
One can draw an analogy to the
individual silver halide grains of a
photograph; these do
not represent the photograph of
a face, but the ensemble
of grains does.
There is in fact some support for this
view.
We have
seen that even as early as the retina,
visual information
IS carried to the lateral geniculate
nucleus and then to
area 17 of the cortex by two parallel
systems, the X and Y
cells.
Moreover, we described area 17 above as
if it sent
one main projection to areas 18 and 19.
Actually, s. M.
Zeki at University College London has found
that area 17
sends five separate projections to area 18
alone.
Zeki
found that the cells in each of the five regions
that
receive input from area 17 have different
functional
properties, a finding that supports the idea that
each
region handles a different aspect of visual
information.
For example, several regions in area 18 contain
cells that
code for color, other regions contain cells that
code for
movement, others still for binocular disparity necessary
for depth perception.
Interconnections among these
various regions could generate a very large variety of
response types suitable for analyzing in almost endless
detail the intricacies of the visual world.

Explaining and understanding the experience of color vision
also requires viewing the visual system in relation to the qualitie
of subjective experience.

The following discussion of color vision

by Peter Gouras illustrates this fact:^

ThLt'for";

r"

has gre:t"s"vlv:r:fire!
^

by a colorLrsuch as
?urtef ToLT"^^
.ilUcn nuances o, conu“a^\\^;,X'/Lf

achromatic rendition of one of
their works
Thi^ h- h
degree of discrimination in
color vision can actually
^ be
understood in quantitative terms.
The subjective
experience of color can be broken
down into
semi-independent sensibilities* 1 huf^' (O'i three
o=
experience is composero^
these three psychological
impressions.
Hue has the strongest effect
on color and is the manor
determinant of principal colors
such as red, yellow
green, _and blue.
It is what we ordinarily
Lin by
color . This impression is
determined by the proportion
in Which the three cone
mechanisms are activated b^hi
object and its background. The
brain must keep trLk of
how much each of the three
photoreceptor systems
detection of an object. Most of
us
hryp^'i
actually about
"
27o%.Tt
I
The second distinct
quaJti
saturation, which reflects how much
a
hn
hue
has been diluted by grayness; this
is determined by
the degree to which all three
cone mechanisms are
stimulated in common by the object and by
the background.
There are about 20 distinguishable
steps of saturation for
each hue.
The third quality of color, brightness
is a sensation
shared with achromatic visual systems.
It is due to the
total effect on all three cone mechanisms
of an object
relative to its background. We shall see
later that one
of the three cone mechanisms (the
so-called blue
mechanism) makes little or no contribution to
brightness.
It is the brightness factor that turns
orange into brown
and gray into black or white.
There are about 500
distinguishable steps of brightness for every hue
and
grade of saturation.
In contrast to achromatic vision
with only 500 steps, color vision has more than
1 million
gradations with which to detect the contours of shapes
in
the external world.... It is no wonder that natural
selection uncovered its power.
By the latter part of the eighteenth century it was
realized that the ability to experience myriad different
colors might not be due to an equivalent number of
detectors in the retina but to a minimum
number three--with every color determined by the
proportions in which each of these three detectors
responds to light.
(

4-

)

.
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The preceding quotations

fron,

Kandel and Gouras show that
in

describing and explaining the visual
system. Including its neural
components, it is necessary to make
use of concepts that contain
a
reference to mental terms. Kandel'
s discussion contains terms
such
as

'shape',

'depth perception'

,

'binocular movement'

Which refer to aspects of visual
experience.

,

and 'color'

Gouras states that

•the subjective experience of
color can be broken down into three

semi-independent sensibilities:
brightness.

(

1)

hue,

(2)

saturation, and (3)

All color experience is composed of
these three

psychological impressions'

.

Even the concept of a visual system

is defined by reference to vision,
which is a mental phenomenon.

Someone who tried to account for the visual
system in terms of only
its (s)physical or (o)physlcal properties
could not explain how the

neural structures of the visual system encode

a

retinal image and

function to make possible the experience of sight.

The neural

structures relating to color vision would be particularly
impossible
to account for using only (s)physical and (o)physical
terms.

It

seems clear, then, that viewing the visual system and its
components
apart from their mental functions strips science of its explanatory
and predictive power.
I

now return to Levin's argument against the possibility of

interaction between mental phenomena and physical entities.

I

have

conceded that Levin's argument may show that mental phenomena do not
interact causally with (s)physical and (o)physical entities.
However,

it is not clear that it shows that interaction between
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cental phenomena and (p)physlcal
entities is not possible.
Earlier
in this chapter^ I formulated
an argument similar to
Levin's
Which purports to show this.
According to this argument,
neural
impulses are either generated by
other neural impulses or
spontaneously,

in neither case is it
necessary to postulate an

immaterial object as a cause.

I

now reconsider this argument
in

light of my discussion of
(p)physioal entitles and (p)physical

propert ies.

The discussion of the visual system
by Kandel and Gouras makes
It clear that some neurons have
properties that are uniquely

specifiable by reference to mental terms.

Kandel says:^^

Several regions in area 18 contain cells
that code for
color, other regions contain cells that
code f or movement
others still for binocular disparity
necessary for depth
perception.

/

These (neural) cells that code for color
have the property that they
code for color.

Likewise, other (neural) cells have the property

that they code for the binocular disparity
necessary for depth

perception.

According to Gouras:^^

has the strongest effect on color and is the major
determinant of principal colors such as red, yellow,
green, and blue.
It is what we ordinarily mean by
color".
This impression is determined by the proportion
in which the three cone mechanisms are activated
by the
object and its background. The brain must keep track of
how much each of the three photoreceptor systems
contributes to the detection of an object.

The three cone mechanisms have the property that the proportion
in
which they are activated by the object and its background determines
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the impression of color the
person experiences.

These examples show

that some (p)physicai entities
have mental properties.

The result that some (p)physical
entities have mental

properties is consistent with the
argument by Davidson which
discussed in chapter

3

I

that every physical event can be
picked out

by a mental description.

1"

if we accept Davidson's view
that an

event is mental if and only if it
can be picked out by a mental
description, the result that some
(p)physical entities such as

neurons have mental properties is even
less surprising.

Presumably

the descriptions given by Kandel and
Gouras can be used to pick out

individual neurons, or at least groups of
neurons.

However, these

neurons will be impurely mental since they are
also (p)physical
entities.
I

now define the terms 'purely mental entity',
'impurely mental

entity',
M(m)

'purely mental property', and 'impurely mental property'.
.

is a purely mental property = df
x is a
property and x is uniquely specifiable in terms
which only make reference to mental phenomena.

2^

M(m)'.

2^

E(m).

2L

E(m)

2L

I

'.

.

is an impurely mental property = df. x is a
property and 2i is partially but not completely
specifiable in terms which only make reference to
mental phenomena.

is a purely mental entity = df.
21 is an entity
and all of 21's essential properties are mental
properties.

is an impurely mental entity = df
21 is an
entity and at least one but not all of 2l's
essential properties are mental properties.

have shown that some

.

(p)

physical entities have mental

properties, and have defined 'mental entity'.

Do some mental
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entities have (p)physical properties?

That this is so follows from

the fact that some (p)physical
entities have mental properties.
a

particular neuron has the property that
it codes for

if

particular
experience of color, then that particular
experience of color has
a

the property that it is coded for
by a particular neuron.

A

particular impression of color has the
property that it is
determined by the proportion in which the
three cone mechanisms are
activated by an object and its background.

Hence mental entities

have (p)physical properties.
It

IS possible to give an independent
argument to show that

some mental entities have (p)physical
properties.

if

i

have

a

toothache, it is a property of this toothache
that it originates in
a

particular tooth.

A toothache originating in a different
tooth

would not be the same toothache even if it is in the same
phenomenal
location.

Since this is so, the property of originating in

a

particular tooth appears to be essential to the toothache's being
the toothache it is.

If this property is essential,

(p)physical property and
entity.

a

it is a

toothache is an impurely (p)physical

If a feeling of love makes my heart beat rapidly on a

particular occasion, then it is

a

property of my experience of

a

feeling of love on that occasion that it makes my heart beat
faster.

basis.

It

is generally believed that thoughts have a neural

Hence if

I

have a thought about my plans for the weekend, a

property of this thought is that it is associated with some series
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of neural events.

These examples show that some
mental events have

(p)physical properties, some essential and
some accidental.
I

now return to Levin's argument as
it applies to the

interaction of mental phenomena and
(p)physical entities.

According

to this argument, a neural impulse is
generated either by other

neural impulses or spontaneously,

in neither case does positing an

immaterial object have any additional explanatory
power.

One

problem with this argument is that it employs an
inaccurate
conception of

a

mental phenomenon: that a mental phenomenon is
an

immaterial object.
properties.

An immaterial object is one with no physical

However,

I

have just shown that some mental phenomena

have (p)physical properties.

It

is the conception of a mental event

as a (purely) immaterial object which is employed in
this argument

against the possibility of interaction which gives the argument its

plausibility since it does not seem possible for an immaterial
object to act on

a

(p)physical entity.

conception of a mental phenomenon is

a

Once we realize that this

misconception, the argument

loses its plausibility.

The conception of "physical entity" this argument employs is

equally misleading.

I

have conceded that the argument has some

merit as applied to interaction between mental phenomena and
(s)physical and (o)physical entities.

However,

(p)physical entities

have mental properties, so they are not purely (p)physical.

Levin's

argument against the possibility of mind-body interaction turns on
the ability to draw a dichotomous distinction between purely mental
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(immaterial) phenomena and purely
physical (non-mental) entitles.

However, this dichotomy is a false
one since some (p)physical

entities have mental properties and some
mental phenomena have
(p)physical properties.

7.3

An Account of Mind-Body Interaction

According to Levin's argument as it applies to the
interaction
of (p)physical entities and mental phenomena, a
neural impulse is

caused either spontaneously or by other neural impulses.
no need to postulate an immaterial object as a cause.

There is

However, if

the other neural impulses that cause some neuron N to
fire are

themselves aspects of

attribute

a

a

mental phenomenon, then it is correct to

causal role to the mental phenomenon.

For example, in

the case of intentional action, the neural patterns associated with

my decision to move my leg initiate the neural activity necessary to

carry out this action.
neurons.
a

This consists in sending signals to motor

My thought that

I

will move my leg has a neural aspect and

phenomenal aspect, and the neural aspect of my thought initiates

the neural activity required for moving my leg.

When

a

mental entity such as

a

thought acts on the brain or

initiates a neural event, the neural aspect of the thought acts on
some other neural aspect.

This second neural aspect may or may not

have an associated mental aspect.

When someone is engaged in

continuous thought, neural aspects associated with thought are
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continuously generating other neural aspects
associated with other
thoughts.

When someone forms an intention to raise
his arm, on the

other hand, the resulting neural activity
may be a signal to the

motor cortex to initiate arm-raising.

This motor cortex activity

need not have mental aspects.

We can picture this as follows:

"2

causes

No

^

2

/

Figure 7—2.

A Diagram of Mental— Physical Interaction

^2

In the above diagram,

and neural aspect N^.

aspect N

is a thought having mental aspect
is a different thought having neural

and mental aspect M

.

The neural aspect N
1

initiates causal neural activity, e.g. by firing an action

potential, resulting in neural state
of thought T^.

a

neural aspect

In this way, through its neural aspect, a thought

can act directly on the brain.
for

which is

As

I

said above, there is no need

to be an aspect of a mental event.

Neurologists still do not fully understand all the neurological

mechanisms of voluntary movement, but there have been many studies.
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One especially interesting account of several studies
is given by

Claude Ghez, and it bears full citation:^^
In voluntary movements pyramidal tract and rubrospinal
neurons start firing 20-50 msec before any sign of muscle
contractions, but other groups of neurons fire earlier.
The activity of neurons in the basal ganglia and the deep
cerebellar nuclei precedes the activity of neurons in the
motor cortex and red nucleus.
During many voluntary
movements activation of the basal ganglia and deep
cerebellar nuclei represent the end result of complex
processes that start hundreds of milliseconds earlier.
Kornhuber and his collaborators in Germany have shown that
changes in the potentials recorded from the human scalp
over the motor cortex begin about 800 msec before a
voluntary finger movement [Figure 7-3]. Although the
mechanisms producing these potentials remain
controversial, their occurrence underscores the fact that
activity in the nervous system begins long before movement
is actually performed.
During this period the central
nervous system is thought to set up a program which
specifies how its neurons will respond to a stimulus.
Evarts and Tanji have investigated this program by
recording the discharges of pyramidal tract neurons in
monkeys that were trained to perform one of two different
responses according to a preceding signal when a sudden
perturbation was delivered to a handle that they were
holding [Figure 7-4]. The instruction to either push or
pull the handle was given by illuminating one of two lamps
The signal to move was a sudden
in front of the animal.
jerk either toward or away from the animal, produced by a
motor attached to the handle itself. Pyramidal tract
neurons were recorded in the motor cortex and the
direction of limb movement with which the unit increased
its activity was also determined.
Two interesting observations emerged from these
First, the instruction itself elicited
experiments.
in activity in the neuron according to
changes
different
called for. The effects also
movement
the direction of
muscle groups whose contraction
the
differed according to
For example, a
was associated with activity in that cell.
when the
active
pyramidal tract neuron that was phasically
activity
animal flexed its arm showed tonic increases in
after the instruction to pull (i.e., to contract the
flexor muscle) was given. This change in neural activity
was, however, not associated with any change in muscle
Second, the perturbation delivered to the
activity.
handle, constituting the signal to move, elicited two
distinct bursts of discharge in the same neurons. The
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first burst, termed the reflex discharge
occurred
whenever the biceps was stretched by sudden
movement of
the handle.
This burst of activity is merely the result
of the stimulus applied to the receptive
field of the
neuron, a reflection of a feedback system
similar to that
described by Asanuma. The later burst (appearing
at a
latency of about 50 msec), termed the intended
discharge
was contingent on the instruction. The intended
discharge
occurred when the animal was instructed to pull (i.e.,
contract biceps); the discharge did not occur when the
animal was to push. This intended discharge actually
produces the intended response to the stimulus. The fact
that its occurrence is dependent on context suggests that
the sensory input can be gated through the pyramidal
tract
neurons by neuronal events set in motion by the
instruction.
The instruction is thought to put the
nervous system in a specific state or voluntary set
It is thought that the relationships between stimulus
and response that are appropriate to a given context or
instruction are established during an initial stage of
learning.
The learned relationship determines which
muscle groups should contract and how much contraction
should occur relative to the locus and the intensity of
stimulation.
Once learned, the instruction signal puts
the nervous system into the appropriate set, which in turn
operates on a neural gate and enables sensory inflow to be
channeled to the proper muscles. One of the principal
reasons for invoking a gating mechanism is that the
interval between the handle jerk and the intended
discharge of the cortical neurons is very brief. Recent
experiments suggest that similar mechanisms operate in the
quickest responses we make to any stimulus be it visual,
cutaneous, or auditory.
,

,

.
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Potentials Recorded Before

a

Voluntary Finger Movement
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Push

Pull

Figure 7-4.

Cortical Activity Prior to Voluntary Movement

There are several points worthy of note about the preceding
quotation.

First, Ghez says "the instruction itself elicited

different changes in activity in the neuron according to the

direction of movement called for".

This can be viewed as the

neurological aspect of the understanding by the monkey of what he is
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to do.

Secondly, the burst of neural activity
termed the intended

discharge is the neurological aspect of the
intention to pull the
handle.

Third, according to Ghez, learning "determines
which muscle

groups should contract and how much contraction should
occur
relative to the locus and intensity of stimulation.

Once learned,

the instruction signal puts the nervous system into the
appropriate
set".

that

Ghez also cites the studies of Kornhuber et al., which
show

changes in the potential recorded from the human scalp begin

about 800 msec before a voluntary finger movement".

This activity

may be regarded as the neurological aspect of the initial

contemplation or consideration of the action (thinking about it).
The preceding study shows that thinking about something,

forming the intention (deciding) to do it, and proceeding to do it
is not an instantaneous action but is rather a complex neurological

and intentional process which occurs over a period of time.

Furthermore, it also shows that accomplishing such

a task

involves

relying on neurological coding which takes place during earlier
learning.

By viewing these neurological aspects as aspects of a

complex process containing neurological, intentional, phenomenal,
and subjective aspects we can explain how thoughts and decisions can

interact with neurological processes.

If we instead view thoughts

and decisions as completely distinct entities from neurological

processes in the manner of dualism, we cannot explain interaction.
Complex patterns of neural states have phenomenal aspects and

a

person learns by experience what neural patterns produce what mental
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phenomena and learns by experience how
to produce these neural
states.

Speech and thought seems automatic
until we try to speak

another language or watch a child learning
his first words.

The

commands which must be issued by the cerebral
cortex to the mouth

muscles are very complex and must be learned
through trial and error
and through imitation.

There are "command" neurons in the cerebral

cortex whose function is to issue motor commands
and commands of
other types to other elements of the nervous
system.

The signals to

these "command" neurons originate in other areas
of the cerebral
cortex.

A person can issue these signals by exerting
a kind of

internal effort, but we must learn what effort will
produce what
results.

Learning to use our brains, like any other conscious

activity, takes attention and experience.
It might be that the states

and N

Figure 7-2 can be functionally defined.

2

in the diagram in

For example,

might be

"the complex pattern of neurons which has as its phenomenal aspect

the sound of the word 'Fire'".

producing

The brain then calls

a

routine

which could be "the complex pattern of neurons which

has as its phenomenal aspect the sound of the word 'Run'".

One

could define other neural states according to their mental function,
including neural states which issue certain specific signals to the
"command" neurons in the cerebral cortex such as "Raise the right
arm".

In this way, one could give a functional analysis of the

brain , not of the mind , and define these functional neural states by
reference to mental phenomena.

Such a view is not

a

reintroduction
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of parallelism, but an account of
mind-body interaction that uses

functional techniques of analysis to show that
mind and brain do not
form a dichotomy but rather are aspects of
one another.
The account of interaction

I

have given applies only to mental

phenomena with (p)physical aspects.

If there is a mental phenomenon

with no associated (p)physical aspects, my account
does not explain
how such a phenomenon can interact with (p)physical
entities.

Because such a mental phenomenon would be one with no
neural or
(p)physical basis, it is doubtful whether there are any such
mental

phenomena.

If one construes the phrase

'mental phenomenon'

broadly

so as to include phenomena such as sentence meanings
(intensions) or

particular features of mental experience such as the intensity of
anger or fear, these intensions or mental features may not have

a

particular (p)physical entity or property associated with them.
However, it is not clear that an intension can interact with a

neural event, and in the case of the intensity of fear or anger the

interaction is between the fear or anger itself and the neural event
or entity; we do not have to say that every feature of the fear or

anger also interacts with
The view
a

I

a

neural event or entity.

advocate is not

a

form of parallelism.

According to

parallelist view, mental states and brain states are distinct and

they occur parallel to each other.

According to the view

I

advocate, neural and other (p)physical entities are properties or

aspects of mental states and hence it is correct to attribute

a

causal role to the mental phenomenon in virtue of the causal action

286

of Its neural aspect.

We often attribute a property to

based on the action of one of its
aspects.

a

whole

For example, we might

say -The water in Reading makes me
thirsty- when it is the sodium in
the water that causes the thirst.

Or, we might say -That car is

making a lot of noise- when it is the car's
exhaust system that is
making the noise.

In both of these examples we attribute
a causal

role to an entity in virtue of the action of
one of its aspects.

Likewise, the neural aspect of a mental phenomenon
acts causally on
the brain and we can attribute a causal role to the
mental

phenomenon in virtue of the action of this neural aspect.

This view

is not parallelism because a parallelist would deny that
mental

phenomena have (p)physical aspects and that (p)physical phenomena
have mental aspects.

7.4

Similar Accounts

The account of interaction

I

have just presented and the

multi-aspect view it depends on is not entirely novel.

Jack

Ornstein develops a multi-aspect view of mind in his book The Mind
and the Brain:

A Multi-Aspect View .

According to Ornstein, an

adequate analysis of a subject's being in pain must take five
aspects into account:

16

An adequate analysis of the subject's being in pain
however, would have to take into account the following
aspects or features: experiential, neural, bodily,
behavioral and verbal.
,

Ornstein then describes each of these aspects:^^

The experiential aspect: This is the
felt quality or
the sensation of pain— the "raw feel"
as it has sometimes
been called.
It is what one experiences or feels
when one
IS in pain.
This is the feature of pain which leads us
to
call pain a 'mental' process,
it is because this feeling
or sensation could not exist unfelt or
unsensed that we
call it 'mental'. That is, it could not be
truly said to
—
unless it were sensed; "I am in pain but I am
not
aware of the pain" is self-contradictory.
It could not
exist unless it existed as an aspect of consciousness.
The neural aspect: These are the brain processes
which
we have granted to be invariably correlated and
concomitantly variable with specific experiences. As
neurophysiologists will readily admit, extremely little is
known about how the brain operates and very little
investigation has been conducted into the phenomenon of
pain.
However, it was thought that criticisms of, and an
alternative to, the Identity Theory, would be more readily
accepted if as much as possible were granted to it.
The firing of the neurons in question, then, has been
conceded to be necessary and sufficient for the occurrence
of the experience.
If the appropriate neurons were not
firing in X's brain, and the rest of his body, then he
would not be having this experience.

Bodily aspects of pain: An example of this aspect would
be X's decayed tooth.
Of course a decayed tooth is not,
properly speaking, an aspect of mind
It is, however,
very often a feature of toothaches states which are
characteristically mental in the senses outlined above.
Thus the bodily aspects of being in pain are part of our
concept of pain. When someone is in pain we naturally
assume that there is something wrong some physiological
irregularity due to damage or disease which is the source
of the pain.
We naturally assume it because there
characteristically is something amiss physiologically when
one is in pain.

—

.

—

The behavioral aspects: This is an aspect of mind.
That is, we often do refer primarily to someone's behavior
when we speak of his mind, e.g. "He has a good mind".
However, .. .consciousness is a sufficient condition for the
presence of a mind. If a person were conscious but unable
to behave at all due to complete paralysis, we would still
say that he had a mind.
In fact, even if we allowed that
a computer or a robot "behaved" in many ways as a man, we
would not say that it had a mind if we know that it was
not capable of being conscious.
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Behavior, then, is often what we are referring
to when
we speak of someone's mind. But we usually
are referring
in such cases not merely to what the person
did or is
doing but also to what he is capable of doing.
The verbal aspect; This is not what X feels,
not what
is occurring in his brain, not what happens
to him and not
what he does--it is what he says.
It may be objected that
verbal behavior is just a species of behavior and,
therefore, that it should not be classified separately.
I think, however, that the verbal
aspect of pain merits
separate classification.
It is the one aspect of pain
which is uniquely human. The other animals share with man
all the other features of pain.
Only man verbalizes his
pain.

These, then, are the five aspects or features of being
experiential, neural, bodily, behavioral and
The first two aspects are the sine qua non of
pain but some or all of the last three are
characteristically present. Pain involves neither solely
neural processes nor solely an experience.
It is
conceivable that someone could possess the latter of these
features without the other but so far as we can tell this
could never occur. Neither, of course, is pain solely
behavior. Once it is learned that pain always has a
neural component, any theory which identifies pain with
actual and potential behavior is rendered untenable.
To say that one or the other of these five aspects is
what pain (or the mind) really is, is to ignore the other
four aspects.
Identity theorists ignore all but the
neural aspect. Cartesian Dualists deny all but the
experiential aspect and Behaviorists deny all but the
behavioral aspect.
in pain
verbal.

—

Ornstein does not to my knowledge address the problem of
mind-body interaction.

However, his view that a mental phenomenon

such as pain has a neural aspect is consistent with the view

present above.

I

He also believes that mental phenomena have a

bodily, a behavioral, and a verbal aspect.

While

I

have not made

this claim, and will not defend it here, such a claim is clearly in

the spirit of the account

I

have given of mind-body interaction.

Ornstein's view is similar to the view

I

present in that he rejects

the claim that the mind-body distinction
is a dichotomy and

recognizes that mental phenomena have (p)physical
(neural and
bodily) aspects.
G.d. Wassermann presents an account of mind-body
interaction

that resembles the one

himself to be defending

give.

I

a

Interestingly, Wassermann takes

view he calls materialistic dualism.

Wassermann states this view as follows:^^
^^terialistic dualism is a metaphysical doctrine, which
hypothesizes that in addition to physical properties some
or conceivably all components of matter are endowed with
mental properties, and that the conceptual modes of
symbolizing physical properties of matter could never
suffice for symbolizing its mental properties.

Wassermann states his view of interaction as follows:^^
An antimaterialist cynic might ask how anyone could
theorize about brain representations of, say, visual
images, without having consciously experienced such an
image, so that his conscious experience of images has a
bearing on his theorizing. To this one can simply reply
that it is our physical brain representations of
theories--and not our conscious experiences of visual
images--that lead us to theorize about brain
representations.
Let us also return to the apparent
dilemma, mentioned earlier in this section.
It concerned
the problem of how people could claim to be consciously
aware of something without their conscious awareness
"causing" the claim to be made. This, however, poses no
problem for the materialist when it is recognized that the
conscious awareness of anything could be associated with a
specific physical state of a particular brain
structure. .. .This awareness-related brain state could then
become associated with appropriate brain representations
that encode verbal claims, leading thereby to a verbal
In this case, however, it
claim of a conscious awareness.
is not the awareness that "causes" the activation of the
brain representation of the claim of that awareness.
Instead it is the brain representation that is associated
with the conscious awareness that causes the brain
representation of the claim of that awareness to be
activated.
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Here Wassermann states a view very similar
to the one

I

advance

above. Instead of supposing that conscious
awareness considered as a

purely mental phenomenon with no physical aspects
causes someone to
make a verbal claim, he supposes that the
awareness-related brain
state becomes associated with brain representations
that encode
verbal claims, leading to a verbal claim of conscious
awareness.

Wassermann does not make the further claim that the brain
state is
an aspect of conscious awareness as

quite similar to the one
In his recent book,

I

I

do, but still his account is

present.

Intentionality

20
,

John Searle presents an

account of interaction that resembles the one

I

have given.

Searle

makes use of the notion of "levels of description" in stating his
view:

21

But this model of "caused by" and "realized in" only
raises the next question, how can Intentionality function
causally? Granted that Intentional states can themselves
be caused by and realized in the structure of the brain,
how can Intentionality itself have any causal efficacy?
When I raise my arm my intention in action causes my arm
to go up. This is a case of a mental event causing a
physical event.
But, one might ask, how could such a
thing occur? My arm going up is caused entirely by a
series of neuron firings. We do not know where in the
brain these firings originate, but they go at some point
through the motor cortex and control a series of arm
muscles which contract when the appropriate neurons fire.
Now what has any mental event got to do with all of this?
As with our previous questions, I want to answer this one
by appealing to different levels of description of a
substance, where the phenomena at each of the different
levels function causally; and as with our previous
question I want to make clear the relations involved by
considering completely banal and unproblematic examples.
Consider the explosion in the cylinder of a four-cycle
internal combustion engine. The explosion is caused by
the firing of the spark plug even though both the firing
and the explosion are caused by and realized in phenomena
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at a microlevel, at which level of description
terms like
firing and "explosion" are entirely inappropriate.
Analogously I want to say that the intention in
action
causes the bodily movement even though both the
intention
in action and the bodily movement are caused
by and
realized in a microstructure at which level terms like
intention in action" and "bodily movement" are
inappropriate. Let us try to describe the case a little
more carefully and again it is not the particular case
or
its details that matter but the type of relations that
are
exemplified. The aspect of the spark plug firing which is
causally relevant is the rise in temperature in the
cylinder between the electrodes to the kindling point of
the air fuel mixture.
It is this rise in temperature
which causes the explosion. But the rise in temperature
is itself caused by and realized in the movement of
individual particles between the electrodes of the spark
plug. Furthermore the explosion is caused by and realized
in the oxidization of individual hydrocarbon molecules.
Diagrammatically it looks like this:

ll
rise in temperature

l2
explosion in
cylinder

causes

causes and realizes

movement of individual
electrons between
electrodes

causes and realizes

causes

.

oxidization of individual
hydrocarbon molecules

The phenomena at
and
respectively are the same
phenomena described at different levels of description.
For that reason we could also draw diagonal arrows showing
that the movement of the electrons causes the explosion
and the rise in the temperature causes the oxidization of
hydrocarbon molecules.
Though we know very little about how intentional action
originates in the brain we do know that neural mechanisms
stimulate muscle movements.
Specifically they stimulate
calcium ions to enter into the cytoplasm of a muscle
fiber, and this triggers a series of events that result in
These cross
the movement of the myosin cross bridges.
bridges connect myosin filaments to actin filaments. They
alternately attach to actin strands, exert pressure,
detach, bend back, reattach and exert more pressure. This
contracts the muscle. At the microlevel then we have a
sequence of neuron firings which causes a series of
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physiological changes,
action is caused by and
and the bodily movement
resultant physiological
formally similar to the
engine

ll
intention in action

At the microlevel the intention in
realized in the neural processes,
is caused by and realized in the
processes. Diagrammatically it is
diagram of an internal combustion

causes
^

l2
bodily movement

cause and realize

cause and realize

individual neuron
firings

physiological changes

Notice that on this model, as with our earlier model, we
could also draw diagonal arrows which in this case would
show that the intention in action causes physiological
changes and that the neuron firings cause bodily
movements.
Notice also that on such a model the mental
phenomena are no more epiphenomenal than the rise in
temperature of the firing of a spark plug.
Let us now return to our 'dilemma*. The first horn
claims that if we think of the relation between the mental
and the physical as causal we are left with a mysterious
I
notion of causation.
have argued that this is not so.
It only seems so if we think of mental and physical as
naming two ontological categories, two mutually exclusive
classes of things, mental things and physical things, as
if we lived in two worlds, a mental world and a physical
world.
But if we think of ourselves as living in one
world which contains mental things in the sense in which
it contains liquid things and solid things, then there
are no metaphysical obstacles to a causal account of such
things.
My beliefs and desires, my thirsts and visual
experiences, are real causal features of my brain, as much
as the solidity of the table I work at and the liquidity
of the water I drink are causal feature of tables and
water.

Searle's account appeals to the notion of "different levels of

description of

a

substance".

On his view, a description of the

neural state associated with an intention occurs at

a

different
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l6Vel of description than a description of the intention.

discussed the notion of

a

level of description in Chapter

context of a discussion of Dennett.

provide

a

I

There

I

4

in the

was not able to

very complete account of this notion.

However, Searle's

use of this phrase seems very similar to my use of the phrase

conceptual domain', which derives from Davidson.

I

see no reason

why Searle's claim could not be formulated as a claim about

different conceptual domains, with

a

unique level of description

being roughly equivalent to a unique conceptual domain.
so,

If this is

his account of interaction is very similar to the one

presented with the (p)physical (neural) aspect of

a

I

have

mental

phenomenon causing other (p)physical (neurological) changes.
Searle's view of the relation between

a

neural state and an

intention is that individual neural firings cause and realize the
intention.

While

Searle's view is

I

a

have not discussed this relation in detail,

promising way to analyze this relation.

Searle also criticizes the view that 'mental' and 'physical'
name two ontological categories that are mutually exclusive.

He

appears to endorse the view that a mental phenomenon together with
its neural aspect form a single substance.

On this view, the neural

aspect of an intention is as much a part or element of an intention
as its phenomenal aspect.

It

is the neural aspect of the intention

that acts causally on the brain.

By rejecting the conception that

the mental-physical distinction forms

dichotomy, such

a

a

mentally exclusive

view can account for mind-body interaction.
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7.5

Viewpoint Pluralism

The account of mental and physical phenomena and of mind-body

interaction

I

present preserves the insights of dualism,

materialism, and functionalism while rejecting features of those
theories which make them untenable in their current form.
I

present preserves the insight of dualism that there is

The view
a

mental-physical distinction, though this distinction is not

a

dichotomy and is a distinction of aspects and conceptual domains.
It preserves the insight of materialism that neural activity plays a

causal role in mental phenomena.

It preserves the insight of

functionalism that it is useful to take
brain.

According to the view

by their mental function.

I

a

functional view of the

advocate, brain states are defined

Because the key feature of this view is

its plural aspect analysis of mental and physical phenomena,

it

is a

plural aspect view.
I

have not disussed pluralism of entities or aspects in this or

in preceding chapters in any detail.

However, in Chapter

1

I

took

note of Spinoza's plural attribute view and Leibniz's pluralism of

viewpoints.

Spinoza's use of the term 'attribute' was similar to

our contemporary use of the term 'property'.

I

have spoken of

pluralism of aspects, which seems to introduce still another term to
describe the same phenomenon.

However, the term aspect does have a

unique meaning apart from 'attribute' and 'property'.

The term
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'aspect', unlike either 'attribute' or
'property', contains a

reference to the idea that something is perceived
from
view.

An aspect of x can be defined as a property
of

a
x

particular
as perceived

from a point of view:
V.

A is an aspect of x just in case A is a
property of x
as perceived from a particular point of view.

This definition of 'aspect' provides

a link

between Spinoza's

plural attribute (property) view and Leibniz's pluralism
of
viewpoints.

If an aspect of x is a property of x as seen from
a

particular point of view, then it should be possible to perceive
different aspects of an entity by changing points of view of the
entity.

For example, changing one's point of view of a house allows

one to perceive its different sides,
its outside and inside.

its different colors,

and both

Conversely, an entity that has many aspects

is one that can be perceived from many points of view.

Principle V

thus allows us to provide a link between a plural aspect view and

pluralism in points of view.
I

cannot fully explicate the link between aspects and points of

view here.

However, there is another connection between the notion

of viewpoint and the concept of a conceptual domain as Davidson

introduces it and as

I

have used it in preceding chapters.

I

stated

that the (s)physical domain includes at least the following elements:
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I

1.

Logical terms ('and',

2.

Mathematical terms ('number', 'line', 'point', etc.).
The mathematics chosen can be governed by
pragmatic
considerations.

3.

Syntactic rules.

4.

(s)physical terms which are descriptive.
nouns, verbs, adjectives, or adverbs.

'or',

'if, etc.)

These can be

gave similar definitions of the (p)physical and (o)physical

conceptual domains.

I

argued that these constitute three distinct

conceptual domains.
My definition of the

(s)

physical domain may appear to be

incomplete in that it does not contain
meaning of the term

'( s)

physical'

.

a

specification of the

In Chapter

6

I

defined the

notion of an (s)physical term as follows:
T(s)

I

't' is an (s)physical term just in case 't' refers
to some (s) physical property or (s) physical entity.

defined the notions of

"

(s)

physical property" and "(s)physical

entity" as follows:
P(s).

is a purely (s)physical property = df.
is a
property and 2L is uniquely specifiable in terms
from only the languages of physics and chemistry.

P(s)'.

is a uniquely (s)physical property = df.
is
property and ^ is partially but not completely
specifiable in terms from only the languages of
physics and chemistry.

E(s).

E(s)

'.

a

is a purely (s)physical entity = df.
is an
entity and all of ^'s essential properties are
purely (s)physical properties.

2^

is an impurely (s)physical entity = df.
entity and at least one but not all of j^'s

2^

JL

essential properties are (s)physical properties.

^n
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The above five definitions are implicit
in the specification of
the conceptual domain

I

gave above (conditions

conditions implicitly rely on

a

1-4)

conception of what an

in that these
'( s)

physical

term is even though this conception is not
explicitly stated.

conjoin conditions

1-4

If we

with the above five definitions we have

a

more complete specification of the (s)physical
conceptual domain.
This specification explicitly states what an
(s)physical term is.

One way to describe this is by saying that it
formulates a

membership condition for the class of (s)physical terms.
It should be possible to state such a membership
condition for

every conceptual domain that can be specified in a way that

parallels my specification of the (s)physical domain.

My

specification of this domain relies on the notion of (s)physical
terms.

It should be possible for any parallel specification of a

conceptual domain to provide definitions that state the meaning of
term which is relied on in this way.
of

'

(

p physica 1
)

'

and

'( o)

physical'

.

Thus,

I

a

also give definitions

In light of the preceding

paragraph, we can say that it should be possible to specify

a

membership condition for any conceptual domain that can be specified
in a way that is parallel to my specification of the (s)physical

domain.

When a conceptual domain includes

a

specification of

a

membership condition as specified in the preceding paragraph,
say that this conceptual domain expresses a point of view.

I

will

The

point of view of the (s)physical domain is that some entities have
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properties that can be uniquely specified in terms from
only the

languages of chemistry and physics.

While

I

cannot fully defend or

explicate this notion of a point of view and its relation to

conceptual domains in this chapter,

I

believe

I

have said enough to

give a sketch of a position.
If my argument that there are at least three distinct

conceptual domains is correct, and

I

am correct in saying that each

of these conceptual domains can be specified in such a way as to

formulate a unique point of view, it follows that there are at least
three distinct physical points of view in terms of which the world

can be viewed.
(point of view)
I

These, together with the mental conceptual domain
,

constitute four points of view of the world.

believe this argument can be generalized to generate

more full-blooded ontological and conceptual pluralism,

While

a bolder,
I

content

myself here with the conclusion that from these four points of view
one can perceive at least four irreducibly distinct aspects of the
world.

I

call this view Viewpoint Pluralism .

7. 6

I

Summary

began this chapter by considering an argument by Michael

Levin advanced in Chapter

6

against the possibility of mind-body

interaction. Using concepts developed in the second half of Chapter
6,

I

conceded that Levin's argument may provide an argument against

the possibility of interaction between mental phenomena and

299

(s)

physical entities and between mental phenomena
and (o)physical

entities.

However,

I

argued that Levin's argument does not show
the

impossibility of interaction between mental
phenomena and
(p)physical entities.

The basis for this claim is in part that
some

mental phenomena have (p)physical properties or
aspects and that
some (p)physical entities have mental properties
or aspects.

I

then

gave an account of mind-body interaction according
to which the
neural aspect of a mental phenomenon interacts causally with
the

distinct neural aspect of a distinct mental phenomenon.

I

then

cited three writers who have presented views similar to the one
advocate: Jack Ornstein, G.D. Wassermann, and John Searle.

concluded by citing the relation between the view
dualism, materialism, and functionalism.

more general theory that links

pluralism of viewpoints.

problem.

1

I

I

advocate and

then briefly stated a

plural aspect view with Leibniz's

call this theory Viewpoint Pluralism.

I

7.7

In Chapter

a

I

I

I

Conclusion

presented a historical survey of the mind-body

In Chapter 2

I

defended Saul Kripke's dualistic views

against criticisms by Fred Feldman.

Davidson's anomalous monism.

While

Davidson develops such as that of

a

In Chapter
I

3

I

discussed Donald

later utilize some notions

conceptual domain,

I

argued that

Davidson has not established anomalous monism and that there are
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good reasons to doubt that it is true.

In Chapter 4,

I

criticized

Daniel Dennett's defense of functionalism.
In Chapter

phenomena.
Rorty.

5

discussed two criteria for identifying mental

I

The first, incorrigibility, is advocated by Richard

The second, intentionality , is advocated by Roderick

Chisholm.

In the first half of Chapter

6

mind-body interaction and concluded that

discussed the problem of

I

a

conceptual revision in

the notions of "mental" and "physical" is necessary before an

account of interaction can be given.
6,

I

attempted such a revision by distinguishing three conceptions

of the physical.
(

(s)

In the second half of Chapter

called these conceptions the scientific

I

physical) conception, the objective

and the personal

(

(p)

(

(o)

physical) conception.

physical) conception,
In Chapter

7

I

returned

to an argument against the possibility of mind-body interaction

discussed in Chapter

6

I

and showed how distinguishing the three

conceptions of the physical helps given an account of interaction.
According to this account, the neural aspect of
causally on the distinct neural aspect of
I

concluded with

a

a

a

mental entity acts

distinct mental entity.

brief statement of Viewpoint Pluralism.
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FOOTNOTES

1.

Michael E. Levin, Metaphysics and the Mind-Body Problem
(Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1979), pp. 84-6.

2.

Refer to the quotation from Noback and Demarest in Chapter
Section 6.2.

3.

Refer to Chapter

4.

Levin, Ibid., p. 84.

5.

By Yuri Gellner and others.
I have not discussed alleged cases
of mind moving matter, extra sensory perception, or other forms
of psychic phenomena anywhere in these chapters not because I
think that nothing can be learned from them but because those
who are predisposed not to accept their validity are usually
not convinced by these phenomena.
On the other hand, many of
those who are predisposed to accept the validity of psychic
phenomena accept their validity uncritically.

6.

Refer to Chapter

7.

Eric R. Kandel, "Visual System III: Physiology of the Central
Visual Pathways", in Principles of Neural Science ed. Eric R.
Kandel and James H. Schwartz (New York: Elsevier/North Holland,

Section 6.2.

6,

3,

6,'

Section 3.2.

,

1981), p.

237.

8.

Ibid., p.

240, pp.

9.

Peter Gouras, "Visual System IV: Color Vision", in Kandel and
Schwartz, op. cit., p. 253.

243-5,

and pp.

245-7.

10.

Ibid.

11.

Refer to Chapter

12.

Kandel, op. cit. p. 247.

13.

Gouras, Ibid.

14.

Refer to Chapter

15.

Claude Ghez, "Cortical Control of Voluntary Movement", in
Kandel and Schwartz, op. cit., pp. 331-3.

16 .

Jack Ornstein, The Mind and the Brain A Multi-Aspect
Interpretation (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972), p. 122.

7,

3,

Section 7.2.1.

Section 3.4.
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17.

Ibid., pp. 122, 130, 132, 134, 138, 141.

18.

G.

19.

Ibid., pp. 721-22.

20.

John Searle, Intentionality (New York; Cambridge University
Press, 1983)

21.

Ibid., pp. 268-71.

22.

Refer to Chapter 4, Section 4.2.1.

D. Wassermann, "Materialism and Mentality", Review of
Metaphysics 35 (June, 1982), p. 716.
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